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ii.  Notes on transliteration 
Arabic words and names appearing in this paper are transliterated according to the rules of the 
English language edition of Hans Wehr‟s Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic.1  Consequently, 
the feminine ةـ tā⁾ marbūṭa ending, commonly transliterated as a final –ah in English, will 
appear as a sole –a. The morphemes th, dh, gh, kh, and, sh conventionally used in English  to 
represent the Arabic letters , ذ, , , and  have been replaced by ṯ, ḏ, ġ, ḵ, and š, 
respectively, throughout this paper.   
Geographical names 
Words of Arabic origin such as geographical names that have found their way into the 
vocabulary of the English Language has not been transliterated (e.g. Beirut instead of Bayrūt, or 
Mashreq and not Mašriq). Names of Lebanese localities without direct correspondence in the 
English Language are referred to as their Romanized spelling based on Hans Wehr‟s oeuvre in 
addition to the official Standard Lebanese Geographic Name Rules2, For example Zaḥla/Zahlé 
for the town of ‎in the Biqāʿ/Beqaa Valley.  
In some rare cases, Ottoman Turkish versions of geographical names occur in the paper. These 
were transcribed following the practice of the İslam Ansiklopedisi (İA).3 
Proper names of foreign origin  
Especially foreign (i.e. not Arabic) given names will be presented in their original form (e.g. 
Pierre instead of Biyār or Georges instead of Jūrj), while family names and Arabic given names 
follow the general rules for the Romanization of the Arabic language mentioned above. 
However, some Arabic proper names (of mainly historical figures) commonly used in Western 
literatures and media, and whose spellings are thus becoming standard will retain their 
commonly Romanised (mainly French influenced) form as they commonly appear in most 
Western sources. For instance, Cammille Chamoun has not been transliterated as Kāmīl Šamʿūn. 
  
                                                          
1 Wehr, Hans; Cowan, Milton (ed.): A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Urbana: Spoken Language Services, 1994) 
2 Following a conference of Arab experts in geographic naming held in 1971 in Beirut, a special order was published 
regulating the Romanization of Arabic geographic names in the member states of the Arab League. The so called Beirut 
paper with its guidelines in compliance with the English and French writing systems was made official with the UN 
resolution 1972(II/8). For the complete document cf.  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/gegn22wp73.pdf (retrieved 
01.02.2010). The official system for geographic Romanization used in Lebanon is the 1973 variante B du système de 
transliteration de l‟arabe “Beyrouth amendé” which seems to be the French inspired version of the Beirut system. 
3 For a comperative list of possible transliteration systems currently used for Ottoman Turkish cf. Buğday(1999) 2-3.  
7 
 
iii. Notes on Statistical Data 
Although statistical data and figures cited in this paper are retrieved from the official website 
of Lebanon‟s Central Administration for Statistics (CAS), or are borrowed from cited authors, 
they should be taken with caution, since a national census has not been conducted in Lebanon 
since 19324. Consequently, the country‟s religious composition lacks accurate and actual 
statistical figures, thus they are debatable approximations.   
Furthermore, CAS publications seem to ignore the country‟s current administrative divisions 
into governorates (muḥāfaẓāt) and districts/cazas (aqḍīya; sg. qaḍāʾ). Instead, own regional 
divisions are employed that, for instance, treat Beirut‟s southern suburbs (aḍ-ḍāḥīya al-janūbīya) 
as separate entity and partition the south according to the extent of damage caused by the last 
Israeli offensive in 2006. As a result, there is merely one single statistical region, the Beirut 
Governorate that corresponds completely to its official counterpart. Although this paper, as 
most its secondary sources, prefers the use of the official administrative subdivisions by any 
reference, however, statistical data are inevitably had to be based on the CAS system in some 
marked cases. 
 
  
                                                          
4 Feki (2008) 46.  
CAS statistical regions 
NL Northern Lebanon Šamāl Lubnān 
ML Mount Lebanon Jabal Lubnān 
BE Beirut Bayrūt 
DH Southern Suburbs aḍ-ḍāḥīya al-janūbīya li-Bayrūt 
BQ Beqaa al-Biqāʿ 
LS Less damaged South al-Janūb al-aqall taḍarruran 
MS Most damaged South al-Janūb al-akṯar taḍarruran 
 
Official administrative subdivisions 
AK ʿAkkār (Aakkar) 
NL Northern Lebanon Šamāl Lubnan, Liban-Nord 
ML Mount Lebanon Jabal Lubnān, Mont Liban 
BE Beirut Bayrūt, Beyrouth 
BH Baalbek & Hermel Baʿlbakk w-al-Hirmil 
WB West Beqaa al-Biqāʿ al-ġarbī, Ouest-Béqaa 
SL Southern Lebaon Janūb Lubnān, Liban-Sud 
NB An-Nabaṭīya Nabatiyé 
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iv. List of abbreviations   
AUB  American University of Beirut (Al-jāmiʿa al-amīrikīya fī Bayrūt) 
CAS Central Administration for Statistics (Idāra li-„l-iḥṣāʾ al-markazī) 
CERD/CRDP Centre for Educational Research and Development / Centre de Recherche et de 
Développement Pédagogique (Al-markaz at-tarbawī li-„l-buḥūṯ w-an-nimāʾ) 
CRDL Centre des ressources sur le développement locale (Markaz al-maʿlūmātīya li-„t-
tanmīya „l-maḥallīya) 
DAPR Department for Palestinian Refugee Affairs 
LAES Lebanese Association for Educational Studies (Al-hayʾa al-lubnānīya li-„l-ʿulūm 
at-tarbawīya)  
LCA Lebanese Colloquial Arabic, al-lahja al-lubnānīya  
MSA Modern Standard Arabic, al-fuṣḥā  
SIP  Service d‟Inspection Pédagogique, the later Ministry of Education during the 
French Mandate between 1922 and 1926  
SISC Supreme Islamic Shiʿite Council 
UL  Université Libanaise (Lebanese University, Al-jāmiʿa al-lubnānīya), Lebanon‟s sole 
public institution for higher education 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East 
USJ  Université Saint-Joseph (Saint-Joseph University, Jāmiʿat al-Qiddīs Yūsuf) 
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Abbreviations of administrative units 
In order to secure clear arrangement in charts and tables, Lebanese administrative units were 
given abbreviations based on their official French name. First-level subdivisions (i.e. 
governorates or muḥāfaẓāt) are assigned a code composed of two letters, while second-level 
subdivisions (cazas or aqḍīya) have a three-letter code.   
 
  
BH Baalbek-Hermel, Baʿlbakk  w-al-Hirmil (Baalbek Baʿlbakk ) 
BLB Baalbeck, Baʿalbakk 
HRM Hermel, al-Hirmil 
AK Akkar, ʿAkkār (Halba Ḥalbā) 
BE Beirut, Beyrouth, Bayrūt 
ML Mount Lebanon, Mont-Liban, Jabal Lubnān (Baabda Baʿbdā) 
ALY Aaley, ʿĀlayh  
BBD Baabda, Baʿbdā  
CHF Chouf, aš-Šūf  
JBL Jbeil (Byblos), Jubayl  
KSR Kesraouan, al-Kasrawān 
MTN Metn, al-Matn 
LS South Lebanon, Liban-Sud, Janūb Lubnān (Saïda, Ṣaydā) 
JZN Jezzine, Jazzīn  
SUR Sour (Tyr), Ṣūr 
SYD Saïda (Sidon), Saydā 
LN Liban-Nord Šamāl Lubnān (Tripoli Ṭrāblus) 
BTR Batroun, al-Batrūn  
BCH Bcharré, Bišarrī  
KUR Koura, al-Kawra 
MND Minniyé et Dinniyé, al-Minnīya w-aḍ-Ḍannīya  
TRB Tripoli, Ṭarābulus 
ZGH Zghorta, Zaġartā 
BO West-Biqāʿ, Béqaa-Ouest, al-Biqāʿ al-ġarbī (Zahlé Zaḥla)  
BQW Béqaa-Ouest, al-Biqāʿ al-ġarbī  
RCH Rachaya, ar-Rāšayā  
ZHL Zahlé, Zaḥla 
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v. Preface  
History and its narratives 
As a French proverb states, there is no history but historians, while according to the American 
social psychologist Carol Anne Tavris, “history is written by the victors, but it's victims who write 
the memoirs”. In any case, it seems to be agreed upon that history is rather an inherently 
subjective perception than a monolithic fait accompli not allowing multiple – in fact, an endless 
number of – possibilities of interpretations, aspects, layers, or colours. Hence, questioning 
history, a human activity since time immemorial, has not only the simple purpose to learn 
about - and from - the past in the searching for answers to the matters of the present, but also a 
rather profane tool to achieve goals and legitimise actions. After all, history always responds to 
a demand and these demands in most cases reflect the interests of those who scrutinise the 
past. Among the many possible fields where demands grow, and target history with questions, 
is education. Unfortunately, this paper cannot provide the right frame to examine the 
relationship between history and the way it is taught, or presented. As it is well known, history 
– or better said its version declared to be agreed upon, common and seminal by an authority or 
a community –has not just a pivotal role in forming the individual, but also in the creating and 
maintaining of identities, legitimising power and policies, or forming of both internal and 
external relations. As such, the instruction of history is a fundamental and much preferred task 
of any organised form of education, as it both makes the instructed firm in their loyalty and 
allegiance, and resistant to undesirable alternative version, options, or opinions. Hence, 
historical narratives are brilliant tools for the dissemination of ideologies, but at the same time 
they also serve as excellent indicators to detect these ideologies, weltanschauung, or any kind of 
allegiances. It should be illustrated with an example: 
Having received the first buds of my formal education in a post-communist state of the 
former „Eastern Bloc‟, but having a family background anything but loyal to the country‟s 
Soviet-dominated post-WW2 stately ideologies, I have some vivid memories of what is called 
change of historical narrative. My first school years fall to the 1990‟s i.e. when the fall of the 
Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union finally allowed its satellite states to abolish 
the compulsory Marxist-Leninist track from their historical narratives and to rewrite their own 
national history – a version that had been labelled as seditionary and pushed underground 
during the forty years of constructing the socialists‟ dream. Hence, I remember my parents 
being far more excited than me to read the chapters of my school history textbook discussing 
the nation‟s interbellum and post-war history. According to them, what my generation was 
taught as the country‟s rewritten official history, had been referred to as „imperialist 
propaganda‟ and thus was banned from the official narrative back then in their school years. As 
an example, my mother was especially delighted to discover the country‟s bloodily overthrown 
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anti-Soviet upheaval, which had been officially referred to as a „fascist counter-revolution‟ and 
was attempted to be erased from public memory by the former regime, as „national revolution‟ 
with a whole amount of coverage on it in my history manual and a national memorial day 
consecrated to it since 1990.  
From this example – which is surely not a unique one – it is easy to deduct the 
importance, but at the same time also the arbitrariness and versatility, of historical narratives 
as well as the possibilities that an analysis on narrative changes and differences has to offer. 
Consequently, with the change of historical narrative its transmitted message, i.e. the identity 
it is intended to support, propagate, or create, it becomes automatically a subject of evolving. 
For instance, the aforementioned example‟s pre-Fall-of-the-Wall narrative was most probably 
foreseen to legitimise Soviet military presence in the country. Hence, history and its 
perceptions, impact on identity, and form as narrative is the first pillar of this paper.  
 
Lebanon and its narratives 
“B-tәtzakkari lammā ʾәltīli, innәk raḥ tәtzawwažīni/bala flūs w-balā bēt /b-tәtzakkari kәnti 
tḥәbbīni, maʿ әnnī miš dēxәl dīnәk/әtzakkari kīf kәnna hēk/әtzakkari lammā әmmәk šefәtni 
nēyim bә-taxtәk/ʾalәt-li әnsa ʿannәk/w-әttifaʾna nḍallna hēk, bala ʾadwār w-ṭәnṭanēt/bala 
kravāt w-ṣobḥīye/bala malāyēn, bala fasātēn”5  
Mashrou3 Laila (Mašrūʿ Laylā): Fasateen (Fasātēn), 2010 
In the search for a second pillar to this paper, or more accurately, a second component serving 
as an example for all what has been said about education and its role as ideological indicator 
and formative power for ideologies, it would be hard to think of a better option than Lebanon. 
Tiny in size but religiously extremely diverse, the country is currently famous for sectarian 
violence, Palestinian refugee camps, and clashes between Ḥizbullāh and the Israeli Defence 
Force. Up until the 1960s, however, the pays des cèdres had a completely different image to 
present. Back then, the country was known as the Switzerland of the Middle East, its capital, 
Beirut, as the Paris of the Orient. Due to its well organised banking facilities the city served as a 
global financial hub – something like a proto-Dubai – bridging the Gulf with the West. Apart 
from these clichés, Lebanon was indeed regarded to be the paradigm of religious tolerance and 
Christian-Muslim coexistence. These perceptions, however, later proved themselves to be 
                                                          
5 In one of its latest songs, Mashrou3 Leila (MSA Mašrūʿ Laylā, Lebanese Colloquial Arabic Mašrūʿ Laila) gives a good 
reflection of Lebanon‟s social and sectarian divides that still coin the society. According to the lyrics of the song 
“Fasateen” (MSA fasātīn, LCA fasātēn, or Dresses), a marriage seeking to ignore religious and financial differences is 
condemned to fail. Mashrou3 Leila – a band of 6 architecture students from the AUB – is a recent figure in Beirut‟s 
progressive alternative music scene. They songs, all written in LCA, often criticise Lebanon‟s social conditions and 
prevailing sectarian structures.  
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nothing more than illusive6. Later after the country‟s submersion in the one and a half decades 
of civil war beginning in the 1970s fought along sectarian lines it generally became clear that 
the „Lebanese model‟ was indeed a fragile and not a viable one. Inter-communitarian fights, 
fuelled both by fears and ambitions regarding the role and the future each sect had and aimed 
to have, inevitably spotlighted the diverging perception these had about the past of their 
respective community, other communities and nonetheless about that of the country and its 
identity. In fact, even after two decades of relative internal peace since the end of the Civil War 
in 1990, national identity in Lebanon remains a contentious issue across many spheres of 
society, allowing the parallel existence of competing historical memories and self-perceptions. 
Consequently, being miš dāxәl dīnәk, i.e. not belonging to the same religious sect is still an issue 
in Lebanon7 and has still pivotal impacts on many segments of daily life. Due to these 
circumstances, Lebanon‟s modern history and sectarian kaleidoscope produced an exceptional 
microsphere serving as a perfect second pillar for this paper.   
  
                                                          
6 The most prominent example for such a spectacular U-turn has been produced by one of the most distinguished 
historians of modern times, Kamal Salibi (Kamāl aṣ-Ṣalībī). In 1965, his work, „The Modern History of Lebanon“, 
presented his patria as an exemplar of successful cultural integration and peaceful coexistence declaring Lebanon to be 
the best model for the whole region. However, in his new book “A House of Many Mansions”, published following the 
Civil War, he revised his theories providing a fundamentally new perception of Lebanese history interpreting it as a 
concurrence of separate, sectarian-affiliated narratives.  
7 As Lebanon‟s 18 officially recognised religious groups maintain the right to oversee marriage, divorce and 
inheritance, couples from different religions, atheists and those who do not belong to one of the officially recognized 
religions cannot marry in their home country. Moreover, civil weddings are not permitted in the country, bur the 
government does recognise those that take place abroad. The option of removing religious-group classification from the 
national identity cards is only permitted since 1998. “Not at home”, The Economist (03.09.2009)   
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I. Introduction  
In April 2010, Al Jazeera‟s Documentary Channel (qanāt al-jazīra al-waṯāʾiqīya) was the first 
Arab-language television channel to air Lebanese filmmaker Hady Zaccak‟s (Hādī Zakkāk) 
award-winning documentary “Darson fel tareekh” (darsun fī „t-tārīḵ, A History Lesson). The 51 
minute-long documentary examines the question of historical perceptions, national/sectarian 
identities and allegiances and the way these are shaped through the complexity of 
contemporary Lebanese history education. In order to represent a wide spectrum of Lebanon‟s 
private education sector, the director interviewed students - and in a lesser extent, teachers – 
from different Sunni, Shiʿa, Catholic, Evangelical and secular private high schools throughout 
the country. As the documentary reveals, deep sectarian divisions and continual disagreements 
between political factions over the tumultuous series of events that have characterised 
Lebanon‟s more recent history, is still resulting in the complete absence of a unified historical 
narrative including the country‟s post-independence history. In private schools, holding the 
larger stake from Lebanon‟s educational system, the situation is roughly same: although mostly 
following other international (but government-approved) curricula, the myriad of textbooks in 
use in these schools offer varying spins on Lebanon‟s past and forge alternating concepts of the 
country. As the director remarks at the end of the film: “They all [the interviewed students] 
believe in Lebanon, but the concept of Lebanon differs. It becomes more, for example, a Muslim or a 
Christian Lebanon first, and then „the Lebanon.‟”8With their contradicting answers to the same 
questions, Zaccak addresses a crucial problem of the modern Lebanese educational system that 
has, however, far reaching consequences: the plethora of concurring historical narratives and 
the lack of unified national identity as the result of this deep rooting concurrence. 
In line with Zaccak‟s track, this paper is aimed to observe the impact that currently 
available history school textbooks have on the formation of identities and the forge of loyalties 
and allegiances. Furthermore, by providing a comparative analysis of textbook narratives, the 
paper also seeks to detect the ways and manners of persuasion these narratives use to attach 
their readers to the sectarian-affiliated historical perspective they are representing. As it is 
hoped, such a comparison will reveal the main lines of Lebanese history that is agreed – or not 
agreed – upon and at same time it will also underline the extent and layers of disagreement. 
However, the dimensions of such a research project are enormous. Firstly, in order to provide  
as representative a survey as possible, an analysis and comparison of all of those history 
manuals that are currently in use in Lebanon would be necessary. However, as my inquiries at 
relevant offices of the Lebanese Ministry for Education and Higher Education confirmed, a list 
of government-approved textbooks indeed exists, but – according to local officials – is 
„unavailable‟. Moreover, I was also told that due to the lack of recent update and the high 
number of continuously authorised manuals, the official list – that is for these reasons never 
published – would practically be worthless. Consequently, a preliminary research on the 
research subject had to be undertaken, mostly by inquiring at schools and local bookshops 
                                                          
8 Zaccak (2009) 
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selling the textbooks. As a result, an unforeseen complexity and abundance of available 
textbooks took form while posing a number of questions – and problems: 
1) The amount and types of textbooks 
In today‟s Lebanon, the freedom in the conception of history textbooks and in the process of 
their commercialisation has resulted in an extremely high number of manuals available on the 
market and used by the country‟s educational institutions. According to Samīr Jarrār, currently 
there are three different types of school textbooks in Lebanon: governmental (rasmī), private 
(ḵāṣṣ), and foreign (ajnabī). Government textbooks, while being standard in other Arab countries, 
are playing a rather peripheral role in Lebanon. Firstly, as it will be discussed in detail later in 
this paper, Lebanon has neither a central stately history curriculum nor a complete series of 
official history textbooks. Secondly, public secondary schools do not have a leading role in the 
country‟s educational structure. Hence, the incomplete series of governmental schoolbooks, 
published by a governmental organ called CERD (Center for Educational Research and 
Development, Centre de Recherche et de Développement Pédagogique, al-markaz at-tarbawī li-„l-buḥūṯ 
w-an-nimāʾ) is only used in some of the country‟s governmental schools. In contrast, the huge 
array of private textbooks, printed by local publishing houses and written by Lebanese authors, 
are virtually ruling the market and are the most widely spread type. As mentioned before, the 
number of private textbooks currently available is practically impossible to track, despite of the 
fact that they must obtain governmental authorisation. Moreover, the Ministry of Education 
and Higher Education has clear guidelines concerning the basic content of history textbooks. 
This type of textbook includes religious, or sectarian-affiliated as well as secular manuals and is 
freely to be chosen by private schools. Among these textbooks, some are newly published 
editions of years-, if not decades-old works coexisting with more recently elaborated manuals. 
The third type of textbooks, that of the foreign published, are mostly French or English 
languages manuals imported from France or an Anglo-Saxon country and are originally 
designed to fit the needs of local, i.e. not the Lebanese curricular regulations. Consequently, 
these narratives are not including any reference to Lebanon or its history, and as one of 
Zaccak‟s interviewee remarks:  "We started learning history in French. We did not learn about 
Lebanon's history. We learned about the first and second world wars and the French revolution. This 
is what we learned", while another student adds: "We learnt more about the history of Europe and 
the US than the history of Lebanon." However, in order to fit the requirements of the centrally 
regulated Lebanese baccalauréat, schools using such books often provide additional instruction 
of Lebanese history, with or without the use of a Lebanese manual.9 Moreover, as Education 
Minister Bahiya al-Ḥarīrī told in a television interview for LBC, the Education Ministry has no 
supervisory authority over foreign textbooks used in schools, as it is the General Security‟s 
                                                          
9 Jarrār (2007) 473-475. 
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responsibility to monitor such manuals when entering the country.10 According to Jarrār, only 
an extremely small fracture of schools allows the exclusive usage of foreign textbooks.  
Needless to say, this problem has a decisive impact on this paper. To begin with, the great 
abundance and different types of existing textbooks made a selection necessary. Due to their 
marginal numerical share on the textbook market, government as well as foreign textbooks 
were excluded from this research. As mentioned, these two types occupy a peripheral position 
in Lebanon‟s education and only affect marginal stratums of society. Consequently, further 
selection restricts itself on the private type of history textbooks that due to its diversity and 
pivotal importance serves as the most representative field for an analysis. This field, however, 
still accounts for an unmanageable plethora of manuals wherefore another selection shall be 
made. Thus, in order to keep the analysis as representative as possible, the ultimate selection 
includes three sectarian-affiliated manuals representing the country‟s biggest sects: a Christian, 
a Sunni, and a Shiʿi.11 
 
2) The content of textbooks 
In pluralistic societies, the teaching of history is a highly controversial issue. Even countries 
not characterised by inter-communal conflicts, e.g. Switzerland, have to some extent diverging 
narratives coined by one of the nation‟s ethnic or religious communities.12 In these societies, 
the interference of communal or minority identities with a centrally proposed, and hence often 
even hypothetic unitary national identity frequently result in the rivalry of multi-layered, 
parallel or even opponent identities and historical perceptions. Consequently, this competition 
hinders the installation of a unified collective memory among the population. In Lebanon, the 
contention is not only between a proposed official and one minority identity, it is also very 
much coined by an inter-communitarian aspect of competing perceptions. Moreover, this inter-
communitarian disagreement on a unified national narrative and the unconditional persistence 
to sectarian-coined perceptions are also responsible for attacking every attempt to change this 
situation. According to Professor Antoine Misarra, former member of a governmental 
committee in charge of elaborating a unified history program in the 1990s, the program was 
unanimously approved by the Council of Ministers and published in the official paper of the 
republic in June 2000. However, the resulting history book, already printed, was finally not 
allowed to be put on the market because of the heavy protests of all of the country‟s religious 
communities that accused the project for interfering with their internal affairs and violating 
their autonomy guaranteed by the constitution.13 Nevertheless, as Misarra ads, this is not the 
sole problem: “What is labelled „History of Lebanon‟ is in fact the history of one part of Mount 
Lebanon. Other regions are forgotten. Where‟s their history?” In fact, the history of regions such as 
the Hermel, the Biqāʿ or the South does not form part of the so-called official history in 
                                                          
10 NOW Lebanon (07.11.2008)  
11 More information on each textbook is to be found in the second section of this paper.  
12 Abou Moussa (1996) 8. 
13 An-Nahār (2.2.2009)  
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Lebanon. As Misarra argues, Lebanon is not the sole country to have witnessed a territorial 
evolution over time, “it‟s also the case of Switzerland and the USA; however in those countries the 
past of more recently annexed territories is accounted for.” He also remarks that in the last 30 
years, Lebanese historians have made remarkable progress in their work on researching 
Lebanon‟s regional history. Their results, however, have never been used for educational 
purposes.14 However, Lebanese textbooks, private or state-produced, have one thing in 
common: In all of the cases, the taught version of Lebanese history ends at 1946, right after the 
country‟s independence from France in 1943. As Zaccak remarks in an interview concerning his 
documentary: “In this post-colonial world, usually a country‟s history begins with independence. Not 
so in Lebanon, where “it stops with independence”. This anomaly is another result of the society‟s 
deep sectarian divisions and continued disagreements between political factions. These ongoing 
antagonisms permit the instruction of a unified historical narrative that goes past the 
independence and includes the often violent – and thus highly controversial – series of events 
that characterise Lebanon‟s post-independence history. Consequently, information on the 
country‟s post-independence history is only transmitted in informal ways, most importantly by 
parents, the community, or the internet. But as even schools are not free from sectarian 
divisions, other environments outside the classroom often contribute to the reinforcement of 
these divides. As the Zaccak ads, “the problem is what they learn from out of school, from their 
environment. […] What I have discovered is that no one from [each of the] communities really 
knows the other.”15 
 
As the frames of this paper do not allow a complete analysis of a four-year curriculum, the 
focus of this analysis had to be delimited. By searching for the most suitable period, there were 
a number of criteria to keep in mind. Firstly, the period shall have a great impact on all of the 
three communities and thus on the country as a whole too. Secondly, it should also play a role 
in the forging of the proposed Lebanese identity. In regard of these factors, the first half of the 
20th century (from the end of the Ottoman era to Lebanon‟s 1943 independence) seems to be 
the most eligible period for the analysis. As said, it is the last era to be included in the national 
curriculum and embraces such crucial events as the end of the 400 year long Ottoman era, 
Lebanon‟s creation as a separate entity, the imposition of the French mandate, the 
promulgation of the country‟s first constitution as well as independence from France in 1943.  
  
                                                          
14 ibidem  
15 Khourchid (2009) 
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II.1. Structure and methods 
  
The question of Lebanese textbooks has multiple dimensions. Besides being of educational 
nature, it is also a political, social, and sectarian question. Moreover, it not only tackles history, 
but has also an essential influence on the formation of identities. Hence, an analysis 
consecrated to the question of Lebanese manuals must investigate political, social, and 
communitarian aspects, as well as the aspect concerning identity issues. Due to this 
multiplicity, the paper cannot spare to put light on a number of topics necessary for the 
understanding of the complex background of the core topic before proceeding to the analysis 
itself. Therefore, it consists of two major sections.  
The first section is foreseen to provide all the necessary information that reveals and 
underlines the importance, far-reaching roots, and function of textbooks and their narratives. 
Firstly, an overview of Lebanon‟s communities is indispensable. Thereby it is important to 
highlight the educational situation of each religious and ethnic community, and to examine the 
sectarian structure of the Lebanese state. Secondly, as the last comprehensive account on 
Lebanon‟s highly divers educational system dates back to the 1960s, it was essential to give an 
outline of the subject with the inclusion of later developments up until today.     
The second section consists of the analysis itself. The analysed periods are divided into eras, 
mostly overlapping with the division of the textbooks proper. In order to demonstrate 
differences between the three narratives, it was useful to provide a general historical overview 
of the examined era, based on the many works dealing with certain epochs or Lebanese history 
as a whole. Thereby it is worth mentioning that so-called „official histories‟, works of renowned 
scholars and researchers, are also highly contradictory. At some points it was indeed a hard 
task to find a version that was more or less agreed upon by more than two scholars. 
Unfortunately, the extent of these anomalies made taking them into consideration impossible. 
It is of itself a topic that deserves a separate analysis.  
The analysis is closed with a general conclusion; additional documents, tables and maps are 
provided in an annex.  
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I.2 Review of available literature 
Given the complexity of the analysis and multidisciplinary approach concerning its historical, 
sectarian, ideological and identity-related background, there is a large number of valuable 
works to consult on all of these fields. 
Although a relatively recent subject, the significance of historical narratives in creating 
detrimental prejudices and stereotypes of the enemy as well as in bringing a common identity 
into being was recognised as early as at the end of the First World War, when the League of 
Nations started to promote international textbook revision. Since then, research and studies on 
textbooks in general have been gradually gaining in importance, for instance, now there is even 
an own institute, the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (Georg-Eckert-
Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung) in Brunswick (Braunschweig), Germany, that 
promotes research and conferences for the reciprocal study and revision of textbooks in order 
to ensure a balanced, up-to-date and unprejudiced mutual knowledge and understanding 
between different peoples16. Since Abdoljavad Falaturi‟s pioneering study17 on Islam in West-
German textbooks from the 1980‟s (and the end of the Cold War), research gradually started to 
focus not only on textbooks of the former enemy (and thus European) states, but also on those 
from the other shore of the Mediterranean. Following the initiative of this very first approach, 
now there are numerous studies consecrated to narrative analysis of Arab-Islamic nations, 
mainly by emphasising Islamo-Christian relations and representations. Among Arab, or Middle 
Eastern nations, Lebanon is often subject of studies of that kind. The most comprehensive 
example is Abou Moussa Tanos‟ thesis on the role of history education in influencing identity in 
Lebanon18, a massive oeuvre analysing a number of Lebanese history school textbooks – 
including state-created and private titles – focusing on the link between these and the country‟s 
sectarian allegiances and identities.   
Concerning Lebanon‟s history, there are a myriad of works available in all major European 
languages as well as in Arabic, from Western and Lebanese scholars alike. The latest civil war 
(1975-90) resulted in a wealth of published works and studies focusing on modern Lebanese 
history and at the same time emphasised the need for a comprehensive, neutral and non 
sectarian-based history of Lebanon. With its pluralistic approach merging historical, economic 
and social aspects and told through a non-sectarian narrative, Fawwad Traboulsi‟s19 path-
                                                          
16 Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research: History. Electronic publication available on the website 
of the GEI: http://www.gei.de/en/the-institute/history.html (last retrieved 08.03.2010) 
17 Falaturi, Abdoldjavad [Ed.]: Der Islam in den Schulbüchern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Braunschweig: Georg-
Eckert-Insitut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung 1986-1990. 
18 Abou Moussa (1996) 
19 Traboulsi (2007) 
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breaking recent Lebanese history being the most eminent example. I would also like to mention 
Georges Corn‟s inevitable Le Liban contemporain20 that gives a great insight not just into the 
fundamental problems of Lebanese historiography, but also into the many facets of Lebanese 
sectarianism and communitarianism. Earlier œuvres, such as an analysis of Syro-Lebanese 
politics of the interbellum era by Albert Hourani, Zamir‟s monographies on recent Lebanese 
political history, or Kamal Salibi‟s reconsidered Lebanese history are also important and much 
cited sources.        
Being a complex, controversial and much disputed issue, Lebanon‟s education has always 
received much academic attention. Theodor Hanf‟s massive and detailed monograph of the pre-
civil war Lebanese educational situation is the best and most valuable source on this field. Even 
though not being the most recent, Maurice Saliba‟s Privatschulwesen im Libanon21, a study on the 
country‟s private education sector, provides an in-depth analysis on broad historical 
fundament. I would also like to mention Abdullatef Hares‟ dissertation on education and 
national integration22 in Lebanon that gives a well-founded analysis of the obstacles of 
Lebanon‟s educational system providing detailed ideological and historical background 
information. For further studies on various aspects of Lebanese education, communal 
perceptions and curricular difficulties cf. the bibliography list of this paper.   
As for the examination of Lebanon‟s multilayered identities, the topic has continued to generate 
interest by scholars resulting in such truly magnificent works as Kaufman‟s Reviving Phoenicia, 
Pipes‟ Greater Syria on the ideological and political currents shaping the history of this never 
realised ambition, as well as Fabiola Azar‟s unique study on Lebanese communal identity and 
confessional appartenance.  
As regards for the exact subject of this paper, as far as I am informed, no comparative study has 
been published on the Lebanese historical perception(s) of the Mandate era based on textbook-
analysis. For an analysis on the image of the Crusades in Arab history textbooks, Matthias 
Determann‟s final thesis is a useful title, as is Namir Frayḥa‟s23 study on the image of the West 
in Lebanese history school textbooks.  
  
                                                          
20 Corm (2005) 
21 Saliba (1974) 
22 Hares (1985) 
23 Frayḥa (1998-1999)  
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1.4 Notes on Terminology  
At the very beginning of this paper some notes on par excellence historio-geographic, terms 
must be made in order to avoid confusion caused by context-related ambiguities. In the case of 
historical and/or geographic terms it is necessary to distinguish between geographic and 
historical regions; historical or contemporary political entities as well as, in some cases, 
between historic and/or contemporary, mainly not realised concepts, ideas and proposals. 
Syria  
(Arabic , Sūriyā or  Sūrīya; French Syrie)  
In contemporary context, the term „Syria‟ refers to the modern state of the Syrian Arab 
Republic ( , al-Jumhūrīya „l-ʿArabīya „s-Sūrīya; République arabe syrienne), a 
political entity in the Middle East existent since her independence from France in 1946 with 
Damascus as capital. 
In other contexts, however, the same term can refer to:  
Greater Syria (  Sūriyā al-kubrā or  bilād aš-Šām24), sometimes also Natural 
Syria (  Sūriyā  aṭ-ṭabīʿa) or geographical Syria marks both a historical and a 
geographical region stretching across the Levant including prominent urban centres such as 
Damascus, Jerusalem, Aleppo, Beirut and Tripoli. Most commonly, its territory is bordered by 
Anatolia‟s Taurus Mountains in the north, the Mediterranean in the west, the Sinai-Peninsula 
and the Gulf of ʿAqaba in the south-west and the Arabian and Syrian Deserts in the south and 
the west. Thus, it includes the territories of modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories as well as the now Turkish provinces of Gaziantep (Ar. ʿAynṭāb), 
Diyarbakır (Diyār Bakr) and Hatay (Iskandarūn), the latter formerly known as the Sanjak of 
Alexandrette.25  This territory can also be described as the western, mountainous part of the 
ancient Fertile Crescent.26 In a broader (and thus mainly political) sense, Greater Syria can 
refer to the same region extended with Mesopotamia, or modern Iraq and the Sinai Peninsula. 
                                                          
24 „litt. « la région à main gauche », de l„ancien usage arabe considérant le locuteur comme faisant face au soleil levant, 
ayant ainsi la Syrie à sa main gauche et la péninsule arabique, notamment le Yaman (« la région à main droite ») à sa 
droite. Dans l‟usage islamique primitif, l‟expression bilād ash-Shām s‟applique à la zone que l‟usage diplomatique et 
politique appelait au début du XXe siècle la « Grande Syrie » […]. (Bosworth, C.E. et al.: „Al-Shām‟, in: Encyclopédie de 
l‟Islam, vol.IX. Leiden:Brill, 1998, pp.269-293: at p.269.) 
25
 cf. EI2, vol.IX. s.v. Al-Shām 
26 “Running in a semi-circle around the edge of the Syrian Desert is the „Fertile Crescent‟, a belt of cultivable land 
bounding the area of pasturage. It may itself be divided into two parts. The western part is a land of mountain-ranges, 
valleys and plains; this is geographical Syria. The eastern part is a vast plain, created and maintained by the two great 
rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, which run southwards to it, finally meeting and flowing together into the Persian 
Gulf; this is Iraq and Mesopotamia.” Hourani (1954) 6.  
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This concept was mainly advocated by the influential Syrian Social Nationalist Party (and by its 
prominent leader Anṭūn Saʿāda/Antoun Saadé) beginning from the 1930s in order to propagate 
Pan-Syrian ideologies that emphasised the cultural, linguistic and racial unity of the region‟s 
distinctive, „Syrian‟ population and thus, wished to establish a „united Syrian nation‟ within the 
boundaries of Natural Syria.27 Elements of this ideology were adopted by many political forces 
of the Levant, most notably by Syria‟s still ruling Baʿṯ (Baath) régime that never really ceded to 
work on the realisation of its Greater Syrian aspirations.  
It is worth mentioning that despite of its long history, Syria or Greater Syria had never taken 
the form of an independent polity before 1946, but always formed a part of a larger entity 
(such as the Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad or Ottoman Empires) or was fragmented into smaller 
units (like it was during the Crusades or the Mandate period). Consequently, distinct regional 
loyalties and identities have always been hindering to that sort of „national‟ cohesion that is to 
be found in other parts of the Arab world, most prominently in Egypt.   
Ottoman Syria, 1516-1920: Both the territory of modern Syria and that of Greater Syria 
described above came under Ottoman rule in 1516 and remained so until the dismemberment 
of the Ottoman Empire in 1920. During this long period, Syria was initially divided into the 
wilayets28 of Damascus (Şām vilāyeti, Şām-i şerīf vilāyeti or wilāyat aš-Šām) and Aleppo (Ḥalep 
vilāyeti, wilāyat Ḥalab), thereby roughly covering the territory of geographic Syria described 
above. Further divisions, such as the creation of the Beirut wilayet (Beyrūt vilāyeti, wilāyat 
Bayrūt) and the autonomous mutaṣarrifīyāt of Mount Lebanon (Cebel Lübnān müteṣarrifliği, 
mutaṣarrifīyat Jabal Lubnān) and of Jerusalem (Ḳudüs-i şerīf müteṣarrifliği, mutaṣarrifīyat al-
Quds)29 are later developments30 that, however, accelerated the emergence of smaller-scale 
regional cohesions along existing political, cultural or religious lines. So as we see, during the 
Ottoman period, Syria did not exist as political or administrative unit, thus the word refers to a 
number of neighbouring, linguistically predominantly arabophone but religiously 
heterogeneous provinces31 occupying the geographical area known as bilād aš-Šām for locals 
and as Syria for Europeans. The official usage of the term Syria (or Sūrīya) only reappears at 
the beginning of the Ottoman Tanẓīmāt-era in the 1840s; when Ottoman decrees increasingly 
                                                          
27 For a comprehensive description of Greater Syrian aspirations cf. PIPES (1990), an outstanding œuvre about this 
crucial but severely neglected issue.   
28
 As for the Ottoman administrative divisions, on the highest level, the Empire was divided into wilayets, or general 
governments (Ottoman Turkish vilāyet, Arabic wilāya), led by a wali (OT vālī, Ar. wālī) or governor general directly 
appointed by Constantinople. Wilayets were further subdivided into sanjaks or districts (OT sancāğ, Ar. sanjāq), with a 
mutaṣarrif on their peak. Sanjaks were composed of a number of cazas or departments (OT ḳaḍāʾ, Ar. qaḍāʾ) and were 
led by qaymaqams (OT ḳāim-maḳām, Ar. qāʾim maqām), cf. Cooke (1968) 5.  
29 Tüccārzāde (1905) 43. 
30 cf. EI2, vol.IX. s.v. Al-Shām  
31 cf. Corm (2005) 55. 
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start to use the term as a reference for bilād aš-Šām. Finally, in 1865 the Damascus wilayet was 
officially renamed wilāyat Sūrīya by the authorities.32 Its territory however, consisting of 
today‟s southern Syria, eastern Lebanon, Jordan, southern Israel and the Gaza Strip, is not 
correspondent to modern-day Syria.   
French Mandate Syria, 1922-1946, (  al-intidāb al-faransī ʿalā 
Sūriyā  w-Lubnān; mandat français de la Syrie et du Liban): Following World War I Syria was 
made into a distinctive polity, first in the form of Emir Faisal‟s short-lived Hashemite Syrian 
Kingdom in 1920 lacking definite boundaries or international recognition and later as a 
separate entity with distinct, however, arbitrary colonial borders mandated to France according 
to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided the Ottoman Levant between the British and 
the French. The territory of this new Syrian entity under the rule of a (Beirut-based) French 
High Commissioner is not corresponding to that of historical Greater Syria: in addition to 
present-day Syria, its boundaries include modern Lebanon, the in 1967 Israeli-captured 
Golan/Jawlān-Hights as well as the province of Hatay, the former Sanjak of Alexandrette ceded 
to Turkey in 1939. Hence, the novel „French Syria‟ found herself delimited from her “southern 
Syrian”33 territories which became the British mandatory states of Palestine and Transjordan 
(the later State of Israel and the Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 
and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, respectively). Additionally, following the immediate 
separation of Greater Lebanon, this newly established “Smaller Syria” was further partitioned 
into semi-autonomous petty statelets by the French Mandatory, viz. the State of Aleppo (État 
d‟Alep, dawlat Ḥalab); an ʿAlewite State (Territioire des Alaouites, dawlat al-ʿAlawīyīn) centred in 
al-Lāḏiqīya; the State of Damascus (État de Damas, dawlat Dimašq) and an as-Suwaydāʾ-centred 
Druze State (État Druze, Jabal ad-Durūz), forming  a so-called “fédération des États Syriens”.34 
Hence, in a context concerning the Mandate period, the term Syria corresponds to this French-
made conglomerate of artificial formations.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
32 Havemann (2002) 124. 
33 According to Pipes, before their existence as distinctive political or administrative entities, Palestine, the later 
Transjordan and occasionally even the Sinai Peninsula were often referred to as „southern Syria‟ by Europeans well up 
until the late 19th century. (Pipes (1990) 14.) 
34 cf. EI2, vol.IX. s.v. Al-Shām 
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Syrian  
(Arabic  sūrī or  šāmī; French syrien) 
Contrarily to the many layers marked by the term Syria as well as the absence of a well 
distinguishable Syrian entity before 1920, the adjective Syrian does not necessarily correspond 
with the existing or obsolete historic, geographic or cultural entities listed above. Although in 
historical sense, the adjective Syrian can denote appartenance to historic Greater Syria (such as 
in the case of the Syrian Protestant College, the predecessor of the American University of 
Beirut in present-day Lebanon), due to strong and deep-rooting ethnic, religious and regional 
segregation, other, more accurate denominations (e.g. Druze, ʿAlewite; Palestinian, Damascene, 
etc.) are often more appropriate. Furthermore, thanks to the existence of these particular 
sectarian and regional identities, the residents of bilād aš-Šām had never evolved into a single 
„(Greater) Syrian nation‟ with common identity or appartenance to the region as a whole.35 On 
the other hand, however, Arab Muslim, especially Sunni inhabitants in the early 20th century 
rather placed themselves and their homeland into a wider Arab and/or Islamic framework, a 
concept that gained its modern political manifestation in the form of European-influenced Pan-
Arabism in the late 19th Century and opposed the creation of smaller, artificial entities.36 Thus, 
when not explicitly explained, in contemporary context, the term Syrian will unanimously 
indicate affiliation with modern Syria (and her post-1967 boundaries), or Syria excluding 
Lebanon, in historical context.     
  
Lebanon  
(Arabic  Lubnān; French Le Liban)   
In contemporary context, the term Lebanon refers to the modern state of the Lebanese Republic 
(  al-Jumhūrīya „l-Lubnānīya; République libanaise), a Beirut-centred political 
entity in the Middle East existent since its independence from France in 1943. 
As for the other contexts:  
The Lebanon Mountains (Ar.  Jabal Lubnān; Fr. Mont Liban) most commonly Mount 
Lebanon or „the Lebanon‟: As a geographical term, it denotes a chain of mountains stretching 
parallel to the Mediterranean littoral in the west, and the Biqāʿ Valley (known as Coele-Syria or 
Κοίλη Συρία in the Antiquity) and the Anti-Lebanon (Ar. Jibāl Lubnān aš-šarqīya, Gr. ’Aντίλίβανος) 
in the east that gave all the later political entities their names. In early times, however, the 
                                                          
35 Cf. Pipes (1990) 16. 
36 Cf. Corm (2005) 54: “Pour eux [the Sunnis of Greater Syria], le seul successeur légitime de l‟Empire ottoman est un grand 
État arabe qui maintiendrait les liens séculaires entre ces grandes villes. À leurs yeux, druzes, chiites, maronites […] ne sont 
que les éléments marginaux dans la société arabo-musulmane. Dans leurs perception, c‟est l‟impérialisme occidentale qui joue 
les minorités pour consolider son pouvoir dans la région.”  
24 
 
term Lebanon simply designated this geographic unit without having any political or 
administrative connotations. On the other hand, as the mountains provided refuge to 
persecuted since time immemorial, they begun to serve as cornerstone in the identities and 
historical self-perceptions among the modern country‟s numerous communities, par excellence 
in the case of the Maronites, a uniate Christian sect making up the majority of the mountains‟ 
population for the last few centuries and playing a decisive role in the formation and extension 
of their homeland into a sovereign state.37 Furthermore, the mountains are also known for their 
iconic forests of Lebanese cedar (the Biblical cedrus libani) that evolved to the symbol of the 
whole country, depicted on its national flag, coat of arms and mentioned in its anthem. Thus, 
thanks to its geographical, historical and cultural importance, Mount Lebanon is the core 
region of the country and the cradle of its Christian and Druze cultures; hence it is often 
synonymous to the country as a polity, mainly in historical context.38  
Smaller Lebanon (Ar.  Lubnān aṣ-ṣaġīr; Fr. Petit-Liban): With its distinguished 
cultural, religious and political nature, Mount Lebanon has always been playing a particular 
role in the region‟s history. Consequently, the mountain was often home to a number of 
political entities bearing certain degrees of autonomy throughout history39. Among these 
polities, it is the mutaṣarrifīya of Mount Lebanon (mutaṣarrifīyat Jabal Lubnān), an autonomous 
province within the Ottoman Empire established in 1861 and governed by an Istanbul-
appointed Christian governor, that is of relevance for this paper, as it can be regarded as the 
embryo of the later Lebanese state. Due to its distinguished political situation, for the first time 
in history, „Lebanon‟ was not solely a geographic appellation, but the name of a political entity 
bearing international recognition European powers with separate administration within 
Ottoman Syria.40 Although the governorate had no clearly defined borders, its territory, 
guaranteed by European powers, comprising seven, mostly Christian and Druze populated 
cazas41 of the Mount, viz: aš-Šūf/Le Chouf, al-Matn/Metn, Kasrawān/Kesraouan, al-
Batrūn/Batroun, Jazzīn/Jezzine, al-Kūra/Koura and Zaḥla/Zahlé as well as the separate qaṣba of 
Dayr al-Qamar and the exclave of al-Hirmil/Hermel in the Orontes-valley42. (It is important to 
                                                          
37 As Abou Moussa remarks, with the term Mont-Liban, the inhabitants of the area seem to denote the north-western, 
Maronite-populated section of the mountain chain, excluding its Druze-populated southern areas. Cf. Abou Moussa 
(1996) 60-62. 
38 Cf. Hitti (1957) 11 and 37. 
39 For a detailed description of Mt. Lebanon‟s political history before 1861 including the Emirate of Mt. Lebanon (1523-
1824) and the Muqatʿaji System (1842-1861) cf. Traboulsi (2007) 3-41. 
40 Abou Moussa (1996) 61-62. 
41 Caza (pl. cazas) is the anglicised form of the Arabic word qaḍāʾ (pl. aqḍiya) denoting an administrative district (a 
third-level subdivision of a sanjak in the former Ottoman Empire or a second-level subdivision of a muḥāfaẓa 
[governorate] in modern Lebanon). The anglicised orthography follows the Ottoman Turkish and Levantine Arabic 
pronunciation of the letter ḍād as z.   
42 Cf. Tüccârzâde (1905) 253. 
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point out that Beirut, an Ottoman provincial port of relatively low importance up until the mid-
19th century, was not forming the part of the autonomous mutaṣarrifīya but, as an exclave 
embedded into its territory, the city proper stood under direct Ottoman rule as the seat of the 
homonymous wilayet). Hence, thanks to its distinct geographic, cultural, religious and social 
features, the mutaṣarrifīya was a compact unit boasting of a society very much different in its 
outlooks, character and interests to that of its Syrian hinterland. As a result, the term Lebanon 
or more accurately, Lebanon proper as well as Mount Lebanon, Mount Liban or just simply the 
Mount as its synonyms occurring in a pre-1920 context connote these seven special cazas 
situated in the Mount Lebanon range.         
Greater Lebanon (Ar.  Lubnān al-kabīr; Fr. Grand-Liban): Lebanon as entity in its 
boundaries defined in 1920 by the French Mandatory power had no precedence in history. 
With the creation of the State of Greater Lebanon (dawlat Lubnān al-kabīr, État du Grand Liban) 
the former Christian dominated mutaṣarrifīya found itself extended with waste, predominantly 
Muslim territories with closer historical, cultural and economic ties to the Syrian hinterland 
than to the Mount proper. These attached territories43, viz. Beirut, the ʿAkkār region and Tripoli 
in the north, the Biqāʿ (al-Biqāʿ, La Béqaa) in the east as well as the southern Jabal ʿAmil region 
with the coastal cities of Tyre (Ṣūr, Sour) and Sidon (Ṣaydā, Saïda). Even though with the 
promulgation of the constitution in 1926 the state was officially renamed the Lebanese 
Republic, however, its disputed borders remained unchanged until today. Ipso facto, reference 
to modern Lebanon indicates the country with its post-1920 frontiers and territory (the Mount 
proper and its annexed areas) created in 1920 and vice-versa.  
Mount Lebanon Governorate (Ar.   muḥāfaẓat Jabal Lubnān; Fr. gouvernorat 
du Mont-Liban): It is important to note that confusingly, the territory of the Mount Lebanon 
governorate, one of modern Lebanon‟s six muḥāfaẓāt is not entirely identical with the historic 
mutaṣarrifīya, as some cazas, historically belonging to this core region, are currently forming 
parts of other muḥāfaẓāt, viz. the cazas al-Batrūn/Batroun, Bišarrī/Bcharré, al-Kawra/Koura, 
Zaġartā/Zghorta and al-Minnīya w-aḍ-Ḍannīya/Minniyé-et-Dinniyé in the north (i.e. the muḥāfaẓat 
aš-Šamāl/gouvernorat Liban-Nord) as well as Jazzīn/Jezzine and parts of the Sidon caza in the 
south (i.e. the muḥāfaẓat al-Janūb/gouvernorat Liban-Sud). These minor discrepancies between 
historical and current administrative divisions have the result that any reference to the modern 
governorate is not exactly synonymous with the territory of the homonymous historio-
geographic region and thus shall be treated with attention.   
                                                          
43 These territories were sometimes referred as „the four cazas and the coast‟ (indicating the cazas of Baalbek [Baʿalbakk, 
Baalbeck], the Western Biqāʿ [al-Biqāʿ al-ġarbī, La ouest Béqaa], Ḥāṣbayyā [Hasbaya] and Rāšayā [Rachaya] as well as 
the littoral stretching from Raʾs Naqūra in the south to the Nahr al-Kabīr in the north), „les territoires annexés‟ or „Le 
Liban périphérique‟ and are mainly referred to as arḍ al-wilāya (land of the wilayet) in contemporary Arabic usage (cf. 
Traboulsi (2007) 81 and  Christian textbook p. 10. 
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Lebanese 
(Arabic  lubnānī; French libanais) 
In contrast to the term Syrian, the adjective Lebanese allows a more exact way to mark 
appartenance to the historically different territories named Lebanon during history and listed 
above. Consequently, the term Lebanese describes affiliation to the historically relevant 
Lebanese entity. Hence, in a pre-1920 context can refer to the mutaṣarrifīya but not, for 
instance, to the Biqāʿ, a region belonging to the Ottoman Damascus wilayet up until 1920. The 
Arabic terms ahl al-jabal and jabalīyūn, „people of the mountain‟ (or French „montagnards‟), 
denoting the residents of both the historic mutaṣarrifīya, and contemporary Western Lebanon 
can also serve as useful means of distinction44. Lebanese, however, is ordinarily connoted with 
modern Lebanon, a polity bearing this name officially and having a well distinguishable 
territory and frontiers.       
  
                                                          
44 Hitti (1957) 15. 
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II 
Background 
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II.1 Lebanon’s communities 
Apart from minority ethnic and immigrant groups, consisting mainly of Armenians, Kurds and 
Palestinians, the majority, about 94% of the Lebanese population is of ethnic Arab background 
strongly sharing a common language (Levantine Arabic), the Arabic culture and historical 
experience.45 Although the question of origin still constitutes a major point of disagreement and 
evokes emotionally laden discussions, a long row of Arab historians has affirmed that all of 
Lebanon‟s confessional communities are in fact descendents of Arabic tribes from the Peninsula 
having arrived in successive waves to the Levant. However many Christians, especially 
Maronites refuse any adherence to Arabity and continue to claim their supposed Phoenician 
origin.46 Hence, communal differentiation has to be made by religious sect, in the first line 
between Christians and Muslims.  
According to Harris, in the late 1980s Christians made up less than 40% of the estimated 
Lebanese resident population of 3.5 million47. Despite their shrinking number, Lebanon is still 
having the largest portion of Christian population among the Arab countries.48 Conversely, 
Muslims comprised about 60%49 of the Lebanese in the same period, rapidly increasing in 
number since the end of the Civil War due to higher fertility rates and less emigrants than 
among Christians. However, as mentioned before, exact figures regarding the actual sectarian 
composition of the nation are absent as a potential census, conducted in 1932 for the last time, 
would seriously contest the delicate confessional equilibrium and would result in the 
repartition of public functions based on the 1943 National Pact.50   
Presently, the Lebanese Constitution recognises 18 sects in Lebanon, but political weight and 
public functions are only divided between the two tiers of seven major sectarian communities. 
The first tier is made up by the three great communities - the Shiʿi Muslims, the Maronite 
Christians, and the Sunni Muslims – each of them containing more than 20% of the total 
population and holding the principal regime offices in accordance with the 1943 National Pact. 
Four other communities – Orthodox Christians, Druze, Greek Catholics, and Armenians 
(Orthodox and Catholic) constitute the second tier by bearing subsidiary stakes in the regime.51    
 
  
                                                          
45 Harris (1997) 67. 
46 Azar (1999) 42. 
47 For July 2010 the CIA World Factbook indicates a total population of an estimated 4,125,000    
48 Corm (2005) 15. 
49 Similar shares appear in the CIA World Factbook 
50 Azar (1999) 42. 
51 Harris (1997) 68. 
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Maronite share in parliamentary seats since 
Ṭāʾif (34/128) 
Maronite seats in the muḥāfaẓāt 
AK:1/7   LN:8/21 
BE: 1/19   LS: 2/12 
BH: 1/10   NB: 0/11 
BO: 2/13  ML: 19/35 
 
 
II.1.1 Religious Communities 
II.1.1.1 Maronite Christians 
 al-mawārina 
(about 21% in 1990) 
As Harris aptly puts it: “Lebanon would not exist 
without the Maronites, as the country is an expression of 
the determination of this compact and relatively coherent 
mountain population to achieve political insulation from 
its Islamic surrounds”.52 The Maronite sect originally 
emerged at the early seventh century AD as a result of 
the Monothelite controversy adopted as compromise 
by the Byzantine emperor Heraclius in order to 
eliminate the divide between Orthodox and 
Monophysite views concerning the human and divine 
natures in Christ dividing contemporary Christianity. 
Among some of the Christianised Arab tribes in the 
northern parts of present-day Syria who had adopted 
Monothelitism there was a small group of monks 
from a monastery of the hermit Mār Mārūn53, and 
under the leadership of Yūḥannā Mārūn54 that 
asserted a certain degree of ecclesiastic autonomy under Islamic rule. However, due to the 
recuperation of Northern Syria by hostile Orthodox Byzantine in the tenth century, Maronites 
were forced to move southwards into the remote valleys of Mount Lebanon in order to remain 
in Islamic territory where they were assured religious tolerance. During the Crusades the 
patriarchs of the tiny Maronite community established formal contact with the Church in Rome 
resulting in a union that, however, only became complete after the Maronites fully dropped 
their Monothelite views around the 1590s, and thus became fully conform with Catholic 
doctrines. From that point, the Maronite church counted as the prototype Uniate church and 
                                                          
52 Harris (1997) 68.  
53 The patron saint of the Maronite church lived in the latter parts of the fourth century and died around 410 in the 
wilderness near Antioch. Following his death, their disciples migrate to Apamea (Afāmīya, in present-day NW Syria) 
and erect a monastery for his relics. Due to ongoing feuds with Jacobite Christians, the Maronite community migrates 
further southwards to Mount Lebanon in the 7th century. (cf. Hitti: pp.247-248) 
54 Following the Maronite migration to Mount Lebanon in the second half of the seventh century, Yūḥannā Mārūn (or 
Joannes Maro, ý 707) settles down his community in the Wādī Qādīšā (Holy Valley) as their first patriarch. (cf. Hitti 
(1957) 249.) 
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started to maintain close ties not just with Rome55, but gradually with the Western civilisation 
as a whole. Due to these western links and influences, by the 19th century, Maronites achieved 
a leading role in Mount Lebanon attaining demographic majority in the Kasrawān/Kesraouan, 
and al-Matn/Metn districts as well as strong presence in the traditionally Druze-populated aš-
Šūf/Chouf and Jizzīn/Jezzine areas. Moreover, thanks to the political support of European 
powers, Mount Lebanon also gained political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire with 
European guarantees. Throughout the centuries Maronites kept Syriac and Arabic as their 
liturgical language56 and a distinctive religious hierarchy headed by the Maronite patriarch 
who had possessed the community‟s political leadership.57 The patriarch‟s political power has 
reached its peak during the patriarchate of Elyās Ḥuwayyik (Ilyās  Hoyek) who represented 
Lebanon at the Versailles peace conference in 1919 and achieved the creation of a Maronite-led 
Greater Lebanon under initial French mandate. Since then, however, the role and political 
power of the Maronite patriarchate have been decreasing58. Maronite political power, however, 
continued to be on the rise during Lebanon‟s naissance as a distinct, Maronite-dominated polity 
under French Mandate, and culminated in the country‟s 1943 independence marked with the 
intercommunitarian agreement of the National Pact assuring the Maronites‟ political 
dominance over the new nation.     
Educational situation 
Historically, Maronites played a pivotal role in the implantation of Western-style education 
in the country. Thanks to their close ties to Western Christianity that enabled the schooling of 
Maronite clergy in Rome‟s Pontifical Maronite College founded in 1582, the returnees catalysed 
an educational boom inexperienced in the region. Additionally to local school establishments, 
the Mountain‟s Maronite population was the primary target of Western missionary activity 
beginning from the early 19th century, predominantly driven by French missionary orders most 
prominently by the Jesuits. From that point, the Maronite community has inextricably became 
exposed to French cultural influence, adopting French school system and introducing French as 
primary language of instruction and social prestige. This development, however, was only the 
impetus of the Lebanese-Christian educational sector‟s further expansion taking place in the 
second half of the 19th century, as additionally to the French orders, American, British and in a 
smaller extent other European missionaries set foot in Beirut and Lebanon by establishing their 
own educational institutions. Despite of the educational growth of other non-Maronite 
                                                          
55 The Maronite church, however, remains autocephalous, meaning that it refuses obedience to Rome by electing its 
own patriarch who resides in Lebanon and not in one of the traditional patriarchal sieges of the Arab East such as 
Antioch, Jerusalem or Alexandria. (cf. Corm (2005)14.)    
56 Corm (2005)14. 
57 Harris (1997) 68. 
58 Kuderna: p.159. 
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Christian communities encouraged by these new foreign missionaries concentrating their 
activities on them, the Maronites retained their unchallenged leading role in private education 
throughout the French Mandate era and the early decades of independence well up until the 
eruption of the 1975-1990 Civil War. According to Hanf, Maronite affiliated foreign and 
national (i.e. local Lebanese) private schools made up the slight majority of the private 
educational sector prior the Civil War, representing a much larger stake in from the total of 
private schools than the community itself from the population.59 The Civil War brought 
fundamental changes: on the one hand, the mass exodus of the Maronite population as well as 
of Lebanese and foreign teachers weakened the community and made regular instruction in 
many cases impossible; on the other hand however, constant fighting, sectarian 
homogenisation, and political cantonisation made market for new schools and even satellite 
campuses of Beirut universities in core Maronite regions and elsewhere.60 Since the end of the 
Civil War and the ratification of the 1989 Ṭāʾif agreement, private sectarian education 
experienced a novel upsurge. Parallel to this tendency, Maronite-affiliated establishments 
retain their social prestige and keep expanding their educational network of every level.  
According to a statistical bulletin issued by the CRDP in 2006, the Maronite community has 
the largest number of schools in Lebanon, and the largest number of students compared to 
other Christian and Islamic confessions. Their schools make up 18.4% of private schools in 
Lebanon, and their students 30% of all students in private schools. A comparison between the 
confessions shows that the Maronite confessions owns 44% of religiously affiliated schools and 
have 51.2% of students.61 Moreover, there are three Maronite-founded universities62, while 
other prestigious institutions, such as the USJ, the UL and the AUB continue to have 
traditionally high portions of Maronite students.       
  
                                                          
59 Hanf (1969) 139. 
60 Besides new establishments such as the Université Notre Dame de Louaizé (1987), the stately Université Libanaise 
and the Jesuit Université Saint-Joseph opened satellite campuses to escape fighting in Beirut (cf. Havemann: pp.104-
115.) 
61 Data published on the CRDL website (http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5190)  
62 The Université de la Sagesse (Jāmiʿat al-ḥikma), founded by the Maronite Archdiocese of Beirut ; the Université Notre 
Dame de Louaizé (Jāmaʿat Sayyidat al-Luwayza), founded by the Maronite Order of the Holy Virgin in 1978, and the 
Université Saint-Ésprit de Kaslik (Jāmiʿat ar-Rūḥ al-qudus fī „l-Kaslīk) by the Lebanese Maronite Order in 1961. (cf. 
Havemann: pp.105-114.)  
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Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic share in 
parliamentary seats since Ṭāʾif (14/128, 8/128) 
Orthodox & Melkite seats in the muḥāfaẓāt 
AK:2/7   LN:4/21 
BE: 3/19   LS: 2/12 
BH: 1/10   NB: 1/11 
BO: 4/13  ML: 5/35 
 
 
II.1.1.2 Other Christians 
 ġayrha min al-masīḥīyīn  
(about 14% in 1990) 
In addition to the Maronites, the Lebanese 
Constitution recognisies a number of other Christian 
denominations too, viz.: the Melkite Greek Orthodox 
(kanīsat ar-Rūm al-Urṯuḏūks), the Jacobite Syrian 
Orthodox63, and the Chaldean Assyrian church.64 
Beside these indigenous communities, which 
constitut some of  Christianity‟s most ancient sects, 
Western missionary activity resulted in the existence 
of three uniate (or autocephalous) churches of the 
Greek Catholics, Syrian Catholics and Chaldean 
Catholics65 as well as of tiny Protestant and Roman 
Catholic communities.66 In present-day Lebanon, the 
Greek Orthodox make out by far the biggest of these 
non-Maronite Christian sects (roughly half of the 
total), followed by the Greek Catholics – an offshoot 
branch of Orthodoxy since their union with Rome in 
1683 retaining Orthodox liturgy but setting up their 
own patriarchate (with a double residence in Lebanon and Egypt)67. Historically, Greek 
Catholics (Rūm Malakī or Rūm Kāṯūlīk) formed a strong community in Aleppo before having 
been persecuted to Mount Lebanon by their original church. The community had strong ties 
with the Austrian Habsburg Empire.68 Greek Catholics, making up about 4-6% of the Lebanese 
                                                          
63 Just like their sister church in Syria, Ethiopian Christians, and the Copts of Egypt, the members of the Syrian 
Orthodox church (al-kanīsa as-suryānīya al-urṯuḏuksīya) accept Monophysite doctrines, i.e. they exclusively believe in 
the divine nature of Jesus. They retain Syriac as language of liturgy, while their patriarch resides in Damascus. (cf. 
Corm (2005)13. et Hourani (1954) 123.)  
64 The followers of the Chaldean Assyrian church (also called Nestorians, after their founding father, Nestorius) believe 
in the two distinct and equally important natures of Christ. The church is widespread in Iraq, but also has followers 
in India and China. The liturgical language is Syriac. (cf. Corm (2005) 13. et Hourani (1954) 123.)  
65 All these uniate churches are the autocephalous splinters of their respective orthodox communities.   
66 Corm (2005) 13. 
67 Hitti (1957) 255. 
68 Corm (2005) 31. 
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population in 199069, are overwhelmingly urban, concentrated heavily in the country‟s larger 
cities and towns. They are considered to be the most prosperous community per capita.70  
Lebanon‟s Greek Orthodox church, the direct heir of Byzantine tradition, is under the 
jurisdiction of the Orthodox patriarch of Antioch, who– unlike all the other heads of the major 
Lebanese sects having their residence in the vicinity of Beirut - resides in Damascus. As an 
adherent to Byzantine dogmas, the church is a sister organisation to the Greek Orthodox, the 
Russian Orthodox, and the other Arab Orthodox churches under the obedience of the patriarch 
of Jerusalem. As Arab Orthodox in general, Lebanon‟s Greek Orthodox form predominantly 
urban communities71 and historically have been living in symbiosis with Sunni Muslims in the 
traditional commercial class of the Arab East, and particularly in the commercial hubs of 
Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon on the Lebanese coast.72 Consequently, Greek Orthodox shared 
greater attachment to the Arab nation and regarded the Occident with distrust refusing any 
assimilation to the Maronites, and fearing Latin supremacy, earning them a good image with 
their Muslim partners. However, the inability to realise the dream of a unified Arab nation and 
the emerging dissension within the Arab world forced the community to change their political 
perspectives. Fears of being treated as secondary citizens in a unified, Muslim-dominated 
empire drove the Orthodox into the Maronite camp, and even made them favour a French and 
Maronite dominated Lebanon built up on sectarian basis offering more guarantees to preserve 
Orthodox particularities and identity. Since independence, and especially during the years of 
the Civil War, Greek Orthodox politics, alliances and strategies were serving this wish to retain 
their community‟s traditions and role.73     
In 1975, non-Maronite Christians comprised at least 60% of Greater Beirut‟s Christian 
population, and probably one quarter of its total inhabitants. The Orthodox were half of 
Tripoli‟s 20-25% Christian fraction, and the Greek Catholics formed the largest community in 
the 90% Christian city of Zaḥla in the Biqāʿ Valley. Predominantly an urban-based community, 
the Orthodox rarely dominate rural areas. Some exceptions, however, are to be find in the 
Kūra, near Tripoli; and historically, in the ʿAkkār, al-Matn, and the aš-Šūf districts of Mount 
Lebanon, while Greek Catholic were prominent in the north Biqāʾ and the east of Sidon74.  
                                                          
69 Since Ṭāʾif, the Lebanese Parliament has 14 seats reserved for the Greek Orthodox, 8 for the Greek Catholics, 1 for 
Protestants, and 1 for other Christian minorities (out of the total of 128, and beside 34 Maronite, 5 Armenian 
Orthodox and 1 Armenian Catholic seats). For a complete list of sectarian distribution cf. Traboulsi (2007) 241. 
70 Cobban (1985) 28. 
71 Hitti argues that the Greek Orthodox (al-Malakīyūn) are descendents of Byzantine-era Greek colonists, having Greek 
as their original language of liturgy and only gradually adopting Syriac. (cf. Hitti (1957) 254.) 
72 Harris (1997) 69. 
73 Azar (1999) 47. 
74 Harris (1997) 70. 
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Educational situation 
Due to their numerical weight among Lebanon‟s non-Maronite Christian minorities, only the 
Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities have a significant network of their own 
denominational schools75. Historically, the establishment of the Greek Orthodox schools in 
Lebanon began in the 19th century in order to create an own network of schools in opposition 
to the Catholic and Protestant missionaries' educational activities that had been soliciting 
Greek Orthodox Christians to join their schools. According to Harris, the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarch complained to the Pope about the activities of the Catholic missionaries in 
proselytizing Greek Orthodox students to Catholicism.76 As a result, Orthodox charity 
organisations proclaimed their objective to establish schools in order to enable free schooling 
for every Orthodox child. In line with these efforts, Imperial Russia‟s rapprochement to 
establish Orthodox schools in Beirut and the Mount financed by the Tsarist court was more 
than welcomed. In these primary and secondary schools, organised in accordance with the 
French system, Arabic was the main language of instruction, while Russian was thought as first 
foreign language. After the collapse of Russia‟s Imperial regime during the WW1, Orthodox 
charitable organisations took on these former Russian missionary schools and introduced 
tuition fees and replaced Russian with French as thought(the) foreign language.77 Today, the 
Orthodox school system is represented at every level, crowned with a patriarchal university in 
Balamand, south of Tripoli, established through the merge of the Académie Libanaise des Beaux 
Arts and the Balamand convent‟s Institute for Theology in 1987. As Havemann remarks, 
“obwohl die Universität von der orthodoxen Kirche als Symbol für die politische Bedeutung ihrer 
Religionsgemeinschaft betrachtet wird, sind über die Hälfte der Studenten keine orthodoxen Christen; 
ein deutliches Zeichen für die traditionellen Bemühungen der Griechisch-Orthodoxen  um eine 
nichtkonfessionsgebundene bzw. überkonfessionelle, säkulare Orientierung.78  According to the a 
statistical bulletin issued by the CRDP in 2006, there were 15 schools affiliated with the 
Orthodox Church in Lebanon, three private- free schools, and 12 private non-free schools 
making up 0.54% of the total number of schools in the country. With their 10,812 students, 
Orthodox schools educated 1.18 % of Lebanese students. In comparison with the communities 
demographic weight (about 14% in 1990), Orthodox educational institutions, which admit 
both Christian and Muslim students, are severely underrepresented and do not occupy a 
prominent position in the Lebanese educational sector.79 
                                                          
75 With the exception of the two Armenian churches to be highlighted later in this chapter  
76 Harris (1997) 70. 
77 Hanf (1969) 81. 
78 Havemann (2002) 113. 
79 Data published on the CRDL website (http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5090)  
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As stated in the same statistic, there are 49 Greek Catholic (indicated as Greek Melkite by the 
CRDP) schools in Lebanon, making up 3.5% of the total number of private schools, and taking 
21,111 students; 3.96% of the total of Lebanese private school students (532,662). With these 
numbers, Greek Catholics are well represented in the educational landscape, and achieve a 
surprisingly balanced portion in comparison with the situation of the Greek Orthodox 
community displayed above.  Greek Catholic schools are well represented in the Zaḥla/Zahlé, 
and al-Matn/Metn cazas.80 These schools include a number of prominent institutions such as 
the prestigious Collége Patriarchal, established in 186481.  
 
  
                                                          
80 Data published on the CRDL website (http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5106)  
81 Hanf (1969) 81.  
36 
 
Shiʿi share in parliamentary seats since 
Ṭāʾif (27/128) 
Shiʿi seats in the muḥāfaẓāt 
AK:0/7   LN:0/21 
BE: 2/19   LS: 6/12 
BH: 6/10   NB: 8/11 
BO: 2/13  ML: 3/35 
 
 
II.1.1.3 Shiʿi Muslims 
 aš-šīʿīyūn  
(about 35% in 1990) 
Shiʿi simply means the faction of the imām ʿAlī, 
cousin and son-in-law of Muḥammad, who 
confronted those who emerged as the Sunni elite of 
the early Islamic world resulting in a major schism 
still dividing Islam. Shiʿism acquired a tradition of 
martyrdom and resistance to established Sunni 
authority when ʿAlī‟s son Ḥusayn rebelled and was 
killed at Karbalāʾ in present-day Iraq. Consequently, 
Shiʿis tend to regard mainstream Islamic history after 
ʿAlī as a wrong path, under illegitimate regimes.  
From the 7th century Islamic conquest and the 
eleventh century Crusader invasion, the Levant was 
dominated by Sunni dynasties82, making the Lebanon 
Mountains to a central refuge for persecuted Shiʿite 
communities, hence Shiʿis‟ presence in the area – 
most notably in the Kisrawān – is broadly 
contemporary with that of the Maronites. By Crusader times, Shiʿis formed the main population 
in the south of Mount Lebanon, in much of the Biqāʿ Valley, and also in large parts of central 
Mount Lebanon later dominated by Maronites and Druze. In the sixteenth century, they 
supported Iran‟s transition to Shiʿism, and thereafter their connection with the Iranian Ṣafavid 
empire, chief Middle Eastern enemy of the Ottomans, made them a suspect element from the 
Sunni Ottoman perspective. Shiʿis were pushed out of the Kasrawān and the Šūf by Maronite 
and Druze expansion, and the late-eighteenth-century Ottoman punitive expedition ransacked 
Shiʿi religious institutions in their southern heartland of Jabal ʿĀmil. As Harris remarks, “such 
experiences left them with little empathy for either Maronite or Druze visions of Lebanon, and little 
interest in Sunni Muslim authority, whether Ottoman or Arab.”83 The community became thus 
geographically segregated, each developing very specific social characteristics. While the Biqāʿ 
Shiʿites retained a vigorous tribal structure leaving large portions of the community living as 
semi-nomadic goat-herds down to modern times, the Shiʿites of the Jabal ʿĀmil traditionally led 
                                                          
82 Apart from a brief period between 969 and 1099, when Shiʿites were able to establish a number of local dynasties in 
Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre, ended abruptly by Crusader invasions from Western Europe. (Cobban (1985) 19.)  
83 Harris (1997) 72. 
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a more settled and stable life84 “disunited by clan rivalries and oppressed by their own feudal lords 
in a manner other communities.”85 Both of these territories were not affected by the Lebanese 
political system until the creation of Lebanon as a territorially extended polity by the French in 
1920 resulting in their peripheral situation within the redrawn borders. Just like against their 
former Ottoman masters, Shiʿites remained hostile against the French mandatory power 
identifying them with their Maronite protégés. Shiʿi abhorrence against the new state was 
further strengthened by their peripheral situation alongside the borders separating Lebanon 
from Syria and Palestine and ongoing economic, social and political marginalisation by the 
Maronites and Sunnis who continued to treat Shiʿites as junior and peripheral in the Lebanese 
political scene well up until the eruption of the Civil War.86 Consequently, Shiʿites remained 
largely exposed to the influence of their traditional feudal landlords or joined the rows of leftist 
political organisations demanding the amelioration of state services, public infrastructure, and 
political representation.87 As one of the first results, the management of Shiʿi legal affairs 
finally became separated from the Sunni judicial system in 1969, when the Iranian-born imām 
Mūsā aṣ-Ṣadr succeeded in having parliament establish a Higher Shiʿi Islamic Council.88 
Moreover, the steadily trickle of Shiʿites into Lebanon‟s urban centres – most prominently into 
Beirut – broadened into a flood from the beginning of the 1960s transforming the capitals 
southern suburbs (called collectively aḍ-Ḍāḥiya or “misery belt”)89 into vast, poverty-hit slums 
forming the third and most novel Shiʿi regional stronghold. The beginning of the Civil War 
“opened a new avenue for the community in accessing the state‟s resources through violent means.” 
During the conflict, Shiʿi positions were strengthened by the collapse of stately structures, the 
naissance of powerful new militias such as the Amal Movement90, and later the Ḥizbullāh91, 
                                                          
84 Cobban (1985) 21. 
85 Harris (1997) 72. 
86 Azar (1999) 44. 
87 Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 24. 
88 Harris (1997) 73. 
89 Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 31. 
90 The Amal Party, abbreviation of Afwāj al-muqāwama al-Lubnānīya (Lebanese Resistance Detachments, or just Ḥarakat 
Amal, literally „Amal movement‟, while the acronym amal means hope), originally an armed militia founded right at 
the beginning of the Civil War in 1975 in order to defend the Shiʿi community and its interests. Enjoying Syrian 
support and having close ties to Iran, the militia played a pivotal role during the fights and could reinvent itself as a 
political force after 1990. Since the end of the strife, however, Amal loses its popular basis to the Ḥizbullāh, another 
Shiʿite force that seriously challenged Amal during the last years of the civil conflict. Finally, Amal declared its 
solidarity for the combat against Israel in 2006. The movement is headed by the Speaker of the National Assembly, 
Nabīh Berry, and is member of the March 8 Alliance, currently in opposition; cf. Vannier (2009) 21. 
91 Founded as a Shiʿite militia to fight Israel‟s offensive against Lebanon in 1982, the „Party of God‟ became a 
prominent figure of the Lebanese political scene following the 2005 elections calling for a transition to a 
deconfessionalised proportional system. Led by its iconic leader, Ḥassan Naṣrallāh, the party‟s resistance against Israeli 
military actions in 2006 reinforced its prestige not just among Lebanon‟s heavy Shiʿi community, but also among non-
Shiʿites. Considered as a terrorist organisation by the United States, the party maintains close ties to Iran‟s ruling 
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supported by Syria, and Iran‟s new regime since 1979. Since the end of the Civil War, the 
disintegration of traditional feudal structures92, its demographic majority, and bourgeoising 
political influence gives pivotal impetus to the reinvention of Shiʿite political role in the 
Lebanese state.  
 Educational situation 
Historically, Shiʿis remained largely unaffected from the Mount Lebanon‟s pre-WW1 
educational boom leaving them in a seriously disadvantaged educational situation throughout 
the most of the twentieth century. Despite governmental efforts to improve their infrastructure, 
Lebanon‟s Shiʿi-dominated peripheral regions continued to be the most underprivileged corners 
of the country.  The small Shiʿite elite continued to send its children to Catholic missionary 
schools. After decades of marginalisation and neglect, Shiʿi-run educational centres only 
experienced a dramatic rise in number during and after the Civil War, as a result of growing 
Shiʿi awareness of the role education plays in improving and change the community‟s position 
in society and politics, according to its demographic majority.93  
Currently, there are four specifically Shiʿite-run, private, fee-charging school networks in 
Lebanon: ʿĀmilīya-schools, Muṣṭafā-schools, schools of the Amal Educational Centre, and 
Mahdī-schools, most of them centred in Beirut and its southern suburbs as well as in the Shiʿi 
dominated rural areas of the south and the Biqāʿ.  
As the oldest of these, the ʿĀmilīya-schools (madāris al-ʿāmilīya, denoting the Shiʿite 
dominated Jabal ʿĀmil region) were first established as early as in 1929 in order to fight 
discrimination and socioeconomic difficulties confronting rural and poor Shiʿite migrant to 
Beirut. ʿĀmilīya schools are primary financed by the Al-ʿĀmilīya Islamic Charity Organisation 
(al-jamʿīya al-ḵayrīya al-islāmīya al-ʿāmilīya), student fees, state subsidiaries and foreign 
government donations.  Since the ʿĀmilīya network had close ties to Iran well prior its Islamic 
revolution in 1979, the 1960s witnessed a brief period when Farsi as a foreign language had 
been introduced optionally additionally to French and English.94  
In 1974, i.e. shortly before the eruption of the Civil War, the Islamic Religious Educational 
Council (jamʿīyat at-taʿlīm ad-dīnī al-islāmī) established a small number of Muṣṭafā-schools 
(madāris al-Muṣṭafā) e.g. in Beirut, an-Nabaṭīya and Tyre in order to avoid the loss of Shiʿi 
students to Christian missionary schools, and increase the weight of Shiʿite educational 
institutions as countermeasure.95 The school lays emphasis on religious instruction and is more 
                                                                                                                                                                          
regime and is currently the only remaining militia in Lebanon that refused laying down its arms. Only slightly defeated 
at the last elections, Ḥizbullāh is the pivotal actor of the oppositional March 8 Alliance. Cf. Vannier (2009) 21. 
92 Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 31. 
93 Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 51. 
94 Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 58. 
95 Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 63. 
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expensive than any of its Shiʿite counterpart. Since 1979, the network has close ties to Iran, but 
in the same time, it persists in proving its loyalty to the state and Lebanese nationalism by 
“emphasising the resistance activities in South Lebanon. A „Week of Resistance‟ in schools is 
celebrated with special programs for the students.”96    
Unofficially known as madāris al-ḥaraka, Amal Educational Centres (muʾassasāt Amal at-
tarbāwīya), or simply Amal-schools (madāris al-Amal) – referring to their primary donor, the 
Amal-Movement – only appeared at the end of the Civil War in 1990 as a result of a wider 
intra-communitarian competition between Lebanese Shiʿa‟s two most prominent political 
representatives of the post-Civil War period, the Amal Movement and the Ḥizbullāh. In order to 
ensure its social presence and ideological basis, the Amal party opened a total number of seven 
schools in Lebanon‟s Shiʿite-dominated regions in the period between 1992 and 2002 providing 
education to around 10,000 students. Among the stated goal of Amal Educational Centres is the 
“promotion and solidification of belief in God”, “the promotion of the idea of national belonging”, 
and “the promotion of the idea of belonging to the soil of a Lebanon that is united and independent, 
while understanding its history and geography within the context of its Arab identity”.97 
As a reaction to its rival‟s educational initiative, Ḥizbullāh began to establish its own 
network of private, fee-charging schools in 1993. Officially named after the Mahdī (madāris al-
Mahdī), and simply referred to as madāris Ḥizbillāh (Ḥizbullāh schools), the network of 
currently 14 schools98 is sustained by the Islamic Association for Education and Teaching (al-
muʾassasa al-islāmīya li-„t-tarbīya w-at-taʿlīm). Among its primary goals, Mahdī-schools try “to 
establish the foundation of religious values and Islamic morals in the Lebanese society and the 
consolidation of human relations between its members […]”99 
According to Shaery-Eisenlohr, all of these three school types perceive themselves as non-
religious, non-confessional schools open for every community. Sectarian dominance is 
explained by geographic and demographic circumstances.100 Furthermore, all of them are 
linked to a larger institution such as a benevolent organisation or a political party. Although 
they emphasis loyalty to Lebanon and its social unity, all of the schools justify their existence 
in terms of filling a gap caused by the shortcoming of public schools in the country and 
                                                          
96 Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 66. 
97 Cited in Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 77. 
98 As the web site of the Mahdī-schools states, the system maintains a school for children of the local Lebanese                                                      
community pursuing its studies in the Shiʿi seminary in the Iranian city of Qom:  
"           ) (         
               (cf. 
http://www.almahdischools.org/newsite/_definition.php?filename=200708150908500) 
99 Cf. ibid.: "
  
100 As Shaery-Eisenlohr remarks, these schools are generally not referred to as „Shiʾī schools‟ (madāris šiʿīya), as this 
term seems to be reserved for Shiʿite theological schools.  
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legitimise the religious instruction offered by them in terms of their goal to rise moral 
standards in society.101  
Concerning the tertiary level of education, the Shiʿite community established its first 
institutes of this kind during and after the Civil War, par excellence technical colleges, 
predominantly in Shiʿite majority regions such as Tyre, or the Biqāʿ, and Beirut. Mainly 
financed by the ʿĀmilīya initially, sponsorship was peu-à-peu taken on by the political 
movements Amal and Ḥizbullāh since the end of the Civil War. Since then, Shiʿite tertiary 
education has been experiencing a rapid rise in the number of establishments, as well as in that 
of its students.102  
 
  
                                                          
101 Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 54. 
102 Cf. Havemann (2002) 114. 
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Sunni  share in parliamentary seats since 
Ṭāʾif (27/128) 
Sunni seats in the muḥāfaẓāt 
AK:3/7   LN:8/21 
BE: 6/19   LS: 2/12 
BH: 2/10   NB: 1/11 
BO: 3/13  ML: 2/35 
 
 
II.1.1.4 Sunni Muslims 
 as-sunnīyūn  
(about 24% in 1990) 
Sunnis, “exponents of the original and unadulterated 
Islamic orthodoxy”103 have always been the dominant 
component of the Islamic world constituting the vast 
majority of Muslims not only in the Levant but in 
most of the Muslim countries. In their views they are 
adherents of the sunna (custom, practice) of the 
prophet Muḥammad, the first four caliphs (three of 
whom are cursed by many Shiʿis), and other Islamic 
traditions (e.g. the ḥadīṯ). Sunni Islam‟s 
jurisprudence is regulated by four major schools of 
religious thought, which wary somewhat on 
interpretation: the Ḥanafī, Ḥanbalī, Mālikī, and 
Šāfiʿī. Lebanese Sunnis follow the somewhat more 
liberal Hanafī law school;104 while the community is 
headed by the chief mufti of the Republic residing in 
Beirut and having authority over the muftis of 
Tripoli and Sidon.  
In the vicinity of Mount Lebanon, Sunnis have always represented a minority, although for the 
most of the period after the advent of Islam, up to the First World War, the region was ruled by 
co-religionist dynasties.105 Predominantly an urban community without major rural hinterland, 
Sunnis formed the ruling commerçant class in the coastal towns of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, 
garnering their commercial and municipal power from their close association with the 
Mamelukes and then with the Ottoman Turks.106 Hence, Sunnis have always perceived 
themselves as “les membres d‟un réseau de villes islamiques – Le Caire, Damas, Bagdad, Alep, 
Jérusalem – qui a structuré la vie des grands empires musulmans ou des divers sultanats. Pour eux, le 
seul successeur légitime de l‟Empire ottoman est un grand État arabe qui maintiendrait les liens 
séculaires entre ces grandes villes.”107 Consequently, they have experienced the creation of the 
Greater Lebanese State not only as the loss of their numerical majority, privileges, and political 
                                                          
103 Hourani (1954) 122. 
104 Harris (1997) 73. 
105 Harris (1997) 73. 
106 Fisk (2002) 56. 
107 Corm (2005) 54. 
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domination but as the forced segregation from their greater Arab-Muslim waṭan.108 After initial 
refuse and disinterest of the new state tailored to the dimensions of a Christian minority, the 
Sunnis were the first Muslim community to accept their appartenance to Lebanon and to 
participate in its government, culminating in the 1942 National Pact based on the power 
sharing of the novel states dominant sects.109 For their part, Sunnis accepted the “myth of the 
Maronite majority” and gave up their claim to reunion with Syria. 
During the Civil War, the Sunni community failed to build strong militias like the other 
major sects (par excellence the Maronites and the Shiʿites) and thus were not directly involved 
in major inter-communitarian fights. The reasons for this relative disinterest laid in the lack of 
sense neither for the Lebanese, nor for the Palestinian cause. Moreover, Sunnis continued to 
maintain a brighter outlook by focusing on the larger Arab region instead of tiny Lebanon. 
Another factor is that the community had much less to lose as the politically overrepresented 
Maronites, nor much less to gain as the marginalized and underprivileged Shiʿites. Finally, the 
end of the war and the ratification of the Ṭāʾif agreement resulted in the preservation and even 
the increase of Sunni political power.110  
As the symbol Lebanon‟s post-war era changes, Sunni-Muslim Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī, a Sidon 
native, launched an ambitious plan to rebuild the county, both physically and economically, 
and to restore its political sovereignty. Serving two terms in office as Lebanon‟s Prime Minister, 
his cabinets could achieve little to abolish confessionalism, a primary goal set in Ṭāʾif.111 His 
assassination in 2005, however, led to massive protests called the “Cedar Revolution” (ṯawrat 
al-arz) resulting in the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country.   
Today, Sunnis still hold the position as largest sect in Tripoli, and Sidon, and constitute one of 
metropolitan Beirut‟s dominant sects, especially in its former western sector112. Outside of these 
urban centres, they only make a significant showing in the caza of al-Minīya w-aḍ-Ḍannīya 
(where they constitute the vast majority) as well as in some rural areas of the ʿAkkār, the Šūf, 
and the Biqāʿ regions.113   
 
 
 
                                                          
108 Azar (1999) 46. 
109 Azar (1999) 47. 
110 Cf. Traboulsi: pp. 123. 
111 Havemann (2002) 51. 
112 Beirut‟s Sunnis first became outnumbered by Christian migrants by the mid-nineteenth century, and during the past 
two decades also by the massive influx of Shiʿi rural migrants and refugees. (cf. Harris: pp.73-74.) 
113 Harris (1997) 74. 
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Educational situation 
Currently, there are 102 Sunni-affiliated schools in Lebanon divided between fee-charging 
private schools (60) and schools without fees (42). With an overall number of 39,872 students, 
these Sunni schools account for 7.3% of the students in those schools.  
Historically, the Sunnis were Lebanon‟s first Muslim community that became inspired by the 
benefits of the Western-oriented Christian educational model and established its first 
association promoting the community‟s educational development, the Jamʾiyat al-maqāṣid al-
ḵayrīya al-islāmīya, or the Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions, in 1878. Even though being 
the first and most prominent of its kind, the association had only gained weight in the 
Lebanese educational sector in the post-war era.114 Today, the Maqāṣid Association operates 41 
schools in the country: 8 in Beirut, and 33 in other muḥāfaẓāt, most notably in the Biqāʿ and 
the North. In its mission statement, the Association “is to ensure the basic education with emphasis 
on a moderate Islamic education for the largest number of its community's youth. It also aims at 
giving them an integral understanding of Islam's mission and its noble values. The goal of the 
Association also is to strengthen the understanding of our Arab heritage and to develop the spirit of 
teamwork amongst each other to strengthen their sense of responsibility and self-confidence“; and 
describes the ideal Maqāṣid student as “attached to his Lebanese citizenship that is not distinct 
from his Arab identity. He is also attached to Islam of which he has a modern, integral and open 
understanding. Tolerant towards other races, religious beliefs and political convictions, the Makassed 
student is self-confident, independent and creative in his thinking and able to cope with the scientific 
and technological changes.”115Moreover, the Association established an own university, the 
Jāmiʿa al-Islāmīya al-Maqāṣid fī Bayrūt in 1982 with faculties for nursing and health sciences, 
management and information technology, pedagogy, and Islamic studies. According to 
Havemann, the university has a good academic reputation due to its distinguished library and 
renown publications. Other institutes of Sunni learning include a number of colleges in Beirut, 
Tripoli, and Sidon, mostly financed by the Maqāṣid, or the foundation of the late PM Rafīq al-
Ḥarīrī such as the Kullīyat al-Imām al-Awzāʿī for Islamic studies and management, or the 
Kullīyat ad-daʿwa al-islāmīya, both located in the capital, as well as the Islamic Centre for 
Education (Al-markaz al-islāmī at-tarbiya) in Sidon, and the Al-Manār University in Tripoli.116   
. 
 
  
                                                          
114 Hanf (1969) 209. 
115 Both citations are from the official web-site of the Maqāṣid Association available under 
http://www.makassed.org.lb/education.html 
116 Havemann: pp.113-114 
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Druze share in parliamentary seats since 
Ṭāʾif: 8 out of 128 
Druze seats in the muḥāfaẓāt 
AK:0/7   LN:0/21 
BE: 1/19   LS: 0/12 
BH: 0/10   NB: 1/11 
BO: 1/13  ML: 5/35 
 
 
II. 1.1.5 Druze  
 ad-durūz; eigenbezeichnung:  muwaḥḥidūn    
(about 5% in 1990) 
Although well known for their closed and 
secretive nature, the Druze have played a pivotal role 
in the history of Mount Lebanon for centuries, and 
largely have been shaping the fate of the modern 
country as well.  Established by the Persian Ismāʿīlī 
mystic and scholar Hamza ibn ʿAlī as an offshoot of 
Ismāʿīlī Shiʿism in Cairo in the early tenth century, 
the small community regarded the sixth Ismāʿīlī 
Fāṭimid Caliph of Egypt, al-Ḥākim (996-1021 AD), as 
divine manifestation on earth. Initially, the small sect 
enjoyed the support of the Caliphate, was however 
soon declared heretic. Some of the surviving 
members of the persecuted group found refuge in the 
remote parts of the Lebanon and southern Anti-
Lebanon ranges in the eleventh century. Druzism, 
named after eleventh-century missionary Muḥammad 
ibn Ismāʿīl Naštākīn ad-Darāzī117, an early follower of al-Ḥākim, secured a strategic location in 
the Šūf hills, proselytised the majority of the local feudal families, stopped missionary activity, 
and closed the gates to new converts after 1043. From that point, the Druze are known to be 
adept in taqīya, or dissimilation, a practiced means of self protection based on close-knit 
communal solidarity and military prowess.118  Despite of its small numbers, the Druze became 
the dominant sectarian affiliation on Mount Lebanon‟s rural social order between the 
fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, before displacement by the Maronites.  
In the early sixteenth century, Druze lords of the Mountain helped the Sunni Muslim 
Ottoman Turks to seize control of the area from the also Sunni Muslim dynasty of the Egyptian 
Mamlukes. As a reward, the Druze were awarded inner autonomy within the frames of a 
„princedom‟ ruled by the Maʿn dynasty (1523-1697) securing the prosperity and stability of the 
region, and laying down the fundaments of an inter-sectarian Lebanon119. Despite this stable 
continuity, the politics of the great Druze leaders remained mainly characterised by long-
                                                          
117 Even though being one of its first prominent leader, ad-Darāzī is considered to be a heretic by modern Druze 
(Benke: p.59.) 
118 Harik: p.43. 
119 Azar (1999) 46. 
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lasting factional rivalries. From the early eighteenth century right down to modern times the 
principal tribal division within Druze society was that between the „Yazbakī‟ and „Junblāṭī‟ 
factions.120 This means that the Druze community generally remained subordinate to the sect‟s 
strong familiar ties organised as a pyramid-like structure of clans and clan-based factions 
allowing the ruling families to retain their feudal power and privileges. However, after the 
discontinuation of the Maʿn dynasty, the Druze experienced stark marginalisation and the 
decline of political power for the benefit the French-backed Maronite community sowing the 
seeds of hostility between the two dominant sects of the mount, and culminating in the 1840 
civil strife.121 These experiences encouraged the further closure of the community resulting in 
the strong feeling of distinctiveness, minimal interaction with other sectarian groups, 
geographic clustering, and the continuous social, territorial, and political separateness.122   
Opposing Ottoman Turkish, French mandatory, and Maronite-Christian political dominance 
over Lebanon, the Druze community retained its assertive behaviour whenever its autonomous 
rights were jeopardised by the central authority. During the civil war, the sect established its 
extra-legal civil administration on its ancestral hinterland in 1983, after a victorious but 
disastrous battle with the Maronite Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese army. This “own version 
of the state”, demonstrating the sect‟s seclusion, and self-reliance in the face of a hostile 
environment, is still functioning, albeit at a reduced level.123  
As a faith, Druzism favours a neo-Platonic view of God as an impersonal universal intellect, 
embraces reincarnation, believes in the transmigration of souls, and rejects the traditional 
“pillars” of Islam such as fasting and set prayer times.124 Moreover, polygamy and concubines 
are prohibited, as well as conversion (either into or out of the sect)125, and proselytising. 
Further characteristics include the lack of shrines, or places of worship, as well as the custom 
of endogamous marriage. The community is thus regarded as grossly heretical for orthodox 
Muslims, and appeared as a synthesis between Muslim teaching, the doctrine of more eastern 
religions, and some Hellenic and other pre-Islamic beliefs for Christians.126  
As a community, the Druze are divided into two distinct classes along the lines of a strict 
religious hierarchy. The majority of the population, the juhhāl („the ignorant‟), while observing 
the religious teachings of the faith, never become initiated into the esoteric details of religious 
                                                          
120 According to Cobban, a 1980 study was able to produce a list of all of the 333 family names currently occurring in 
the Druze community, of which 29 were still clearly identified as denoting „aristocratic‟ families. Additionally, the 
researchers‟ interviewees were clearly able to agree on the affiliation of each of the 333 families to either the Yazbakī 
or Junblāṭī party. (Cobban (1985) 23.)  
121 Corm (2005) 16  
122 Harik: p.45. 
123 Cf. Harik: pp.41-42. 
124 Harris (1997) 75. 
125 A prominent exception was, ironically, that of the Junblāṭs (Cobban (1985) 22.) 
126 Cobban (1985) 22. 
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knowledge guarded by a class of religious initiates, termed ʿuqqāl („the wise men‟). Sitting at 
the apex, the šayḵ al-ʿaql conducts both the secular, and the political life of the community as 
its highest religious leader. While originally designed to channel inner-communitarian political 
rivalries, as well as to represent the community to outsiders, the position of the šayḵ al-ʿaql was 
split between the rival Junblāṭī and Yazbakī factions after 1825, creating a double spiritual 
leadership.  “In 1962, the šayḵ al-ʿaql became a governmental official responsible for the legal 
affairs and the religious property of the Druze community, equivalent to the Sunni Grand Mufti, and 
in 1970 Kamāl Junblāṭ and Majīd Arslān, as factional chiefs, agreed on the de facto reunification. In 
other words, there would be only one šayḵ al-ʿaql at any one time.”  
Currently, the political leadership of the community is in the hands of the former warlord 
Walīd Junblāṭ, nominally the chief of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP, al-ḥizb at-taqaddumī 
al-ištirākī)127. The BBC describes him as “the country's political weathervane - consistently emerging 
on the winning side through the twists and turns of the 1975-90 civil war and its troubled 
aftermath.”128 
Today, Druze are spread in the rural areas of Jabal Lubnān‟s southern ranges, and on the 
southern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, constituting a minority in the cazas of aš-Šūf, 
ʿĀlayh, Baʿbdā, and to a lesser extent in Ḥāṣbayā, Marjaʿūn, the West-Beqaa (al-Biqāʿ al-ġarbī), 
and ar-Rāšiyā. Outside of Lebanon, Druze maintain important communities in the Ḥawrān 
region (in and around the city of as-Suwaydāʾ, capital of the French mandate-statelet Jabal ad-
Durūz) in southern Syria, as well as in Galilee (al-Jalīl) and the Golan-heights (Haḍbat al-
Jawlān) in northern Israel.129  
According to Harik, the community‟s social structure remains close-knit, assertive, and 
predominantly rural. A small upper class (an estimated 9% of the community) is made up by 
traditional landowners and entrepreneurs, while a strong petite bourgeoisie of shopkeepers, 
and producers account for a share of more than 50%. The rest, about 40% of the community‟s 
population is considered as members of the lower class.130   
 
                                                          
127 Founded in 1949 by the Druze political leader Kamāl Junblāṭ, the party advocated for the abolition of Lebanon‟s 
confessional system, and for an Arab socialist policy free from western influences. During the Civil War, party 
militias supported the progressive factions of the Palestinian side, and thus were heavily involved in the fighting. In 
1977, Kamāl had been assassinated, probably for his opposition to Syrian intervention. The party‟s leadership was 
taken on by his son Walīd, who allied with Syria after the letter broke with the party‟s main Christian adversaries.  
Following the war, the pro-Syrian Émile Lahoud‟s (Imīl Laḥūd) presidency forced Junblāṭ to brake his fidelity to 
Damascus and turn to Sunni-Christian opposition, finally joining al-Ḥarīrī‟s government and the March 14 Alliance in 
2000. (cf. Vannier (2009) 20.) 
128 BBC World Service   
129 Harris (1997) 75. 
130
 Harik : pp.42-43. 
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Educational situation 
Among Lebanon‟s non-Christian communities it were the Druze who firstly profited from 
western-style education after the British colonel Charles Henry Churchill established a Druze 
primary school in the Mount in the 1840s. As the next step, the Ottoman mutaṣarrif, or 
governor of Mont Liban, Dāwūd Pasha founded the first secondary school for Druze in 1862. 
However, due to the lack of a complete and widely spread educational network, Druze children 
often frequented Christian, par excellence Protestant schools available in the Druze-inhabited 
rural areas. The situation has little changed during the mandate years, or after the nation‟s 
independence; according to Hanf‟s 1969 study, Druze schools still made out an insignificant 
percent of the private educational sector at the time of writing.131  
During the Civil War, the de facto autonomous Druze civil administration that controlled 
the Druze „canton‟ in the Šūf, took charge over the educational sector as well. Its Education 
Committee, ordered by the community leader Walīd Junblāṭ, went even so far to introduce a 
new series of history textbooks displaying the community‟s history, and promoting Lebanon‟s 
historical narrative from a Druze point of view.132  
 
Today, there are 19 Druze schools in Lebanon, 9 private-free, and 10 private fee-charging 
taking an overall number of 7,211 students they account for the 1.37% of the total of Lebanese 
private school students.133  
In addition to these private schools, Druze-inhabited regions of the country have also a 
number of public educational institutions. As a recent study showed, children of the Druze 
community‟s socio-economically privileged upper class often frequent these public schools 
instead of their private counterparts as it could be assumed. Half of these students were 
enrolled into the Baʿqlīn public school, a model institution with good library and laboratory 
facilities. Another reason for this unexpected phenomenon is the lack of private schools in 
some of the Šūf Mountain‟s remote rural areas.134    
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 Hanf : p.244.  
132 Havemann: p88.  
133 Data published on the CRDL website (http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5085) 
134 Harik: p.45. 
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II.1.1.6 Jews 
 al-yahūd, םידוהי yehūdīm   ‎   
(less than 100 person in 2009)135  
Prior to the 1975-1989 Civil War, Lebanon had a small Jewish community centred in Beirut136 
but also spread in the coastal towns of Sidon and Tripoli. Surprisingly, the number of the 
Lebanese Jewry had been significantly increasing up until 1958, from approximately 3,300 in 
1923 to around 7,000 in 1939 and exceeding 10,000 in 1958. This unique tendency was the 
result of the major influx of Syrian Jews following the birth of the Jewish State in 1948 and the 
increasing pressure caused by the war between Syria and Israel. Additionally, despite of its 
open sympathy for the Zionist movement, the anti-Zionist atmosphere and anti-Jewish 
sentiments of the 1930s and 1940s left the community largely unaffected. The Lebanese Jewry 
had no organised leadership and based on their low numbers, the sectarian political structure 
of the Lebanese state allowed them no political representation or influence. Hence, around 90% 
of its members lived from commerce. The majority of the Lebanese Jewry was arabophone 
additionally to a smaller stratum of francophone elite.   
Following the 1958 Lebanese civil strife and the events of 1967, whereby the PLO established 
itself as a pivotal actor in Lebanese politics, mass Jewish exodus begun from Lebanon too, so 
that at the beginning of the Civil War no more than 1,000 Jews remained, most of them 
leaving for France, Canada, and the United States.137 Thus, the Civil War ended Jewish 
presence in Lebanon, leaving only a tiny community a few dozen of (mainly elderly) Beirut 
Jews by the end of the conflict.138  
 
Educational situation 
Adjacent to traditional midraš schools existing in Beirut and Tripoli, beginning from 1860, 
Jewish education was provided by the École de l‟Alliance Israélite in Beirut founded by the 
Alliance Israélite Universelle, a Paris-based international Jewish organisation maintaining 
Jewish schools across the Middle East and North Africa and subventioned by the Quay d‟Orsay. 
Consequently, the school was based on the French model and had French as its main language 
of instruction with additional courses in Hebrew, Arabic and English; while religious education 
was provided by rabbis. After obtaining their brevet, AIU pupils often continued their 
education at the AUB or USJ. Tuition fees were defined according to the parents‟ financial 
                                                          
135 Courrier: p.65. 
136 While the wealthy stratum was concentrated in Beirut‟s Eastern Christian districts, financially disadvantaged 
families continued to inhabit the capital‟s traditional Jewish quarter called Wādī Abū Jamīl in the Western section of 
the city.   
137 As only exception, the generally rather poor Sidon community had almost entirely left for Palestine as early as the 
beginning of the 1930s.  
138 Cf. LASKIER: pp.332-334. 
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situation, a policy that allowed the inscription of children with financially less privileged 
background.139 The building of the AUI school had been destroyed during the Civil War and has 
not been rebuilt ever since.  
  
                                                          
139 Cf. Hanf (1969) 172-173. 
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II. 1.2 Ethnic Communities 
Similarly to the uncertain figures concerning Lebanon‟s sectarian communities, the numeric 
proportion of the country‟s ethnic immigrant population is also a subject of approximations.  
While Harris speaks of a share of 6% (which would mean approximately 210,000 souls from 
Lebanon‟s estimated total population of 3.5 million), Corm places the number of non-Lebanese 
residents between 800,000 and 1 million140. The great majority of these immigrants is 
undoubtedly formed by Palestinians, Syrians and Kurds who typically remain socially 
segregated from Lebanese society, even though they are majorly Muslim arabophones. The 
number of Palestinians, mainly living in refugee camps, is estimated to be between 250,000 
and 425,000, while Syrians, par excellence guest labourers could have 500 to 700,000 strong 
community. In contrary to the recent immigration of Palestinians and Syrians, the Kurdish 
presence has a long history in the region dating back to the 12th century. However, the Kurdish 
population has rarely received any attention or reached political or cultural significance 
remaining without any official recognition or political representation.141 Since the end of the 
Civil War, the number of ethnic immigrants has been further increased by the influx of Sri 
Lankans, Philippines and Africans, mainly working as domestic labourers and only temporary 
residing in Lebanon. Their number is estimated to reach 80,000.142  
As an exception, ethnic Armenians retain their special position in Lebanon and are well 
integrated into its society. Due to their distinct educational structures, this community, as well 
as that of the Palestinians are to be further examined here.   
  
                                                          
140 Corm (2005) 10. 
141 Meho: p.1. 
142 Cf. Smith 
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Armenian Orthodox & Catholic share in 
parliamentary seats since Ṭāʾif: 5/128, 
1/128 
Armenian seats in the muḥāfaẓāt 
AK: 0/7   LN:0/21 
BE: 4/19   LS: 0/12 
BH: 0/10   NB: 0/11 
BO: 1/13  ML: 1/35 
 
 
II.1.2.1 Armenians 
al-arman, հայեր hayer  
(about 4% in 1990) 
As the largest non-Arabophone community of the 
country, Lebanon‟s approximately 150,000 plus 
Armenians make up an estimated 4% of the 
population. There are three officially recognised 
Armenian denominations: the Armenian Orthodox, 
Armenian Catholic and a small community of 
Armenian Protestants. Apart from these religious 
structures, Lebanese Armenians are well organised 
on numerous other fields: with three major political 
parties143 and currently 6 seats in the Lebanese 
Parliament as well as with a myriad of Armenian-
language dailies, two own radio stations and 
regular Armanian-language programming provided 
in some of the country‟s major commercial 
broadcasting channels their representation in 
Lebanese politics and media is well assured. 
Moreover, Armenians count own sports clubs, charity, social and scouting organisations. 
Thanks to these structures, Armenians are well integrated into (Christian) Lebanese society but 
at the same time succeed to maintain their language, religion, and cultural traditions.144  
Armenian presence in Lebanon dates back to the 1915 Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman 
Empire that resulted in the massacre of more than one million ethnic Armenians in Eastern 
Anatolia and the forced expulsion of the remaining population by the Ottoman Army. From 
these refugees, an estimated 30,000 reached the later Lebanon and settled down in Beirut‟s 
Christian districts of Mār Miḵāʾīl/Mar Mikhaël and al-Ašrafīya/Achrafié, and the eastern 
suburbs of Burj Ḥammūd/Borj Hammoud and Anṭiliyās/Antelias. Following the attachment of 
the Alexandrette Sanjak from French Mandate Syria to Turkey, a second wave of Armenian 
refugees arrived to Lebanon settling down in the village of ʿAnjar/Aanjar on the Syrian border. 
These communities continue to inhabit their original settlements up until today, often 
constituting the majority of local population.145  
 
                                                          
143 The three major parties are: Tashnag, Huchnag and Ramgavar, each of them having its own daily newspaper. 
144 Informations retrieved from the official website of the Armenian community in Lebanon:  
http://www.lipananahay.com/ 
145 Cf. Hourani (1954) 121. 
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Educational situation 
Similarly to their political and social presence, Armenians have an extensive network of 
educational institutions of every level financed by one of the Armenian churches or private, 
mostly Armenian-affiliated bodies. Generally, Armenian schools are having Armenian as their 
main language of instruction but follow the official Lebanese curricula with significant amount 
of additional classes in Armenian language, literature, and history. Given the tight contacts 
with the large American Armenian diaspora, private schools are often organised according to 
the Anglo-Saxon model emphasising English as their first foreign language beside Arabic.  
On the peak of the Armenian educational system stands the prestigious Haigazian University 
(Jāmiʿat Hāykāziyān, or Haykazean Hamalsaran), an Anglophone university in Downtown Beirut 
established in 1955.146  
                                                          
146 Cf. Hanf:p.321. 
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Location of Palestinian refugee camps 
II.1.2.2 Palestinians 
al-filasṭīnīyūn  
 
An unwelcome addition to Lebanon‟s diversity, the 
country‟s estimated 425,000 strong Palestinian 
refugee-community arrived in three major waves: 
following Israel‟s birth in 1948; after the defeat of 
the Arab armies by Israel in 1967; and as a result of 
the PLO‟s expulsion from Jordan in 1970-1971.147 
The most ill-fated in the Lebanese mosaic, 
Palestinians are largely Sunni Muslims148 and live 
under the most miserable circumstances. The 
Lebanese population, while sympathizing with the 
Palestinians in general terms, resented their presence 
in the country, blaming the PLO for its role in the 
1975-1989 Civil War. However, in order to maintain 
Lebanon‟s delicate sectarian balance, the government discourages Palestinians from becoming 
permanent fixtures by refusing them the right to own property, obtain working permit, to 
access public health care, and became integrated into Lebanese society.149 Even though they are 
making out a large portion, an estimated 10%, of Lebanese population, Palestinians are 
formally citizens neither of Lebanon nor of another state, but are classified as foreigners by the 
government since 1962. Thus, they are excluded from basic human rights and are not able to 
claim the same rights as other foreigners living and working in Lebanon. The majority of 
refugees and their descendents are living in one of the 12 refugee camps150 administrated and 
maintained by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees on the Near 
East (UNRWA) that defines a Palestinian refugee as “any person whose normal place of residence 
was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost their home and means of 
livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict”151 and divides these into three distinct categories:  
                                                          
147 Shafie (2007).6-7. 
148 Fisk (2002) 470. 
149 Klaushofer (2007) 221. 
150 Currently, these are: Rāšidīya/Rachidiyé, Burj aš-Šimālī/Borj El Chemali, al-Buṣṣ/El Buss, ʿAyn al-Ḥilwa/ Aïn El Héloué 
and al-Miya-Miya/Mié-Mié in the South; Burj el-Barājna/Borj El Brajné, Ḍbaya/Dbayé, Mār Ilyās/Mar Elias and 
Šātīlā/Chatila around Beirut; and al-Baddāwī/Beddaoui and Wīfil/Wavel in the North. The camps of Dikwāna/Dekouané, 
Jisr al-Bāšā/Jisr El Bacha, an-Nabaṭīya/Nabatiyé, Nahr al-Bārid/Nahr El Bared, Ṣabrā/Sabra and Tall az-Zaʿtar/Tell Ez 
Zaatar are now destroyed. Cf. NATIONAL INSTITUTION FOR SOCIAL CARE AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING: „Institutionalized 
Discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon: Report submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination‟, Geneva (February/March 2004), p.5. http://www.hic-
mena.org/documents/NISCVT-HIC%20CERD%2004.pdf 
151 Shafie (2007)1-3.  
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1) Refugees registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities: 406,342 in number in June 
2006, mostly 1948 refugees and their descendants. They were issued passports and ID cards but 
are refused to enter civil service or obtain the privileges and services of Lebanese citizenship.152 
2) Palestinian Refugees registered with the Lebanese authorities but not with UNRWA (non-
registered Palestinian refugees): According to the European Union‟s Humanitarian Aid Office, 
their estimated number is between 10,000 and 40,000. Half of these refugees were registered 
by the Red Cross and later by the Lebanese Government, and are also 1948 refugees, while the 
rest arrived after 1967.153  
3- Non-ID Palestinian refugees: the recently discovered group of refugees without any identity 
papers has an estimated number between 3,000 and 16,000. Completely stripped of any rights, 
they fear imprisonment for illegal residency.154 
 
Educational Situation 
Due to their disadvantaged status within Lebanon, Palestinians are denied access to Lebanese 
public schools, while private education is beyond the means of the majority of the refugee-
population. For the inhabitants of officially registered camps primary education is provided by 
UNRWA. It maintains a network of 75 schools with approximately 33,000 pupils or 95% of 
Palestinian schoolchildren. While secondary education is not considered to be within UNRWA‟s 
temporary mandate, Lebanon is its only field of operation where it maintains secondary schools 
(six in number).155 However, in the case of Palestinians without identity documents, secondary 
school education is inaccessible altogether due to their inability to sit for the intermediate 
schooling exam taken at the age of 15.156 
Additionally, as the official website of the UNRWA states: “budgetary cuts meant fewer 
classrooms had to cater to a higher number of students; in addition, parents had to meet part of the 
schooling costs, which proved to be prohibitive in most cases. Access to Lebanese schools remained 
extremely limited due to cost, distance, or both.”157 Moreover, UNRWA school facilities are 
reported to be in bad condition and the school buildings are in need of repair or replacement. 
Due to poor socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon many students are 
compelled to leave school and seek work in order to support their families. Palestinian schools 
in Lebanon have the highest drop-out rates in all of UNRWA‟s areas of operations and with an 
average of 53 pupils per classroom, the largest classes as well.158  
                                                          
152 As Fisk remarks, the passport issued by the Lebanese government have the same pale blue colour as ther former 
British Palestine passport, but with the Lebanese cedar printed on it. Cf. Fisk (2002) 69.  
153 Data retrieved from: SHAFIE: pp. 1-3. 
154Klaushofer (2007) 223-224. 
155 Up until 1983 secondary schools were held by the PLO. Cf ABU-HABIB, Lina: „Education and the Palestinian refugees 
of Lebanon: A lost generation?‟ in: Refugee Participation Network, (April 1996) 
http://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/abuhabib.htm 
156 Shafie (2007) 12. 
157 Cf. the UNRWA website‟s section for Lebanon under http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=65 
158 Shafie (2007) 12. 
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According to the UNRWA, camp-schools follow the host authorities‟ curricula and textbooks 
and are supplemented with the agency‟s own materials on human rights.159 In the case of 
Lebanon it is, however, unclear which of the many available and stately approved manuals are 
meant.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
159 UNRWA website 
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II.1.3 Lebanon’s confessional system 
Modern Lebanon‟s pre-Tāʾif constitutional order is based on the combination of the 1926 
written Constitution (dustūr al-Jumhūrīya „l-Lubnānīya) and the 1943 unwritten National Pact 
(al-mīṯāq al-waṭanī) representing a compromise between the leaders of the nascent country‟s 
most prominent communities brought together into one single polity without historical 
precedence by the French mandatory in 1920. To make this new entity work safe, the ruling 
Maronite and Sunni political class concocted a system referred to as confessional democracy 
enabling equilibrium through communal power sharing based on the first –and until today, 
last- census conducted in 1932, which showed a marginal Christian majority of 51%, compared 
with a Christian proportion of approximately 75% within the former Mutaṣarrifīya. As its 
earliest fundament, the 1926 Constitution – that formally renamed Grand Liban to the Lebanese 
Republic, leaving the state within its 1920 borders and under the same French mandatory rule – 
defined the republic‟s different governmental components and organs setting up the presidency 
(riʾāsat al-jumhūrīya, président de la république), the cabinet (majlis al-wuzarāʾ, conseil des 
ministres), the parliament (majlis an-nawāb, chambre des députés), but without defining sectarian 
distributions.160 As second fundament, the 1943 National Pact, the founding stone of Lebanon‟s 
independence, included an oral understanding about the proportioning of governmental, 
military, and bureaucratic positions among sectarian communities. “In essence, the Maronites 
hung onto the maximum possible prerogatives compatible with keeping non-Christians in the political 
system, while the Sunni leadership dominated non-Christians.” According to this – basically 
Maronite-Sunni – deal, the former held the powerful, French-style executive presidency, while 
the subordinate but strategic post of the prime minister was reserved for the latter. The 
country‟s than third largest, but notoriously underprivileged community, the Shiʿites were 
given chairmanship of parliament, referred to as “the second presidency” which was in fact 
little more than a representative position in the early decades of Lebanese independence. In 
addition to the presidency, the Maronites also secured the most prominent positions in the 
military, security institutions, and the single-chamber parliament where they succeeded to 
enforce a 6:5 Christian-Muslim ratio by allowing electoral districts to have seats divided 
                                                          
160 On the other hand, article 24 on Electoral Laws had defined the principle of equal representation of Christians and 
Muslims in the parliament, stating: “[…] the distribution of seats is according to the following principles: a. Equal 
representation between Christians and Muslims. b. Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each 
religious community. […]” The Lebanese Constitution (1926) 
seats Sunni Shiʿi Druze Maron. Gr. Orth. Gr. Cath. Arm. Orth. Minor. Total 
BE 2 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 9 
BH&BO 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 
LN 5 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 12 
LS 1 6 0 1 1 1 0 0 10 
ML 1 1 3 10 1 1 0 0 17 
Total 11 10 4 18 6 3 2 1 55 
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between sectarian proportions, with the same quotas introduced in public bureaucracy:   
As it is visible from the chart, a 29:25 Christian-Muslim ratio as well as well 18 Maronite (out 
of the total of 55) seats secures the sect‟s dominance, further emphasised the disproportionate 
representation of the Christian-majority governorates of Mount Lebanon (ML) and Liban-Nord 
(LN).161 
Despite of significant demographical shifts in the Christian-non-Christian population ratio 
to the disadvantage of the former since 1932 caused by differential natural increase and 
continuously high emigration rates, political allocations remained frozen according to the 1943 
portioning for decades. Consequently, the Maronite ruling elite avoided conducting another 
official census in order to preserve the delicate balance of 1932 resulting in the absence of 
reliable and up-to-date statistical data and demographic studies. Estimates from the 1990s, 
however, indicate a significant Christian decline from 51% in 1932 to 35-40% in the late 
1980s, and mainly a widening Christian-Muslim fertility and emigration gap as its main 
cause.162   
 
 Lebanese 
resident 
population 
Data 
sources 
% 
Maronite 
% other 
Christian 
% 
Sunni 
% 
Shiʿi 
% 
Druze 
remarks 
1911 
414,858 census 58 21 4 6 11 
the Mutaṣarrifīya’s 
territory 
1921 609,069 census 33 22 21 17 7 enlargement to Grand 
Liban; WW1 losses; 
Armenian refugee influx; 
Shiʿi increase 
1932 
782,415 census 29 22 22 20 7 
1943 
1,046,421 
official 
estimate 
52% Christian 48% non-Christian 
no census after 1932; 
trends: Christian and 
Druze decline, Shiʿi rise 
1970 
2,265,000 
adjusted 
Ministry of 
Planning 
survey 
42% Christian 58% non-Christian 
growth rate somewhat 
depressed by civil war, 
accelerated out-migration 
more significant than 
casualties  
1990 
3,500,000 
Ḥarīrī 
Foundation 
estimate 
21 14 24 35 5 
Table 2. Lebanese Residents in Lebanon: Numbers and Sectarian Proportions 
(based on Harris (1997) 84.) 
As it is clear from the table, the most prominent feature cutting across the dividing line 
between Christian and non-Christian sects is the Shiʾite community‟s vast growth from one-fifth 
of Lebanon‟s population in 1932 to over one-third within 50 years, overtaking both the 
Maronites and the Sunnis – the leading partners of political sectarianism – as the country‟s 
largest sect. Parallel to this trend, the population‟s Sunni-Shiʿi ratio has changed from 22:20 in 
1932 to an estimated 24:35 by the beginning of the 1990s, while Maronite decline resulted in 
                                                          
161 Table based on Benke (1987) 72. 
162 For more information on these and a number of other studies and estimations cf. Harris (1997) 82-85. 
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the loss of the position of the country‟s largest minority – 29% in 1932- counting for only the 
21% of the population – and only the third largest – sect in 1990. Naturally, this demographic 
evolution is not without considerable political importance. Recently, traditional Christian-
Muslim sectarian distinction seems to have given way to a more complex, triangular distinction 
between Christians, Sunnis, and Shiʿites. This tripolarity seems to be the result of sharpening 
Sunni-Shiʿite divide fuelled by the rapid demographic rise of the latter as well as the Maronites 
increasing gravitation into a more cohesive communal block with other Christians. , Due to its 
extremely late debut on the Lebanese political stage and fragmented political representation, 
the Shiʿite community‟s coherence has been fragile and thus failed to present itself as the 
country‟s largest minority. Although being Lebanon‟s sole community without substantial 
numbers of coreligionists in the neighbouring countries and thus with no communal interest 
across the borders, Shiʿites have only recently started to show interest for active participation 
in the Lebanese state, i.e. well after the formal end of the Civil War.163 
On 21 September, 1991, the Lebanese parliament ratified the Document of National 
Accord adopted in the Saudi-Arabian city of Ṭāʾif one year earlier to put an end to the 15 years 
of the Lebanese Civil War. The Ṭāʾif Accord, as it became known later, aimed to replace 
Lebanon‟s political structure based on the duality of the 1926 Constitution and the 1943 
National Pact and envisaged a solution to the Lebanese crisis in two periods. It gave birth to 
the Second Lebanese Republic conceived to be leading to a future Third Republic in which 
political sectarianism would be abolished. The system would be inaugurated by the election of 
the first non-sectarian parliament, while the sects would be given representation in a Senate-
like second chamber of parliament to vote on issues of national character. In the reality, 
however, the solution found little support among the country‟s community leaders and 
resulted, in practical terms, in the reproduction of the sectarian system, but at least with some 
pivotal modifications. First and foremost, the Agreement modified the hitherto 6:5 Christian-
Muslim ratio in the distribution of parliamentary seats increasing their number from 55 to 
128.164  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
163 Cf. Harris (1997) 85-90 
164 Traboulsi (2007) 244-245 
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As it becomes clear from the chart, the two major Muslim sects are still given a much weaker 
representation in the post-Ṭāʾif parliament than the country‟s Christian and Druze sects that 
represented by a higher number of deputy per voting member, while Christian-majority 
governorates, most notably the gouvernorat du Mont-Liban, are also disproportionately 
overrepresented.   
In addition to these modifications, sectarian quotes were abolished in the governmental 
bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military, and the police, with the exception of the so called 
Degree One posts, that is, general directors in ministries, where parity and rotation were to be 
applied, meaning that no Degree One post is reserved for a fixed sect. Concerning the posts of 
the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament, the 1943-system to reserve 
them to the Maronite, the Sunni and the Shiʿi sects, respectively, remained intact. The 
prerogatives of the president of the republic had seriously been curtailed practically loosing 
most of his executive power remaining head of the state and symbol of the country‟s unity and 
guardian of the constitution, while the prime minister, previously appointed by the president of 
the republic, “would henceforth be designated by „obligatory consultations‟ that the president 
carried out with the members of parliament, and he was bound by the decision of the majority. 
[…] This ruling troika arrangement created one of the most unstable power relations 
imaginable. In that sense the Ṭāʾif Accord merely created another system of discord. Conflicts 
between the holders of the three top posts became endemic.”165 
   
 
  
                                                          
165 Traboulsi (2007) 245 
 AK BE BH BO LN LS ML NB T & 
of seats 
No of voting sect  
member per deputy 
Sunni 3 6 2 3 8 2 2 1 27 21.1 24,984 
Shiʿite - 2 6 2 - 6 3 8 27 21.1 23,641 
Druze - 1 - 1 - - 5 1 8 6.1 9,245 
ʿAlewite 1 - - - 1 - - - 2 1.5 18,996 
Maronite 1 1 1 2 8 2 19 - 34 26.6 17,840 
Gr. Orth. 2 2 - 2 4 - 3 1 14 10.9 16,178 
Gr. Cath. - 1 1 2 - 2 2 - 8 6.1 18,331 
Arm. Orth. - 3 - 1 - - 1 - 5 4 17,930 
Arm. Cath. - 1 - - - - - - 1 0.8 19,332 
Protestant - 1 - - - - - - 1 0.8 18,230 
Minorities - 1 - - - - - - 1 0.8 58,819 
Total 7 19 10 13 21 12 35 11 128 100 Average: 20,698  
Table 3 Sectarian distribution of deputies according to geographic regions since Ṭāʾif 
Source: Electoral list of the year 2000, based on the table cited in Traboulsi (2007) 241 
60 
 
II.2 Lebanon’s Educational System 
 
Considering the statistics of education in Lebanon, the tiny country can boast of surprising 
figures. With a total population of barely 4 millions, currently there are ca. one million of its 
citizens enrolled in one of the country‟s numerous stately owned or private educational 
institutes. The number of these available establishments, especially that of in tertiary 
education, i.e. at university level, as well as the gross enrolment rate is also remarkably high, 
the latter one in fact the second highest in the whole region after Libya166. Furthermore, with 
the percentage (9.3% of its GDP - the five-fold of the OECD average167) the country invests in 
education and with a high literacy rate168, Lebanon can be considered the most educated Arab 
state169. But its wealth is not only expressed in numbers, as with a palette of different linguistic 
and religious affiliations, diversity is also one of the main characteristics of Lebanon‟s 
educational landscape. However, this multifarious system has its disadvantages. Many agree 
that its diversity and variety in sponsors, organisation, objectives and curricula, which are 
considered to be blessings in pluralistic societies, should be regarded as drawbacks in the case 
of Lebanon170. As Hares puts it: “Instead of creating a common ground for mutual 
understanding and respect among the Lebanese, the educational systems reflect the same 
instability and intolerance that characterise life in the nation in general.”171 
Another characteristic of the Lebanese educational system is the extreme share of private 
enrolment at every level of education172. This is partly because, as Hares argues, education in 
Lebanon owes its rise and development to French, American, British, Danish, Italian, German 
or Russian private denominational schools, that speeded up the Lebanese system far beyond 
what would normally be expected173. However, a country plagued by structural, ideological and 
social discrepancies and antagonisms as well as the dividing powers and developments that 
have been paralysing the nation as a whole since even before its creation, Lebanon‟s 
educational sector has always “guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo in Lebanon, and 
                                                          
166 According to a 2008 Development Report of the World Bank, Lebanon‟s gross enrolment rate in tertiary education 
was 47.6% compared to the region‟s average of 25.8% in 2003. „MENA Development Report: The Road Not Traveled. 
Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa‟ (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2008): p15. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/EDU_Flagship_Full_ENG.pdf (retrieved 21.03.2010) 
167
 cf. Frayha (2003) 87. 
168 According to the CIA World Factbook, with its total literacy rate of 87.4% Lebanon boasts of the 4th place in the 
Arab World after Palestine‟s estimated 92,4%, Jordan‟s 89,9% and Bahrain‟s 89%. (cf. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html retrieved 23.01.2010) 
169 Hares (1985) 80.  
170 cf. ibid. p.80  
171
 Ibid. p.80. 
172 The percentages are 64.7%, 57.8 and 49.3% in the primary, secondary and tertiary education, respectively, while 
the regional average lies well below with 19.8%, 13.7% and 23.6%, respectively. In: World Bank MENA Report,  , p.27. 
173
 Ibid. p.81. 
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the reproduction of the existing social structures”. As a matter of fact, the conflict within the 
educational system (or to be more exact, between the rival educational systems) with its 
imbedded historical contradictions, is obviously not recent.  As a basic principle, the problems 
are based on the rivalry between two historic components. The centuries-old, well established 
and hence prestigious and privileged private sector of education, established and still led by 
foreign missionaries or by one of Lebanon‟s many (mainly Christian) sects promotes a variety 
of philosophies and different outlooks, thus producing a generation foreign in aims, aspirations, 
loyalties and outlooks to the other174. Opposed to these divisive effects, governmental schools 
are characterised by the unifying attempts of the Lebanese State in order to create a collective 
identity for its fragmented and divided population. In such a case it is not hard to realise the 
crucial role education plays in laying down the fundaments of any kind of commonality or 
conformity within the frameworks of the artificial Lebanese state.  
However, as Hares argues, the cementing of existing social structures is not the only way the 
educational system divides the Lebanese175. In addition, Lebanon is the only country in the 
Middle East where two complete foreign-language educational systems coexist beside the 
native Arabic one: a Francophone and an Anglophone, both of them offering instruction at 
every level of education, from kindergartens and schools of primary level through an 
abundance of secondary schools to two prestigious universities, the Université Saint Joseph and 
the American University of Beirut176. By promoting foreign languages (as we see mainly French 
and English) at the expense of Arabic, the system‟s language policy is a further hindrance in 
establishing a single collective loyalty177. As a result, many (mainly Christian) Lebanese are 
more fluent in a foreign language than in their (notionally) native Arabic. En citant Hitti: 
“...being educated in a foreign language further removed the person from its original 
environment and rendered him incapable, if not unwilling to share fully the fruits of his 
learning with his fellow citizens178.”   
Thus, as we see, an analysis on Lebanese history textbooks would not be complete without 
spotlighting the complexity of the educational system. Therefore, the following chapter will 
seek to give an overview of the historical development of education in Lebanon from its 
possible of origins, but especially beginning with the Ottoman era until up to the present, 
including its current state and difficulties concerning its form and function in contemporary 
                                                          
174
 cf. Salibi, Kamal: The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965): p.138.; cited ibid. 81. 
175
 Ibid. 81-82.  
176
 Hanf (1969) 69. 
177
 as one of my Lebanese acquaintances, a Western-educated elderly gentleman brought it to the point: “You know my 
son, when I was a young man – and that was well before the Second World War- we adored the French, we wanted to became 
French and we really believed we can build up a piece of France on Lebanese soil… but these dreams were swept away by the 
many wars we were forced to fight, and we had to realise that we had failed. So now, we are building our America.” (personal 
conversation, Beirut, July 2009)  
178
 Hitti (1957) 454.  
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(i.e. post-civil war) Lebanese society. At the end of this chapter I will also provide a summary 
of the recent debates on language policy and of course the inevitable curriculum reform where 
especially the revision attempts of the history curriculum plays a key role on the way towards a 
common national identity for Lebanon.    
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II.2.1 Theories of origin of formal education in Lebanon 
The origin of education in Lebanon is an exceedingly controversial issue and depending 
on ideological and sectarian appartenance it is linked with several historical periods of the 
country.There are theories assessing a certain educational system as early as in the Phoenician 
period, based on some archaeological funds confirming the existence of philosophy schools in 
Ṣaydā/Sidon179 and par excellence highlighted by the “invention and export” of the modern 
alphabet by the Phoenicians. Even though there is only scarce material evidence providing any 
detailed information about education of the era, Phoenicians are still regarded by many as 
“représentants de le culture au vrai sens du mot”180.  
Other theories suggest that Lebanon‟s educational traditions are rather to be traced back into 
Greco-Roman times.  The Macedonian conquest of the Levant by Alexander the Great in 334 
BC181 brought the Hellenistic culture into the region and established Greek as its official 
language (replacing Phoenician and Aramaic). Consequently, Phoenicia‟s coastal towns 
experienced massive Hellenisation including the adoption of the Hellene administrative system 
or the establishment of Greek schools, both remaining predominant even after the Roman 
occupation of the territory in the 1st century BC.182 Under Roman control, the merchant hubs of 
the Phoenician coast183 enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy that allowed them e.g. the 
founding of philosophy-schools184, most notably the Roman Law School in Berytus (present-day 
Beirut) that is often celebrated as the world‟s first university thanks to its academic excellence, 
prestige and crucial role played within the intellectual life of the Roman Empire. However, it is 
not just official academic education that starts flourishing with the arrival of the Romans. The 
educational situation of the Republic and of the early Empire is mainly characterised by the 
absolute dominance of private education; as Saliba puts it:  
“La terre libanaise connut dès l‟époque romaine les conflits qui n‟apparurent en Europe que plus de 
mille ans plus tard entre les deux types d‟enseignement, l‟école privé et l‟école publique185.“  
Although very attempting, the contemporary Lebanese educational system cannot have its roots 
that deep in history, neither in the Phoenician, nor in the Greco-Roman period. The forms of 
formal education in later periods, viz. the uninterrupted existence of Roman and Byzantine 
theological and law schools in the early Islamic era following the Arab conquest of Syria in the 
                                                          
179
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 Kaufmann, Asher: Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity of Lebanon (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004): p.3. 
182
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 Saliba (1974) 36.  
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7th century, or the significant but short-lived florescence of churchly schools founded by the 
crusaders and the local Christian communities during the Crusades, or the emergence of the 
renowned madāris (pl. of madrasa) and Qurʿanic schools as centres of Muslim religious teaching 
(predominantly in Ṭarābulus/Tripoli) or the monasteries of Mount Lebanon as bulwarks of 
Christian education in the Mamluk period186 can also hardly be linked to any modern 
institutions.  
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II.2.2 Education in the Ottoman Era (1516-1920) 
The birth of systematic education in the territory what is today‟s Lebanon is marked by two 
significant events. Firstly, the Franco-Ottoman Concordat of 1536, signed by the French king 
Francis I and Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, granted France what is known as the 
Capitulation Right in cultural and economic affairs187 and acknowledged the country as the 
protecting power of Christians living on Muslim soil188. Furthermore, this treaty opened the 
Ottoman Empire for Christian missions form Europe, and thus enabled Western-style education 
to be introduced in the Levant.   
Secondly, the establishment of a Jesuit-run Maronite College in Rome (Pontificio Collegio 
Maronita di Roma/ al-Madrasa al-Ḥabrīya al-Mārūnīya fī Rūmā) by Pope Gregory XIII on 21 
March 1582189 enabled the training of Maronite scholars in the Urbs Æterna by granting them 
papal scholarships. Even though initially significant for only a tiny stratum of the Maronite 
clergy, the effects of establishing such tight ties to the core of Christian civilisation were far-
ranging, playing a crucial role in the development of the Christian educational system. As Hanf 
describes:  
“die maronitischen Geistlichen, die ihre Ausbildung in Rom beendet hatten, übernahmen nach 
ihrer Rückkehr fast ausnahmslos neben ihrer seelsorgerischen Tätigkeiten die Leitung von 
Schulen, wobei sie vielfach auf wissenschaftliche Karrieren in Europa verzichteten, um sich 
ihrer Erziehungsaufgabe im Libanon zu widmen“190.  
The return of these Western-educated men of-the-cloth enabled the formation of numerous 
schools that contributed to an educative renaissance of the Mount and paved the way for a 
direct Occidental influence in the region. A next significant step was taken by the ruler of the 
by that time autonomous Emirate of Mount Lebanon191, Faḵr ad-Dīn II., who, in order to link 
his country to Europe, allowed Western missionaries to establish their schools in the territory 
of present-day Lebanon192.  Following the Capuchins, who arrived in 1625 as first in the region 
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and founded a number of village schools in the Mount as well as a Seminary in Beirut193, it was 
the Jesuit Order that largely took advantage of the emir‟s religious tolerance and began its 
missionary work in 1645. Initially, the Jesuits set foot in the coastal towns of Ṭarābulus/Tripoli 
and Ṣaydā/Saïda (Sidon), but their focus was gradually turning on the mainly Maronite-
populated regions of Mont Liban, where the order founded – with the permission of the 
Maronite patriarchs - numerous smaller schools, many of them providing scholarships to Rome 
for their best disciples194. In addition to these first foreign, initially purely theologically 
orientated schools, the Maronite community soon began to establish its own village schools. 
The initiative emanated from the rows of the Western-educated Maronite clergy that 
encouraged the transformation of several monasteries into schools. Thus, within a short time, 
the education of the whole Maronite Community was monopolized by foreign, mostly French 
Jesuit, and the local clergy195, thereby exposing the community and binding the emirate 
irrevocably to the Occident.    
A turning point in the history of Lebanon‟s education is the 1736 Maronite synod of al-
Luwayza/Louayzé that, apart from enacting a fundamental reform setting the Maronite Church 
in its modern form, momentous decisions regulating the educational system were made. 
Concerning the final document of the synod:  
«Nous ordons, que dans les villes, les villages et les grands couvents soient ouvertes des écoles 
où les garçons apprendraient des choses… Nous exhortons et supplions les évêques, les curés 
et les supérieurs des couvents de s‟entraider pour nommer un professeur, là où il n‟y a pas, 
d‟inscrire des noms des garçons, capables de faire des études et d‟obliger leur parents  à les 
conduire à l‟école… Nous ordons à ces maîtres de suivre d‟un programme: Ils enseigneront 
d‟abord la lecture et l‟écriture dans les langues syriaque et arabe, plus les psaumes, le service 
de la messe, le bréviaire et le Nouveau Testament… […] Que ses [des écoles] professeurs 
sachent que le premier devoir de leur mission est l‟instruction des enfants… […] Nous ordons 
aux religieux libanais de St. Antoine de ne pas manquer d‟ouvrir des écoles dans leurs 
couvents pour instruire la jeunesse.»196 
As a result, a plethora of educational establishments, especially secondary schools and 
seminaries were founded immediately, offering education (that included the instruction of 
modern foreign languages, mainly French in addition to Arabic and Syriac) in the first instance 
to lower levels of society.  
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The Maronite example was soon started to be followed by many of the region‟s other Christian 
sects: Subsequently, Armenian Catholic, Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox schools came to 
existence, while the Maronite kept on extending their existing system197. In addition to the 
emerging concurrence between foreign, mostly French missions and the proactive local 
Christian communities, the region‟s educational landscape was further enriched by the 
appearance of American missioners, highlighted by the formation of the Protestant schools in 
Beirut in 1823198. 
With the weakening of Ottoman power in the 1830-40ies the increasing political influence of 
the European powers in the Middle East resulted in an intensification of Christian missionary 
activity especially in the predominantly Christian-inhabited parts of the Ottoman Empire, most 
notably in Jabal Lubnān, the region with the longest history of European exposure and with a 
non-hostile population199. The investment into the region‟s educational system promised the 
creation of loyal factors within the Empire‟s population as well as of a beachhead for further 
political influence or intervention.  Hence, foreign missionaries were not only receiving 
financial encouragement to start for the Levant, with the renewal of the 1536 Capitulation 
Rights between France and Turkey, but they were also granted diplomatic immunity from their 
governments200. In addition, the Ottoman administrative reforms of 1839, known as at-
Tanẓīmāt, allowed the Christian communities of the by the time autonomous Mount Lebanon to 
establish their own schools without the guidance and assistance of the civil authorities201. 
These rights were further extended by the Ḵaṭṭ-i Hümāyūn reforms of 1856202 that gave tax-
exemption to the Christian and Jewish communities203. All these factors resulted in an 
inexperienced boom of the Christian educational sector, characterised by the emerging 
concurrence between French and American missionaries, but also between the foreign 
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missionaries and the local communities204. Apart from these changes, the geographic focus of 
educational activities was shifted: Hitherto, with its autonomous government guaranteeing the 
security of Christian communities, Smaller Lebanon was the preferred centre of both 
missionary activities and local educational initiatives. However, following the stark Christian 
exodus from the South of Lebanon to Beirut in the 1860s205, the heretofore insignificant, 
Muslim-dominated and for educational purposes unfavourable coastal town (that economically 
and culturally became increasingly linked to the Mount indeed, but being under direct 
Ottoman rule, was politically not part of Christian Petit Liban) has gained in importance as 
centre of foreign education206. Already existing schools, such as the School of the Jesuit Order 
of Ġāzir/Ghazer, or Dr. van Dyke‟s American secondary school in ʿAbayh/Abey, were relocated 
to Beirut. After their relocation, both of these schools were developed into high-quality 
universities. The former one of these was recognised by the Holy See as a papal university in 
1874 and was given the name „Université Saint Joseph‟. Today, the USJ is the oldest still 
operating Christian institute of higher education in the Middle East, and one of the most 
prestigious in Lebanon (with French as language of instruction). Initially, it offered courses in 
Semitic, Greek and Latin philology; European languages and literatures, natural sciences, 
mathematics, philosophy and theology, later also in medicine. The latter one, Dr. van Dyke‟s 
American school was reopened as the „Syrian Protestant College‟ in 1866 (and was created the 
„American University of Beirut‟ in 1920). At the beginning, Arabic was intended to be the 
language of instruction; however, difficulties in the terminology of many disciplines caused the 
adoption of the English language instead.  
In contrary to the unprecedented educational boom experienced by the Christian communities, 
the Muslim community had little chance keep step with this process; hence Muslim education 
was still limited to the traditional religious schools207. These were divided into „kuttāb‟ [writers] 
and „al-madrasa‟ [the school] schools, the previous group aiming to teach children the Qurʾan 
and the basic principles of Islam, while the latter had the function “to teach Islam in its 
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traditional manner, one which had not changed or advanced for centuries.”208 Unlike their 
Christian neighbours who could easily accept the West and regarded the Westerner as their 
coreligionist and also as a champion and protector, Muslims kept their religious or political 
reservations and considered increasing Western influence as threat to their communities209. 
Even so, many Muslim boys attended Christian schools. The first step towards the 
establishment of educational institutes for Muslims was taken by the first governor of the 
newly created Mutaṣarrifīya of Jabal Lubnān, Dāwūd Pasha, who in addition to (mainly Druze) 
primary schools, founded a secondary school in 1862210.  
However, in the peripheral territories of present-day Lebanon211, at the time under direct 
Ottoman rule, it was only an 1869 decree that enabled the formation of public schools. The act, 
besides recognising foreign private schools, declared education a state function and hence, 
compulsory and free of charge212. Furthermore, schools in the Ottoman Empire were divided 
into two distinct categories, viz. “les écoles publiques dont la surveillance et l‟administration 
appartiennent exclusivement à l‟État” and “les écoles particulières, qui, placées seulement sur 
la surveillance du gouvernement, sont fondées et directement gérées par les particuliers ou le 
Communauté.213” As an effect, at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 the Lebanese 
territories under direct Ottoman rule could boast of the total number of 125 primary and three 
secondary schools (but even so, it was no real concurrence to the private sector). The syllabus 
of instruction (with emphasis on foreign languages, natural sciences and mathematics) was 
modeled after the French system; however, the main language of instruction was Turkish. 
Hence, thanks to this Turkish character, the Ottoman school system was only beneficial for the 
children of Turkish public servants and of a small stratum of the turcophil Sunni elite.  
Thus, in order to be able to respond to the growing demand for education, Muslims started to 
draw inspiration from Western and local Christian examples. With the intention to back 
Lebanon‟s Muslim community, a group of Sunni notables from Beirut founded the Jamʿīyat al-
maqāṣid al-ḵayrīya al-islāmīya (Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions) in 1878. The Society 
began its work with the establishing of smaller schools in Beirut offering primary and religious 
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education214. Later, their activities enabled to set up a number of secondary schools for boys 
and girls in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. The financing of the Society was assured by the 
community‟s waqf-proprieties and the generous contributions of the active members215. The 
Maqāṣid schools, while laying emphasis on the Arab and Muslim heritage of the Sunni 
community and maintaining close connections to the Ottomans, also took positive steps toward 
western education by employing Christian teachers in their schools and by consulting with 
foreign establishments on pedagogical questions216. 
The other Muslim communities, viz. the Druze and the Shi‟ites were the only Lebanese sects 
who remained largely unaffected by the educational progress of the time, none of the both 
having own denominational schools. Although the communities‟ right to establish and maintain 
their own educational institutions was recognised by the Sultanate since 1869, however, the 
Shi‟ite Muslims were barely benefiting from the regulation, as they were not regarded to be a 
separate sect by Constantinople. Therefore, they were hindered to develop their own social 
structures as extensively as other minority and religious groups of the Empire217. Other 
impediments, such as their political persecution at the hands of their long-time political rivals, 
the Sunni Muslims as well as the remote and isolated regions they have inhabited also cut the 
community off from outside forces and ideas and were not exposed to the educational influence 
of foreign missionaries218.  
The Druze, however, were in a more beneficial position. In addition to the special school 
established by the first governor of the mutaṣarrifīya, Dāwud Pasha, the Druze, even though not 
having further educational institutions of their own, also benefited from the Christian 
educational system by availing themselves of its schools219.  
In addition to these Christian and Muslim220 denominational schools as well as the centralised 
Ottoman school system, the second half of the 19th century brought a third form of educational 
institutions to existence, namely private schools without any confessional affiliation. The first 
of these schools, the Collège Nationale (al-kullīya al-waṭanīya) was founded by the scholar and 
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homme de lettres Buṭrus al-Bustānī (Boutros Boustani)221 in 1863 with the intention to reconcile 
Lebanon‟s communities after the bloodshed of the 1840s and 1860s and to rescue his fellow 
citizens from the destructive effects of religious fanaticism.  He was determined to forge a 
secular national identity for the Lebanese that prevents sectarian division and the farfetched 
exposure to foreign ideas and ideologies. Located in a pleasant Beirut suburb, the Collège 
Nationale could boast of an excellent staff, own textbooks, written by al-Bustānī himself and a 
curriculum directly geared to the real needs of society. Although the model that provided a safe 
haven for intellectuals of any confession and prepared a new generation of Lebanese 
intelligentsia was proved to be successful, it could do little to change the country‟s evolving 
sectarian structure222. After al-Bustānī‟s death in 1883 his school merged into the Syrian 
Protestant College (the later AUB)223, but despite of its short life “it had a major impact on the 
education in Lebanon, since it provided a model for a number of national schools that were 
founded to counteract the religious and foreign schools”224. 
Concerning the educational situation of the late 19th century, Syria (and especially its 
autonomous mutaṣarrifīya) can be considered as the most advanced part of the Ottoman Empire 
and the Arab World. Western exposure, relative Ottoman liberalism, and proactive local 
communities all contributed to this educational boom that raised the cultural standard of the 
region to a relative high level and made the educational sector to a pivotal segment in the 
country‟s modernisation process. However, the various communities were not benefitting 
equally from this process and thus education cannot be regarded as an unmixed blessing. By 
dividing the people among religious, communitarian and cultural lines, Western (and Western-
inspired) education rather emphasised sectarian divisions, strengthened inequality and 
deepened social differences.      
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II.2.3 Education during the French Mandate (1920-1943) 
„N'oublions pas que la France a créé votre pays, la France vous a donné les frontières. 
Nous vous avons enseigné la paix, nous avons préparé votre civilisation et votre 
constitution.  Sachez que l'éducation, l'éducation française en particulier, est le seul 
chemin pour vous sortir de vos coutumes primitives.“225 
in Ziad Doueiri: West Beyrouth (Drama, France-Lebanon, 105 min.), 1997.    
 
During the First World War Lebanon sank into one of the darkest eras of its history. 
Without respecting the Règlement organique that served as a basis for its autonomous status, 
Smaller Lebanon was occupied by Turkish troops and was merged into the neighbouring 
Damascus wilayet in order to prevent any foreign intervention. Thus, the country was sealed 
off from the outside world, as communication with Europe and even with the numerous 
expatriate communities became literally impossible. The four years of direct Ottoman rule, 
marked by the repressing of any form of resistance against the regime, executions, 
deportations, famine and diseases cost roughly 100.000 Lebanese their life alone in the 
territory of the quondam mutaṣarrifīya, although it was spared from direct military 
operations.226  
With the seizure and occupation of French, British and Italian missionary schools by the 
Ottoman army, the elaborate educational landscape suffered the same fate: foreign staffs were 
forced to leave the country or were detained, school buildings were transformed into barracks 
or military hospitals, while in the still operating establishments of local communities the 
instruction of the French language had been replaced by Turkish227. Only few the American, 
and (not surprisingly) German private schools and Turkish governmental schools enjoyed 
unaffected freedom, however, they could not assume the role of the closed French schools. 
Ultimately, with the Ottoman capitulation and the withdrawal of Turkish military and civil 
servants from the region as its result, the majority of these remaining schools were also closed, 
resulting in the complete collapse of the educational system228.  
Following the Ottoman defeat, France took possession of the Syrian coast marked as the “Blue 
Zone” in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement signed between the governments in London and Paris 
in order to partition their spheres of influence in the Middle East. On September 1st, 1920, 
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Henri Gouraud, commissar and general of the Armée Française en Orient proclaimed the State of 
Greater Lebanon (dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr/État du Grand-Liban) in Beirut. Two years later, on 
July 24, 1922, the League of Nations mandated direct control over Syria and Lebanon to 
France. However, the French rule was not only set limits by the catastrophic economical 
situation of the region, but it was also tied by the League of Nations‟ Charter that specified the 
mandate as an interim arrangement on the path to Lebanon‟s (and Syria‟s) full independence229. 
Furthermore, Article 8 of the Charter required the mandatory power to guarantee the freedom 
of education: 
“The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of 
all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination 
of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of 
differences in race, religion or language. 
The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium 
of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon. 
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of 
its own members in its own language, while conforming to such requirements of a general 
nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.” 
 In order to construct and anchor loyalty in the local population that best served their interest, 
officers of the occupant French Army had not been hesitant to issue certain orders concerning 
education just shortly after entering the Middle Eastern territories of the obsolete Ottoman 
Empire in October 1918, i.e. well prior the official beginning of the Mandate in August 1922. 
These acts proclaimed the maintenance of the educational system and the replacement of 
Turkish with French as the language of instruction.230  
Furthermore, in January 1919 the French High Commissioner ordered, "que chaque religion 
ouvrirait ses principales écoles d‟avant-guerre, que le Haut Commissariat donnerait une allocation de 
1600 à 1900 francs par professeur et un secours extraordinaire pour subvenir aux frais de première 
installation; que moyennant ces secours, les enfants pauvres seraient admis gratuitement dans les 
écoles”231. Thanks to these measures, the number of schools reached the antebellum level, so 
that at the beginning of the Mandate in 1922, French schools of the reconstructed private 
                                                          
229 Article 1 of the Mandate Charta: „The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force 
of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon. 
This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and 
wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the 
progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the 
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Genava, August 1922, pp.1013-1017)   
230 “Art. 1 – Les écoles sont maintenues. Art. 2 – Le personnel reste en fonction. Art. 3 – La langue française remplace la 
langue turque.”, in Saliba (1974) 108. 
231 Semaine Sociale de Beyrouth, Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1942, p.28. ff.; cited in  Hanf (1969) 72. 
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system accounted for the majority of existing foreign institutions in the country, and also more 
than the half of all private schools were francophone.232  
Accordingly, the French education policy was oriented according to these preconditions. 
Firstly, in order to reshape education after the French model, French-language schools were to 
be strengthened further and given a privileged role. Secondly, by leaving the primacy of the 
private educational sector unchallenged, the system‟s pre-war status quo was to be maintained. 
Thirdly, plans to unify curricula and to introduce a compulsory examination system aimed to 
centralise education, even though its secondary and tertiary levels were exclusively dominated 
by foreign and local private institutions233.  
To pursue these goals without violating the interests of the various religious communities, the 
French decided to build up a state-controlled educational system complementary to the already 
existing structures provided by the private sector. In 1922, the French High Commissariat set 
up the Service de l‟Instruction Publique to enforce French education policy in Syria and 
Lebanon234. Thus, Lebanon‟s new stately educational system was built up as a copy of the 
French model with the only difference that Lebanese curricula ware added additional courses 
such as Arabic and local history, literature and geography235. Just like in France proper, the 
system was composed of 4 levels:  
1. The école maternelle, for children aged between 2-6 years, was comparable to 
kindergartens and was regarded as a preparatory stage for the elementary school. 
2. The école primaire took children in the age of 6-12 years and provided classes in Arabic, 
French, mathematics, history, geography, physical education, art, natural sciences, 
ethics and religion. The course was to be completed by the „certificat des études 
primaires‟, an exam composed of an oral and written part that entitled its bearer to 
enter the secondary level. Children not willing to do so had the possibility to spend two 
additional years in a cours complémentaire that prepared for a profession and was 
completed by the „brevet elémentaire des études primaires‟236.  
Throughout the whole mandate period, the elementary level was that level of the 
educational system the French High Commissariat‟s efforts were mostly focused on: the 
number of pupils attending stately-founded primary schools increased from 8.611 in 
1925 to 17.228 in 1941. However, given the fact that the newly created State of 
Greater Lebanon included not only the former Christian mutaṣarrifīya, but also 
predominantly Muslim territories formerly under direct Ottoman rule237 that lacked 
                                                          
232 Labaki, Boutros: Education et mobilité sociale dans la société multicommunautaire du Liban : approche socio-historique. 
Materialen zu Gesellschaft und Bildung in multikulturellen Gesellschaften, vol. 2,  Frankfurt a.M.: Deutsches Institut für 
Internationale P dagogische Forschung, 1988, p.54. 
233 cf.  Hanf (1969) 75-76. 
234 In contrary to its name, the SIP was not only in charge for the public sector, but for the whole of private institutions 
as well. The Lebanese branch of the SIP became the Ministry of Education of the Lebanese Republic in 1926 
overtaking all its assignments and competences.  
235 Frayha (2003) 80. 
236  Hanf (1969) 80. 
237 These were the surroundings of Tripoli and the qaḍā of ʿAkkār in the north, the coast between Sidon and Tyre as 
well as the Jabal ʿĀmil region in the south, the Biqāʿ in the east, the two former regions forming previously the parts 
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any stately or private educational network comparable to that of the Christian regions, 
the mandatory power‟s school-founding activity favoured these disadvantaged 
territories. Apart from the aim to develop the educational infrastructure in these new 
(and in many cases towards the mandate hostile) regions, the French authorities used 
the (re)construction of the educational system to promote and unite a state never 
existed before and generate loyalty to the country‟s French rule, just like as it was 
practiced in France‟s colonies long before238.  
3. The secondary level received pupils of age 12-18 and was to be completed by the 
Lebanese baccalauréat that was made compulsory in whole Syria and Lebanon. In 
contrary to the primary level, however, not a single new secondary school was 
established during the 21 years of the mandate-era in Lebanon. Given the excellent 
network of private, mostly communitarian-affiliated and foreign- or locally-owned 
secondary education in Mount Lebanon and Beirut dating back to the Mutaṣarrifīya 
that met the current needs of the whole of secondary level education, the authorities 
(initially the SIP, from 1926 the Lebanese Ministry for Education under the auspices of 
the French High Commissariat) limited themselves to elaborate new, centralised 
curricula and a unified, stately examining system compulsory for every private 
institution239. In order to create the legal framework to its control over the private 
educational sector, the French High Commissariat has issued a decree setting the 
adoption of the French curricular programme as a precondition to new school-
establishments. In addition, the autonomy of private secondary schools was further 
restrained by the introduction of the baccalauréat240 as the sole examination confirming 
a rounded secondary education that allowed the authorities to exercise a certain 
indirect authority over the de jure independent private sector241. According to the same 
decree, the Haut Commissariat allocated financial means for the subvention of private 
(both French and national) schools in order to make them accessible for an as broad 
public as possible. Even so, secondary education remained reserved for the country‟s 
elite.242  
As Kurani summarises: “With the program at each stage modelled after the French, 
with external examination controlling the process of education in every stage, and with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of the Ottoman Beirut Wilayet, while the latter one being the integral part of the Damascus Wilayet until 1920. 
Moreover the majority of the attached regions‟ Muslim population objected both the Mandate rule as well as the 
creation of a separate Lebanese entity detached from Greater Syria. Cf. Daher, Franceline: „L‟enseignement de la 
langue française au Liban: Analyse critique des nouveaux programmes du secondaire‟, Thèse du doctorat. Strasbourg: 
Université Marc Bloch (Strasbourg II), 2002, p.29. 
238 cf. Kaufmann (2008) 111. 
239  Hanf (1969) 76. 
240 Like in France, the central Lebanese baccalauréat contained of two separate, an oral and a written part which were 
to be sit in the penultimate and the last year of secondary education, respectively, optionally in French or in Arabic.  
As requirement for governmental positions, and following a 1934 decree, as compulsory entry requirement for 
universities, the obtaining of this certificate meant the major goal of secondary education. cf.  Hanf (1969) 78. 
241 Abou Moussa (1996) 151-152. 
242 Abou Moussa (1996) 154 
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a central body [...] deeply concerned over the educational policy [...] Uniformity in 
standard and output prevails.”243  
4. In the stage of tertiary education the French mandatory power pursued the same policy 
as in the secondary level: the existing structures remained intact and in the case of the 
Jesuit-run francophone Université St. Joseph in Beirut that “crowned the whole system 
as the semi-official state university of Lebanon”244, it was even supported by the 
authorities. However, with the unification of the lower levels of the Lebanese 
educational system, the USJ‟s American counterpart, the American University of Beirut 
found itself in a disadvantaged position. Although it was still possible to pursue a 
complete study program at every four levels based on the Anglo-Saxon system, the AUB 
had to face the increasing concurrence of the implanted French model.245 
 
So as we see, although Lebanon‟s pluralistic educational system was still in the hands of 
different quarters and was not directly monopolised by the French authorities, the mandatory 
power found a number of indirect ways to standardise and reshape it:  
Besides the unified examination policy and the adoption of the French structure it was the 
introduction of the French language in public and private institutions alike as one of the 
official language of instruction on the side of Arabic246. Although the measure was intended to 
contribute to the harmonisation of the diversified educational landscape, it was, however, 
proved to be rather counterproductive as it has generated strong resentments and resistance 
from various sides. The majority of Muslims but also many Christians, especially the 
traditionally Russophile Greek Orthodox, have regarded the language policy as a clear bias 
towards the Maronites, the community having the strongest ties to France and thus benefiting 
the most from it. The non-French private schools were also against this unification which they 
criticised for creating an unfair vantage-point to French schools already dominating the 
Lebanese private education sector.247 In fact, proposed official bilingualism in administration 
and stately examination made the knowledge of the French language indispensable within a 
short time248. Thus, in order to maintain their number of students, British and American schools 
had no other choice than to introduce French language instruction to prepare their students to 
                                                          
243 Kurani, Habib: Education in Territories under French Mandate, in: The Open Court, Chicago, April 1936, vol.50. Nr. 
937, p.2. (cited in:  Hanf (1969) 78.) 
244 Bashshur, Munir: Higher Education and Political Development in Syria and Lebanon, Chicago, 1963, p.8. (cited in:  
Hanf (1969) 79.)  
245  Hanf (1969) 82. 
246 According to the decree N°455 of February 9, 1920 the French language was introduced as the second official 
language of administration and education in order to achieve official bilingualism in Lebanon. Cf. Abou Mrad, Moufid: 
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154.)  
247 Labaki,  , p.79.  
248 As Kurani ( ,p.7.) puts it : “The ability to read and speak a foreign tongue is taken as the main criterion for judging the 
success of elementary education. This emphasis on languages is seen more vividly in the Secondary Schools. The examinations 
for the baccalaureate demand almost an equal knowledge of two languages and literatures – the Arabic and the French. The 
standards of examination are not low. This has rendered the Syrian and Lebanese Baccalaureate Diploma rather more difficult 
to obtain than the French baccalaureate.” (cited in:  Hanf (1969) 82) 
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the Lebanese baccalauréat. The prestigious AUB went even so far to establish an own 
preparatory school modelled after a French lycée where French was thought as intensively as 
English.249    
Another French attempt to harmonise the educational sector was the elaborating of new 
curricula with special emphasis on the development of new historical narratives250. As Kaufman 
explains: “The French authorities were absorbed by the idea that they could use school 
curricula as an the avenue through which to cast national content into the new petty states 
they had formed by teaching Syrian, Lebanese, Druze and „Alawite children French and 
European Civilisation, on the one hand, and selective local history, on the other.”251 The 
teaching of local history, however, was not entirely novel in Lebanon as many confessional and 
private schools had been offering courses on regional and non-Arab history well before the 
beginning of the French mandate. The major change was brought by the mandatory nature of 
the French-based curricula as, with the exception of foreign schools entirely financed by 
foreign sources without the subvention of the Haut Commissariat, they were to be adopted by 
both public and private schools. Concerning the proposed history textbooks, the French were 
aware of the fact that their Syro-Lebanese mandate, as newly created entity separated from its 
wider Arabic context, can only survive with the support of a rewritten history that gives the 
region an own individuality and distinct identity based on its local character and culture, 
besides “attaching the thoughts and the hearts of the local elite to France”. Within this French 
dominated Syrian framework, however, the novel Greater Lebanon was in a more specific 
situation. As a new, heterogeneous state it not just had to be differenced from its Arab 
environment but also from its Syrian hinterland. Additionally, with its diverse population, the 
French faced the existence of very different loyalties, both hostile and amicable. Hence, the 
new curricula both had to convey political messages to reflect the shift from Ottoman to French 
rule and contribute to the population‟s cultural homogenisation.252 Not surprisingly, the first 
new history manuals designed for Syria and Lebanon were the products of French, French 
Jesuit253 and to lesser extent Lebanese authors, the latter all being graduates of the Université St 
Joseph in Beirut and thus were very much reflecting these efforts. According to Hares, these 
three quarters initially brought out three, thanks to their perfect monopoly position highly 
decisive, history manuals that were intended to shape the societies of the mandated territories 
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250 Not surprisingly, the instruction of history and geography is considered to be most effective means for the 
dissemination of national sentiments and the creation of collective identities. Thus, by elaborating new curricula for its 
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251 Kaufmann (2004) 111 
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in a for the French beneficial way. The first and most influential among them, the French-
language „Histoire de la Syrie, précis historique‟254 by the Belgian orientalist scholar Henri 
Lammens propagated a „Syrian nation‟ distinguished from its “nomadic and illiterate” Arab 
(“Hidjâzî”) neighbours through its perfect territorial unity and distinct race, regardless of 
confessional appartenance. Within this historical Syrian framework, however, Lammens 
maintained the theory of Lebanon as a (Christian) refuge with a long and important pre-Islamic 
history forming rather the part of the Mediterranean than the Arab World and thus legitimating 
its separation from Greater Syria by underlining its distinct historical development and 
traditions as well as its close ties to France.255 However, he describes Lebanon as a Syrian land 
and as such; he treats its history tightly attached to that of Syria only distinguishing it in later 
chapters. As Abou Fadel, editor of contemporary Lebanese history textbooks summarises: 
“[l‟ensemble des manuels inspirés par Lammens n‟a pas] traité l‟histoire du Liban d‟une façon 
autonome, mais à travers de l‟histoire de la grande Syrie, c'est-à-dire les régions sous mandat 
français”.256 This treatment of the region‟s history follows General Gouraud‟s request to 
emphasise ancient and Frankish history and to “give Arab civilisation a place in history no 
greater than it deserves”.257   
Despite of the predominant position Lammens‟ textbook enjoyed in the first years of the 
mandate, other manuals, however, were providing a throughout different approach to the 
region‟s history. Seeking to give the newly created state an own identity, history textbooks 
from francophone or French-educated Maronite historians and politicians were focusing on 
historical events of primary relevance for the Lebanese entity and thus detached these from 
their wider regional context. Even though these Lebanon-centric textbooks were mainly written 
by USJ graduates, they are openly concurring with Lammens‟ Histoire de la Syrie by refusing its 
imposed Syrian national identity and thus, with the preferred French narrative as well. The 
most notable of these works, „Tārīḵ Lubnān al-mūjaz‟ (Brief History of Lebanon) by Asad Rustum 
and Fuʾād Afrām al-Bustānī, was commissioned in 1936 by the at that time Lebanese president 
of the republic Émile Eddé (Imīl Iddih) who feared the growing desire of the country‟s Muslim 
population to join Syria as the first step to reach Arab unity and hence, felt the necessity of a 
national narrative to support Greater Lebanon‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The 
rewritten narrative that became immediately introduced in public schools and also as primary 
reference for official examinations, denied the country‟s Arab identity (consecrating only 7 
pages to Arabic history from its total of 176 and using derogatory terms to the Arab population 
and Islam258) but established the dynasties of the Maʿnī and the Šihāb as founding fathers of the 
Lebanese state. However, despite having been published 12 times until 1957, the textbook‟s 
usage had been limited to Maronite schools and the Francophile stratum of society, but with its  
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Lebanon-centric and heavily Christian dominated national narrative it had met with severe 
criticism from Muslim, par excellence Sunni intellectuals. These quarters, “made up largely of 
sympathizers with the Arab cause who like to see the Arabic culture of Lebanon maintained, 
accuse them of not paying enough attention to Arabic and Eastern cultures, and assert that 
what is called "Mediterranean culture" is nothing more than a thin veil for the attempt to 
preserve French Catholic influence and education in Lebanon.”259  
As a result, two Sunni two historians, ʿUmar Farrūḵ and Zakī Naqqāš published their “scientific 
critique” to disprove what they called “historical myths” created by Christian historians to 
legitimise Lebanon‟s existence and separation from Syria and the rest of the Arab-Muslim 
world. In their oeuvre, titled „Tārīḵ Sūrīya w-Lubnān al-muṣawwar‟ (Illustrated History of Syria 
and Lebanon), Lebanon appears as one of the numerous Arab provinces without any special 
attention or particular significance. By marginalising antiquity (Phoenicia is consecrated only 2 
out of its 294 pages), the textbook focuses on Islamic history and the historical development of 
the Peninsula‟s Arab tribes. Furthermore, in order to undermine the country‟s Maronite 
legitimisation, Arab empires are set as historical models in opposition to the Roman and 
Byzantine Empires and par excellence the Crusaders‟ states; the emirs of the Mount are 
pictured as insignificant betrayers of the Ottoman Empire; and describes Lebanon as integral 
part of Syria.260  
Yet, as we see, these three types of textbooks (French oriented, promoting Lebanese 
particularity within Syrian frames; Maronite oriented, seeking to justify Greater Lebanon‟s right 
to existence; and Arab-Muslim oriented opposing the country‟s forced separation from Syria) 
offering fundamentally differing identities based on antithetic concepts of history stirred sharp 
controversy among the various communities. The most disputed historical periods were, 
however, not those concerning the Phoenicians or the region‟s antique past, but rather the 
chapters describing the role the Arab-Islamic civilisation and the Crusades play in the 
formation of Lebanese national identity. By the last decade of the French Mandate, the 
presentation of these historical eras became the most controversial issues of the curricula, 
laden with contradictory ideological constructs. As Kaufman puts it: “Politically, it [Lebanon] 
was struggling on two fronts with France and Syria. Culturally, the country experienced 
internal strife that practically began with its formation and peaked towards the end of the 
1930s, dividing Lebanon between supporters and opponents of its political integrity and 
cultural uniqueness.”261 
 
Hence, French attempts to harmonise the newly created mandate‟s heterogeneous society 
through education met with the strong opposition of the country‟s fragmentising sectarian 
reality that did not allow harmonisation or reconciliation imposed from above. This effort, 
however, cannot be regarded as entirely false. From the very beginning of the mandate period, 
the French authorities were well aware of the potential role a diversified and thus not cohesive 
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educational system can play in the strengthening and reproducing of existing social divisions: 
“A divided country will never be strong, especially when the children cannot forget their 
rivalry and quarrel for the control of the country. Differences among religious groups have 
caused a lot of bloodshed in the past. Renewing this conflict would be fatal and disastrous to 
the nation‟s development.”262 Although the Christians, especially the Maronites were 
considered as the Mandatory‟s natural local allies and thus occupied a privileged role in the 
further decades, numerous measures, for instance the establishment of the stately owned public 
school system was more beneficial for Muslims and their areas.    
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81 
 
3.3.4 Education in the first three decades of independence (1943-1975)  
Following the proclamation of Lebanon‟s independence on November 22, 1943, the 
recognition of communitarian privileges rooting in centuries-old Ottoman policy-making was 
regarded to be incompatible with the idea of a centralised, supracommunitarian nation state à 
la française, the model Lebanon‟s novel administration saw the key in to the country‟s unity and 
territorial integrity severely questioned by its Syrian neighbour. Thus, communitarian 
allegiance and sectarianism (ar. ṭāʾifīya), a principle exploited and constitutionally anchored 
during the French Mandate, were now the main obstacles to the emergence of a desired 
homogenous nation and a modern Lebanese society. Due to the intact existence of 
parallelgesellschaften on the territories what were created Grand Liban back in 1920, the 
transition from a système communautarisé to a système laïcisé was impossible to be achieved 
within few decades. Sectarian allegiance retained its strength and priority role; hence the idea 
of Lebanon as a nation was no real alternative to give up sectarianism.263 With the end of her 
mandate rule, France did not cede to serve as role model for its former Mandate, French 
culture and education retrained its place de choix in Lebanese society, and secondary education 
remained the privilege of private institutions with predominantly French affiliation264. Thus, 
education policy of the young nation turned its focus on two major points: Firstly, in order to 
“create a sense of social unity and nationhood among the Lebanese based on common 
principles and values, and not on religious affiliation”265, the curriculum was to be further 
centralised by the government. Secondly, given the influence, but also the differing interests 
and loyalties of the private educational sector, the new Lebanese administration‟s relationship 
to the private school system was to be rethought and harmonised.  
The unwritten National Pact (al-mīṯāq al-waṭanī) of 1943 forced the Maronites to accept 
Lebanon as an Arab, and not Western affiliated country and not to seek foreign intervention; 
and Muslims to abandon their aspirations to unite with Syria. As the agreement defined 
Lebanon as a country with Arab face (balad bi-wajh ʿarabī)266, Arabic became the only national 
language and was to replace French as language of administration and instruction.267 Even 
though the independent government‟s first official educational programs of 1946 were merely 
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the modified versions of the 1932 curricula, and as such, strictly followed the French model268, 
they caused major disagreement and severe critique from the private denominational sector. 
Furthermore, government policies with the objective to support Lebanese identity through 
development and unification of official curricula; further centralisation of the educational 
system; enactment of educational legislation or textbook supervision were also not well-
received by private institutions. Hence, the new authority regarded private schools as main 
obstacle, “perpetuating social, religious and political divisions among the Lebanese youth”.269 
The opponents, mainly French schools, however, made a clear distinction between 
"Lebanonisation"270, which they supported, and "Arabisation", which they rejected and pled the 
freedom of education, the right conserved from the Mandate Charta in the Constitution.271 
Additionally, by accusing the poor quality of Arabic-language Lebanese textbooks, private, par 
excellence French catholic schools kept on using their French-language manuels.272 Thus, they 
vehemently opposed the Arab character of the government-imposed Lebanese national identity, 
clearly articulated in the compulsory instruction of history, geography and citizenship 
education in Arabic.273 
In order to assume greater control of the educational system, the government issued a number 
of decrees seeking to regulate and centralise the sector. Firstly, decree N.7000/1946, regulated 
the conditions required by the Ministry of Education to establish new private schools. Another 
decree, issued in 1949, set up a commission du manuel scolaire to create a list of conditions for 
future textbooks as well as to decide upon their adoption and official authorisation; while a law 
passed in 1950 ordered the governmental monitoring of private schools, however, without 
defining its exact modalities. In line with the French policy of the mandate period, the 
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government continued strengthening the state-owned primary school system274; and opened the 
first governmental secondary school in 1949; and finally the Lebanese University (al-Jāmiʿa al-
Lubnānīya/Université Libanaise) in 1951, hence creating a complete network of stately-owned 
educational institutions of every level. Furthermore, a Lebanese baccalaureate replaced its 
French imposed counterpart as unitary examination compulsory for public and private schools 
alike.275   
Considered as a whole, it appears that the first years of independence brought only the slight 
shift of focal points, but no path-breaking alternations in the country‟s educational policy and 
landscape.276 Despite the government‟s clear objective to use education as unifying instrument 
in the quest to provide future generations of Lebanese with the vision of a supracommunitarian 
and secular nation-state, it has failed to lower the private educational sector‟s influence that 
continued to divide society among confessional and social lines. As Hanf argues, governmental 
efforts to unify and harmonise the educational landscape remained fruitless, but contributed to 
conserve all the problems of the mandate period, such as the questions of identity, loyalty and 
language.277 In addition to its internal division, the 1948 creation of the State of Israel brought 
Lebanon into the Middle East conflict assuring constant international political tension and the 
shift of political focus away from education “as the most important factor in bringing young 
generations together in order to create a common denominator of shared values and beliefs 
regarding their coexistence and destiny as members of the same society”.278 As a result, by the 
end of the 1950s Lebanon experienced the exacerbation of internal tensions and political 
violence, acuminating in a brief civil strife ended by American intervention in 1958.279 
Additionally, the unequally distributed wealth of rapid economic development of the 1960s as 
well as the catastrophic effects of the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel helped little to stabilise the 
already fragile social balance still laden with the controversial issue of Lebanese identity and 
                                                          
274 As before, governmental efforts focused on the amelioration of educational infrastructure in the country’s peripheral, 
Muslim-dominated regions.   
275 Cf. Hanf (1969) 85. 
276 Concerning the educational system, just like prior independence, the Ministry of Education classified the country‟s 
educational institutions into three groups, viz. governmental schools, national schools (i.e. private schools supported by 
Lebanese associations or individuals) and private schools. For a more exact classification, however, Hanf suggest the 
following groups: governmental schools, private schools of the French type, private schools of the Anglo-Saxon type, 
and Muslim private schools following the Egyptian system and having Arabic as their sole language of instruction. For 
an extremely detailed examination of these school types with a complete list of notable schools of each type cf. Hanf 
(1969) 89-214 
277 Cf. Hanf (1969) 85. 
278 Freyha (2003) 83. 
279 In accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine and at the request of Lebanese President Camille Chamoun [Kāmīl 
Šamʿūn] US Marines debark in Beirut to intervene against pan-Arab insurgents opposing his second term as president 
and seeking Lebanon‟s incorporation into Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser‟s [Gamāl ʿAbd an-Nāṣir] United Arab 
Republic composed of Egypt and Syria. Cf. Fisk (2002) 70-71.     
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conflicting national ideological orientations.280 As a reaction to these dramatic regional, social 
and economic changes, a new curriculum was introduced between 1968 and 1971 that, 
however, was neglecting current social, civic, political and confessional issues and lacked 
encouragement for the development of analytical or critical thinking, but instead, provided 
pupils with a large amount of lexical knowledge. Thus, social cleavage between rich and poor, 
Christian and Muslim remained largely intact and even exacerbated; and even though 
curricular change alone would not have been enough to prevent communitarian violence and 
civil strife, this ill-designed reform contributed little to nothing to support social cohesion and 
prevent Lebanon‟s devastating sectarian Civil War beginning in 1975.281   
 
  
                                                          
280 Cf. Freyha (2003) 83. 
281 Cf. Freyha (2003) 84. 
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II.2.5 Education during the Civil War (1975-1990) 
The 15 raging years of the Lebanese Civil War erupted in 1975282 had fundamental impact on 
the educational landscape of the country. While many Lebanese chose foreign exile, those who 
remained had to cope with considerable deficits. Although the intensity of war operations 
fluctuated constantly and it could also lead to months of peace time, the average school year 
was reduced to just three months.283 Occupation of school buildings, bombings and constantly 
fluctuating numbers of pupils and teachers could hardly make a normal school day 
possible. Additionally, for teachers and students the way into and from the school often 
concealed dangers, especially in the hard-fought urban centres of Beirut and Tripoli. Thus, 
parents were facing a dilemma: Should they continue to give their children a certain degree of 
education by sending them to school or should they prefer to keep them safe at home and thus 
cut them off from formal education and social interaction?284 In this situation it is hardly 
surprising that a large share of educational activities had been taken on by parents and family 
during the war, just as social relationships and interaction had often to be restricted to the 
family and the immediate, in most of the cases confessionally homogenous, neighbourhood.285 
With the worsening state of security and the deficiency of stately functions, the civil war had a 
fundamental and complex impact on the young generation. In contrary to the bleak prospects 
the failing state could offer, service in a militia provided a sort of perspective and rapid 
progress for the youth. In addition to frequent forced recruitments in schools, many young 
joined armed militias voluntarily in the hope to acquire positions and influence within a short 
time.286 As Bashshur summerises: “Education was captured and put at the service of the war 
machine”.287 
Due to the fact that the Civil War was an internal sectarian and ideological strife and a proxy 
war steered by Lebanon‟s hostile Syrian and Israeli neighbours at the same time, militias 
frequently changed alliance and loyalty. Consequently, the justification of bloodshed became 
exceedingly difficult for many of the fighting militias and thus generated tension, resignation, 
apathy and often threatened the ideological basis of the militant groups.288 In order to avoid 
internal ideological collapse, beginning from the mid 1980s, militias deliberately generated 
fear of communitarian existence in order to mobilise as many of their co-religionists as 
                                                          
282 As known, Lebanon‟s confessional balance came under significant stress when the PLO substituted Lebanon for 
Jordan as an operational base for its activities. By and by, the Muslim communities became disgruntled with the old 
power-sharing arrangements, seeking to enhance their position in the confessional system. As a reaction, the Christians 
mobilized in defense of the prevailing status quo. After a Phalangist attack on PLO guerrillas in Beirut Christian-Muslim 
civil war broke out on April 13, 1975 (cf. RABIL, Robert G.: Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2003, p.43.) 
283 Bashshur (1988) 42. 
284 Assal (1992) 281. 
285 Ibid. 280 
286 Tannous, Helen: „Religious Diversity and the Future of Education in Lebanon‟, in: Mediterranean Journal of 
Educational Studies, vol. 2/1 (1997), p.28. 
287 Bashshur (1988) 48. 
288 Assal (1992) 286. 
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possible. For instance, the right-wing Maronite Lebanese Forces289 warned against the 
supposedly proposed extinction of Christian presence in Lebanon.290 In addition to this blend of 
ideological and emotional manipulation, militias went on with the confessional “cantonisation” 
of the country by creating and ruling confessionally homogenous territories. This forced 
sectarian and social segregation not only deepened the already murderous dividing lines, but 
by taking on the control on wide segments of public administration, for instance of the 
educational system, it also contributed to the complete disappearance of governmental 
authority. Therefore, militia-ruled schools frequently functioned as ideal venues to spread the 
ideology represented by the relative militia.291 Once again, the teaching of history came to a 
throughout important role as an instrument to transmit confessional, apologetic, i.e. in many 
cases popular science versions of sect-related histories in order to legitimise and support militia 
ideologies and to strengthen their popular basis. For instance, the Druze leader and warlord 
Walīd Junblāṭ introduced a series of history textbooks in the areas under his control 
propagating the country‟s history from a Druze point of view.292   
  
                                                          
289 The Lebanese Forces (Al-Quwwāt al-Lubnānīya, Forces Libanaises) was the civil war‟s main Christian militia founded 
by Bachir Gemayel (Bašīr Jumayīl) that retrains existing as a political party led by Samir Geagea (Samīr Jaʿjaʿ) and 
forms the main Christian component of the March 14 Alliance. Cf. Traboulsi: pp.208-210 and the general information 
about the March 14 coalition on the Now Lebanon! website (http://www.nowlebanon.com). 
290 Bashshur (1988) 57. 
291
 Assal (1992) 284. 
292 Havemann (2002) 88. 
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II.2.6 The Ṭāʾif Agreement and the Educational Reforms of the 1990s 
The Civil War made clear that the educational system cannot be reformed by simply taking 
up the aborted initiatives of the late 1960s.  Additionally, the conflict had not only conserved 
and exacerbated the sector‟s unsolved problems and existing dilemmas, but created a number 
of novel wounds. As Bashshur remarks, Lebanon‟s educational system became a “mirror of a 
fractured national image.”293 Thus, the 1989 Ṭāʾif Agreement (ittifāq aṭ-Ṭāʾif), that put a formal 
end to the civil strife raging since 1975, included the requirement of educational reforms294 and 
called for the continuation of the reform process interrupted by the war. On the other hand, the 
Ṭāʾif Agreement tried to bring the simultaneous expenditure of the public school system and 
the maintaining of the private educational sector in line. Moreover, by foreseeing the 
elaboration of new curricula and the uniting of history and civic textbooks, the importance of 
formal education had once again been acknowledged.295 In order to carry out these 
developments, the Centre of Educational Research and Development (CERD)296, a governmental 
centre responsible for the writing of new textbooks for the public sector, was put in charge by 
the government. Until 1994, the CERD elaborated the „Plan for Educational Reform‟ (ḵuṭṭat an-
nuhūḍ at-tarbawī) to set the objectives of future reforms: “(a) the strengthening of national 
affiliation and social cohesion among students; (b) providing the new generation with the basic 
knowledge, skills and expertise, with emphasis on national upbringing and authentic Lebanese values, 
such as liberty, democracy, tolerance and rejection of violence.” Moreover, the Plan articulated the 
following principles: “(a) A belief in humanistic values and principles that respect the human being 
and consider the importance of reason and stress learning, work and ethics. (b) The Lebanese 
understanding of the meaning of existence springs fundamentally from the heavenly religions, and the 
spiritual culture personified in the monotheistic religions.”297 Concerning the objective of 
citizenship education, the Plan indicates the following principles:  
1. “The supremacy of law over all citizens is the only means of achieving justice and equality 
among them.  
                                                          
293 Bashshur (1988) 76. 
294 Cf. Frayha (2003) 84. 
295 Cf. articles 2, 3,4 and 5 of the Ṭāʾif Agreement concerning education: 2- L‟affirmation du principe de la liberté de 
l‟enseignement conformément à la loi et aux règlements en vigueur.3- La protection de l‟enseignement privé et le renforcement 
du contrôle de l‟Etat sur les écoles privées et sur le livre scolaire.4- La réforme de l‟enseignement public, professionnel et 
technique, son renforcement et son développement pour s‟adapter et répondre aux besoins de construction et de progrès du 
pays. La réforme de l‟Université libanaise, en lui assurant l‟aide nécessaire, en particulier à ses facultés des sciences appliquées. 
5- La révision et le développement des programmes dans le but de renforcer l‟appartenance et l‟intégration nationales, et 
l‟ouverture spirituelle et culturelle, ainsi que l‟unification du livre scolaire dans les matières d‟histoire et d‟éducation 
nationale.”  (cf. the complete text of the agreement in French and Arabic in the annex of this paper) 
296 Established as early as in 1972 (i.e. well before the outbreak of the Civil War) by the Ministry of Education to unify 
the public sector‟s textbooks, the Center for Educational Research and Development (officially Centre de Recherche et de 
Développement Pédagogique or Al-markaz at-tarbawī li-„l-buḥūṯ w-an-nimāʾ) started the publishing of its own series of 
pedagogically and didactically high-quality history textbooks. Its enterprise, however, was interrupted soon by the 
country‟s violent political events. For further details on the CERD cf. Abou Moussa (1996) 245-246.  
297 Ministry of Education of the Lebanese Republic, Centre for Educational Research and Development: Plan for 
Educational Reform in Lebanon. Beirut: CERD, 1994, p.8., cited in Frayha (2003) 85.  
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2. The respect of individual and social freedoms, which is guaranteed by the constitution and 
stated by The Human Rights Charter, is a vital necessity for the continuing existence of 
Lebanon.  
3. The participation of social and political activities within the framework of the Lebanese 
democratic parliamentary system is the right of every citizen and a responsibility towards the 
society and the county.  
4. Education is a national priority. It is a social necessity and a comprehensive social enterprise.  
5. The formation of a citizen who: 
(a) Feels honoured in his country – Lebanon – and is proud of his loyalty and belonging to 
it.  
(b) Is proud of his Arab identity and kinship, and of his commitment to them. 
(c) Recognises the long national Lebanese history that, emancipated from extremist beliefs, 
will attain a unified, open and humanistic society.  
(d) Realises the importance of co-existence among all citizens since „there is no legality for 
any authority that contradicts the Document of Co-existence‟, which remains a unique 
guide in the region and to the whole world.  
(e) Respects personal and social freedom and preserves others‟ rights and properties.”298    
Besides, the Plan contains further recommendations concerning the language issue, as it 
declares Arabic, the national language, to a means of social communication and interaction 
ensuring social co-existence and considers it as a crucial element of national unity and 
citizenship. On the other hand, the Plan strongly suggests the student-citizen to “master at least 
one foreign language as an effective means of interaction with the international cultures, to enrich 
these cultures and to be enriched by them.”299  
 
The government‟s further initiative, namely the elaboration of the much-desired new 
curricula, proved itself to be far more problematic. Albeit for the first time in Lebanese history, 
curricula and teaching material were to be based on educational research and not on political 
or religious ideologies, and were even promoted by the UNESCO, it soon became clear that the 
teaching of history remained the most controversial field.300 As expected, the religious 
communities‟ vehement opposition prevented the implementation of unified history textbooks. 
These quarters criticised the objectives of the Educational Plan and accused the new curricular 
guidelines to be unrealistic and to be a copy of the Jordanian and Syrian curricula. As the 
Coordinator of Catholic Schools in Lebanon explains: "The plan came from above. It was driven 
from the Jordanian educational system, embellished and then introduced into Lebanon. They 
allocated for it a huge budget, which exceeds the capacity of great countries. How can Lebanon with 
its economic problems secure such an enormous budget? Such a plan aimed to limit the role of private 
                                                          
298 Ibid. p.11-12.  
299 Ibid. p.12.   
300 Freyha (2003) 86. 
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sector and control it. It was a replica of the Syrian educational system."301 Fearing the curtailment 
of their educational autonomy, Lebanon‟s established confessions were in a rare accord with 
each other against the proposed changes.302 The increasing pressure finally forced the Lebanese 
Parliament to withdraw the educational plan in 1994, so schools remained free to use whatever 
book they like.303  
Within one year, the plan had been replaced with the “New Framework for Education 
in Lebanon” (al-haykalīya al-jadīda li-„t-taʿlīm fī Lubnān) developed by a joint committee 
composed of policymakers, representatives of public and religious schools as well as expert 
delegated by the CERD. Besides setting up new public schools, encouraging teacher training 
and remodelling the educational ladder, the framework recommended the introduction of civic 
studies and common inter-faith religious education regardless of confessional appartenance.304 
While the adoption of civic education can probably be seen as the most important achievement 
of post-civil war educational policymaking, the proposed inter-faith religious education 
encountered resistance from the religious communities that perceived the step as interference 
in their internal affairs. As a compromise, religious instruction was provided in confessionally 
separated classes.305  
As for the instruction of history, the concept avoided the much desired unification of history 
textbooks which means that even manuals dating back to the pre-Civil War era are still 
reprinted and are in use. Although the CERD indeed finished with the elaboration of a unified 
history curriculum and the first-ever stately history textbooks, none of the both has been 
implemented ever since. According to Antoine Misarra, a former member of the CERD 
committee commissioned to elaborate the history curriculum, the complete series of the final 
CERD manual was prevented to be published by a direct order of the Education Minister, 
although they were already printed and only awaited distribution.306  
 
The debate over a new history textbook revealed several inherent weaknesses of the education 
reform and the country‟s dysfunctional decision-making system in general. As we saw, despite 
being an explicit provision in the Ṭāʾif Accord, religious communities were still able to torpedo 
governmental attempts to elaborate a stately narrative as an additional option to the many 
sectarian narratives. As a result, the nation‟s contemporary history including the Civil War is 
                                                          
301 Abouchedid, Kamal: „Confessional Pluralism and Education Policies and Practices: Themes from the Lebanese 
Experience‟, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1997, p.242. Cited in: Abouchedid et al. (2002) 3. 
302 As a Lebanese policymaker noted: "...for the first time ever in Lebanon all educational institutions were united against the 
plan....Muslims, Christians, all." Ibid. 
303 Quilty, Jim: „Separate Learning. Learned Separateness‟, in Daily Star,  19.02.2007   
304 Abouchedid et al. (2002) 3.   
305 Cf. Inati (1999) 7. 
306 An-Nahār (2.2.2001) 
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still widely omitted from all sorts of curricula, preventing post-Civil War generations to tackle 
its events in a formal environment, free from sectarian biases.  
Moreover, despite decade-long attempts to reform the educational system and elaborate a 
unified history textbook serving as a tool to bypass sectarian divides, the supremacy of the 
private educational sector still prevails. Lebanese parents, regardless of sect or social stratum, 
still prefer sending their children into private educational establishment if their financial means 
allow and thereby contribute to the maintenance and reproduction of the country‟s 
omnipresent sectarian dividing lines.  
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II.2.7 Contemporary aspects of language policy 
As it became clearly visible, throughout its long history, the instruction of French and 
Arabic played a decisive role in Lebanese education. Thanks to its ideological connotations, the 
language issue has been serving as a source of conflict and set the two concurrent languages 
antipodes. The post-civil war era, however, brought significant changes and altered the general 
language situation of Lebanon.  
At the side of French that had been enjoying an unchallenged supremacy as the country‟s first 
foreign language for decades, if not centuries, English have been rapidly gaining on 
importance. The process was accelerated by the growing regional importance of English in the 
region and its status as contemporary global lingua franca. Moreover, Lebanon‟s key economic 
partners such as the UAE or Qatar are having an Anglophone business culture, while 
traditionally Francophone regions such as the Maghreb have little or no economic contact with 
the country.307   
Although Lebanon is still regarded to be the sole remaining Francophone bulwark in the 
Middle East308, where the bonne connaissance of French continues to imply good breeding and 
high economic status, the advantages of English are starting to be exceeding those of its 
counterpart, as it seems to open more doors, enable more economic opportunities in the 
industrial and commercial globalization or have a stronger cultural appeal due to the 
omnipresence of American media and global mainstream culture.309  
As a reaction, the government introduced the obligatory instruction of two foreign languages in 
1995, i.e. the teaching of English gained official support. It is worth mentioning that in 
contrary to several previous reform initiatives, this step encountered little resistance.310 Ipso 
facto, fluency in English seems to be regarded pragmatically and be free from ideological 
contents. As Lebanon‟s English-language daily remarks: “While French is still the most 
important second language being taught at Lebanese schools today, it has been losing ground 
to English. According to statistics from the Education Ministry, 62.5 percent of all Lebanese 
schools offered French as a second language in the school year 1999-2000. This number 
decreased to 55.8 percent in 2005-2006. During the same period, schools offering English 
increased from 19.7 percent to 21.6 percent. The number of schools offering both English and 
French has also increased. In 1999-2000 17.8 percent of the schools offered both languages; by 
2005-2006 that figure had grown to 22.6 percent.”311 The decline of French in Lebanon can 
also have its causes in the decreasing presence of the language in society. Although its usage is 
still officially supported and its deep linguistic effects on colloquial Lebanese are still 
undeniable, French does not, however, serve as daily means of communication and is only 
                                                          
307 Bonrepaux (2006) 66. 
308 Lebanon is one of the two Middle-Eastern members of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (along with 
Egypt) and hosted one of its summits in 2002.   
309 Ross (08.10.2007)  
310 Daher (2002) 121.  
311 Frey (26.09.2008) 
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represented by one daily newspaper but on the other hand with no French-language television 
channel in the elaborate Lebanese media landscape. At the present, the usage of French 
restricts to the traditionally francophone (and as such, Christian) cultural and political elite of 
the country, among whom many have been educated in France.    
However, the gradual shift from French to English as Lebanon‟s first foreign language does not 
necessary mean the mitigation of the decades-old language issue. Parallel to the decline in the 
quality of French, many also note the extraordinary decline in Arabic. This phenomenon, 
however, affects largely the standard (non-spoken) version of the Arabic language, while the 
colloquial Lebanese dialect312 enjoys a renaissance, as many, par excellence Maronites, regard it 
as a distinct manifestation of Lebanese identity that allows them segregation from the Muslim-
majority Arab World. As such, the Lebanese dialect seems to take on the former functions of 
French and plays an increasingly important role in the development of Lebanese identity. As 
part of this process, the traditional Arabic alphabet is more and more substituted by Latin 
letters, especially in informal context. This novel and spontaneous Romanisation called 
„Arabish‟ or „ʿArabīzī‟313 by its, mainly young, users, is becoming more and more present not just 
on its original domain of internet and telecommunications, but also in commerce and more 
traditional sectors of media. The tendency has of course its opponents who seek to protect 
Arabic from westernisation. Whether this new aspect of Lebanon‟s ongoing language debate 
represents a new source of conflict and will be exploited by politics is yet unclear. Although at 
its current stage of development the question of dialect usage and Romanisation is a rather 
marginal one and restricts itself to only certain aspects of life, should it, however, continue to 
spread in usage, it would inevitably cause increased debate and thus gain political significance.     
 
 
                                                          
312 Similarly to the rest of the Arab World, Lebanon‟s linguistic situation is also characterised by the coexistence of 
Modern Standard Arabic and local dialects, a linguistic phenomenon called diglossy. While Standard Arabic (or al-luġa 
al-ʿarabīya al-fuṣḥā) that serves as the sole official language of the country is not spoken as a mother tongue and only 
appears in written form or in formal context and in the media; the myriad of dialectal variants commonly referred to as 
Lebanese, Syro-Lebanese or Levantine Arabic (ʿammīya, lahja or al-lubnānīya/əl-ləbnēnīye) are the actual mother tongues 
of the population and are used as means of communication in various aspects of everyday life. Given Lebanon‟s 
geographical, confessional and ethnic diversity; as well as the high portion of foreign loanwords and terms, the country 
boasts of a high number of different dialectal varieties and sociolects. Thus, individual language usage reveals much 
information about the speaker‟s social, religious and educational background. Cf. Versteegh (1987) 80-83; 123   
313 In contrast to previous attempts to Romanise Arabic (such as Saʿīd ʿAql‟s infamous initiative to replace Standard 
Arabic with Lebanese written in Latin script as the country‟s official language in the 1960s) the spread of Arabish is the 
first transliteration effort not imposed from above by an ideologically affiliated elite. Thanks to the historical 
precedence of English over Arabic in Internet and mobile phones at the beginning of the 21st century, the Arabic 
language was not supported by the widespread technology, thus Arabish was the only possible way chat or write 
messages. Although the tendency seems to have its roots in Lebanon and Jordan, it is now ubiquitous in the whole 
Arab World and is now applied to a myriad of Arabic‟s dialectal varieties. As a distinct feature, Arabish uses numerals 
to represent Arabic sounds absent from the Latin script (e.g. 3 for ع ʿayn or 7 for ح ḥāʾ). The system seems to be 
especially widespread in parts of Lebanon. For a detailed account on Arabish/ʿArabīzī cf. YAGHAN, (2008) 39-52.  
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III. Textbook Analysis 
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III.1 Presentation of material 
As it was already mentioned, this research on textbooks is foreseen to provide an aspect of 
Lebanon‟s sectarian division and current situation of its own historical narrative(s). Despite the 
existence of official guidelines issued by Lebanon‟s Ministry of Education, the country‟s 
communitarian dividing lines and the high proportion and prestige of private schools in the 
educational system contribute to the existence of a wide range of accredited school manuals 
used by the mainly sect-based, non-governmental schools. During my research on textbooks in 
Europe and especially in Lebanon, I have encountered a surprisingly high number and diverse 
range of different textbooks, whereas their availability was in many cases determined by 
region, dominant sect, or socio-demographic status of the given region. For example, history 
textbooks by the Maktabat Ḥabīb, the publishing house of one of the analyzed manuals, seemed 
to me, despite being government-approved, literally unavailable and unknown in Sunni-
dominated, middle-class West Beirut neighbourhoods or Shiite majority southern suburbs (such 
as Raʾs Bayrūt/Ras Beyrouth or aḍ-Ḍāḥiya /al Dahiyé, respectively), while on the other hand in 
upscale Christian districts and suburbs (such as al-Ašrafīya/Achrafiyé or Sinn al-Fīl/ Sinn El 
Fil314) this textbook was virtually the sole one in stock in many bookshops. Almost all of my 
informants (booksellers, teachers and students alike) explained this geographic and social 
distribution of availability with the sectarian affiliation of history textbooks, a feature not 
being official, but also not uncommon or unknown in Lebanon. Opinions and sect-based views 
of common history are still divided among Lebanese, as it is reflected in the myriad of different 
manuals one can find. Given this wealth of potential material, as well as the relative similarity 
and stark parallels among textbooks affiliated to the same sect, or used in a social milieu or a 
distinctive region, a selection must have been made in order to keep the objects of an analysis 
straightforward and manageable. In order to be able to give representative and broad 
perspective within the frames of this paper, I decided to select three textbooks, each of them 
affiliated with one of the nation‟s three major religious communities: the Christian, the Sunni 
                                                          
314 Despite the emergence of some mixed neighbourhoods since the end of the last civil war, Beirut‟s districts and 
neighbourhoods remain largely segregated  among sectarian and social lines. The new electoral division of 2008 
created three separate electoral districs (manāṭiq) within Beirut‟s municipal borders: Christian-dominated Beirut I in the 
East, composed of the al-Ašrafīya/Achrafiyé, ar-Rumayl/Rmeil and aṣ-Ṣayfī/Saïfi neighbourhoods (aḥyāʾ) ; Sunni-Shiʿa-
Armenian mixed Beirut II in the middle including the al-Bāšūra/Bachoura, Marfaʾ/Port and al-Midawwar/Medawar 
neighbourhoods such as the iconic Wasaṭ al-Madīna/Centre Ville (Downtown) area; and Muslim majority (Sunni-Shiʿite 
mixed) Beirut III in the West with the aḥyāʾ Raʾs Bayrūt/Ras Beyrouth, ʿAyn al-Marayssa/Ain el Mreisse, Mīnāʾ al-
Ḥuṣn/Minet el Hosn, Zuqāq al-Balāṭ/Zoukak el Blat, al-Muṣṣayṭba/Moussaytbé and al-Mazraʿa/Mazraa. For detailed 
figures concerning the new electoral districts cf. http://www.nowlebanon.com/Library/Files/EnglishDocumentation/ 
Other%20Documents/IFES%20Briefing%20Document%20on%20New%20Electoral%20Districts.pdf (retrieved 01.03. 
2010) Further afield, Beirut‟s ever-expanding suburbs grow among the same sectarian dividing lines as the 
municipality itself: banlieus such as luxorious (and Maronite-dominated) Sin al-Fīl/ Sin el Fil on the North-East or 
poverty- and in 2006 IDF-hit (and Shi‟ite-dominated) Southern Suburbs, a stronghold of Ḥizbu-‟llāh on the South are 
world apart from each other. 
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and the Shiʿa Muslim. As I was informed, all of the manuals I have finally selected are used in 
private, i.e. non-governmental schools par excellence. Of course, I was hesitant if a textbook 
preferred by governmental schools was included in order to provide a more nuanced image. 
However, given the fact that every single manual available in Lebanon must be approved by 
the Ministry of Education, and that governmental schools make up not more than one-third of 
the educational system315, and that sectarian-affiliated textbooks are more eligible for an 
analysis seeking to display the sectarian differences in historical narratives, the original plan of 
a three-book-analysis will be preferred in this paper.       
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III.1.1 The Christian Textbook  
The textbook At-tārīḵ al-ʿilmī al-ḥadīṯ (The Modern Scientific History) from the authors Yūnis 
al-⁽Ilm, Munīr Ilyās Salāmah, Ziyād Ġamrāwī and Christian al-Ḥilw was published by the Beirut 
based Maktabat Ḥabīb publishing house in 2007. Despite being based in former West Beirut, an 
associate of the house told me in a telephone interview that their textbooks are primarily 
ordered and used by Christian private schools in former East Beirut districts (i.e. al-
Ašrafīya/Achrafié), the North-East suburbs (e.g. Fanār/Fanar) and in the Mount Lebanon area 
(e.g. Jamhūr/Jamhour). This information was confirmed by a number of East-Beirut bookshops 
and private secondary schools, among them the prestigious Jesuit-run Collège Notre Dame de 
Jamhour316. According to a recent study, the textbook is also widely used by Greek Orthodox 
private schools, as some of the authors are members of this sect.317  
As the preface indicates, the textbook is the third part of the Modern Scientific History series 
designed for the faculties of the third class in secondary schools, meeting the requirements of 
both the 1968 official guidelines issued by the Ministry of Education and that of the official 
school leaving examinations.318 It seeks to provide a scientifically based and thus student-
friendly approach to curriculum topics, as well as to avoid “narrative-construction” by focusing 
on the display of causes and effects of historical events319.      
There are no sources or bibliographies provided in the textbook except for cited historical 
documents. However, certain passages and interpretations seem to be identical to those of 
Kamal Salibi‟s House of Many Mansions.  
 
Structure  
The textbook is composed of two major parts as well as a short historical timeline of events of  
WWI provided at the end of the book.  
 
The First Part describes Lebanese history from the beginning of  WWI to the declaration of 
Lebanon‟s independence in 1943 on 85 pages and in 10 chapters (durūs). Each chapter is 
                                                          
316 The school‟s textbook list is available in the online shop of the Librairie Orientale chain under 
http://www.librairieorientale.com.lb/schools.php?bid=16 (retrieved 26.01.10)  
317 Wilson (2007) 9. 
318 Christian Textbook  5 
319 For further details see the Preface of the Christian Textbook, e.g.: 
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divided into numbered sections (3-7 in number) and colourfully framed passages labelled “zid 
maʿlūmātak”, „increase your knowledge‟, containing additional or background information, 
summaries, historical documents and statistics. These vary in size from few-line quotations to 
multi-page cited documents.  
  
Ch. Al-qism al-ʾawwal Lubnān (First part: Lebanon) p. 
1. Lubnān fī „l-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā (Lebanon in the WW1) 10 
2. Lubnān min al-ḥarb ilā „l-intidāb (Lebanon from War to the Mandate) 20 
3. Al-intidāb (The Mandate) 27 
4. Dawlat Lubnān al-kabīr (The State of Greater Lebanon) 1920-1926 31 
5. Ad-dustūr al-lubnānī w-našʾat al-Jumhūrīya al-Lubnānīya 1926-1939 
(The Lebanese Constitution and the Birth of the Lebanese Republic) 
40 
6. Al-aḥdāṯ as-siyāsīya ḥattā bidāyat al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya  
(Political Events till the Outbreak of the WW2) 
45 
7. Lubnān fī-l-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya (Lebanon in the WW2) 56 
8. Al-ḥulafāʾ fī Lubnān wa-Sūriyā (The Allies in Lebanon & Syria) 06.1941 61 
9. Al-istiqlāl al-lubnānī (The Lebanese Independence) 1941-1943 69 
10. Istilām al-maṣāliḥ  w-taḥqīq al-jilāʾ al-ʿaskarīya  
(The takeover of the administration and achieving the withdrawal of military forces) 
82 
  
Second Part  
The 58-page long Second Part summarizes the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab 
states from the end of the 19th century to approximately the end of  World War II or 
exceptionally even beyond (e.g. in the case of Egypt or Algeria). In comparison with the First 
Part we see that Lebanese history is consecrated in a much larger section of the textbook than 
that of the Arab states and Turkey. Just like in the first part, chapters are divided into 
numbered sections, however, framed “zid maʿlūmātak” boxes are almost completely absent. 
This part is divided into the following seven chapters: 
 
Ch. Al-qism aṯ-ṯānī: As-salṭana al-ʿUṯmānīya w-al-buldān al-ʿarabīya  
(Second Part: The Ottoman rule and the Arab Countries) 
p. 
1. Al-ʿarab w-as-Sulṭāna munḏu ʾawāḵir al-qarn at-tāsiʿ ʿašr  
(The Arabs and the Sultanate since the End of the 19th Century) 
96 
2. Tafakkuk as-Sulṭāna al-ʿUṯmānīya w-qiyām al-Jumhūrīya at-Turkīya  
(The Dissolution of the Ottoman Sultanate and the Rise of the Turkish Republic 
114 
3. Tārīḵ Miṣr al-ḥadīṯ (The Modern History of Egypt) 120 
4. Tārīḵ Sūriyā  al-ḥadīṯ (The Modern History of Syria) 130 
5. Al-Mamlaka al-ʿIrāqīya (The Kingdom of Iraq) 138 
6. Al-Mamlaka al-ʿArabīya as-Suʿūdīya (The Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia) 142 
7. Istiqlāl buldān šimālī Ifrīqiyā (Independence of North-African States) 146 
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This part focuses on the histories of key nations of the Mashreq with the Ottoman 
Empire/Turkey in the first line followed by Egypt (the Arab World‟s leading nation in many 
respects), Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Other countries of the Waṭan are mentioned 
summarized (like the Arab states of North Africa in the last chapter) or not mentioned at all 
(such as the Gulf-states, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and surprisingly, Palestine/Israel).   
It is remarkable that despite Lebanon‟s geographic unity and strong historical ties with Syria 
the country is not granted any priority or special extent and is rather neglected. Throughout 
the whole textbook, Lebanon is displayed as a separate entity (even before the country‟s formal 
detachment from Ottoman Greater Syria by the French), not having any special relation to its 
Syrian neighbour320.  
Another interesting point to mention is the complete absence of any detailed information on 
Palestine, the Palestinian cause, the 1948 Nakba or the Zionist movement and the Jewish State. 
There is no chapter devoted to Palestine; Lebanon‟s sole bordering state apart from Syria only 
occurs marginally and exclusively in connection with Lebanese historical events in the First 
Part, or as Ottoman territory and later as British mandate-area without any special importance 
in the Second Part. On the few maps of the Second Part the territory is consequently referred to 
as Filasṭīn al-muḥtalla, i.e. “occupied Palestine”.  
 
  
                                                          
320 This detail caused major concern among my Syrian informators and was largery regarded as a „typical Lebanese 
attitude” distinguishing their country from Syria. 
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III.1.2 The Sunni Textbook 
 
The second textbook, Al-ḥadīṯ fī tārīḵ Lubnān w-al-bilād al-ʿarabīya (The Modern in the 
History of Lebanon and the Arab Countries) by ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Ḥāwī seems to be published by 
the author himself, as there is no publisher house or organisation indicated on or in the 
manual. The first page only states that it is suitable for preparation to the general secondary 
school leaving exam in all of the classes. According to a number of interviewed schoolteachers 
and shop assistants, Mr Ḥāwī was a prominent Sunni educator teaching in various West Beirut 
Sunni private schools during and after the Civil War.  
Even though appearing to be dubious, this manual was the sole one available for the last class 
of the secondary school in a high number West Beirut districts such as middle-class Raʾs 
Bayrūt/Ras Beyrouth, upscale Verdun or petit-bourgeois al-Mazrʿa/Mazraa. As many of the 
book shop assistants stated, this manual was the first choice of local schools, and the most 
requested in the area, regardless of religious affiliation of the school. This information was 
confirmed by some local schools as well. 
Concerning the sources, similarly to the previous textbook, there is no bibliography or 
literature list provided in this manual. 
 
Structure    
Contrary to the Christian textbook, the manual I will refer to in the following as the Sunni 
Textbook, is also divided into distinctive sections for Lebanese and Arab history with Lebanese 
history considered most important followed by general Arab history including the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the Christian textbook, however, these two parts are collected 
into separate sequential sections . Moreover, the textbook contains no structures for additional 
information, extracurricular material or cited historical documents analogous to the Christian 
textbook, but poses a number of questions concerning the content of the relevant chapter at the 
end of these, and also provides answers to in a separate section at the end of the manual.  
 
The first part covering Lebanese history is made up of 11 chapters on 55 pages. Hence, in terms 
of quantity, this narrative is significantly shorter than its Christian counterpart. As for its 
content, the narrative also begins with the outbreak of WWI and ends with the 1946 French 
withdrawal from Lebanon.  
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Ch. Mawḍūʿ ad-dars (Topic of the chapter) p. 
1. Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā (Lebanon during the WW1)  5 
2. Lubnān bayna 1918 w-1920 (Lebanon between 1918-1920) 11 
3. Mabdaʾ al-intidāb w-qīām dawlat lubnān al-kabīr 
(The beginning of the Mandate and the establishment of Greater Lebanon) 
18 
4. Niẓām al-ḥikm fī dawlat lubnān al-kabīr  
(The governmental system in the State of Greater Lebanon) 
23 
5. Ad-dustūr al-lubnānī (The Lebanese Constitution) 28 
6. Aḥdāṯ lubnān fī ẓill al-jumhūrīya (1926-1939)  
(Lebanon´s events during the Republic 1926-1939) 
33 
7. Lubnān fī maṭlaʿ al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya (Lebanon at the outbreak of the WW2) 38 
8. Duḵūl al-ḥulafāʾ ilā Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya  
(The Allies´ enter into Lebanon during the WW2) 
41 
9. Aḥdāṯ Lubnān min ṣayf 1931 [sic!] ilā aylūl 1943 
(Lebanon´s events from the summer of 1941 until September 1943) 
45 
10. Taḥqīq al-istiqlāl (Achieving independence) 50 
11. Maʿrakat al-jilāʾ al-iqtiṣādī w-al-ʿaskarī. (The fight for economic and military withdrawal)  57 
 
Second Part  
The 46-page long second part summarizes the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab 
states from the end of the 19th century to approximately the end of the World War II, or in the 
cases of Egypt or Algeria even beyond. Hence, this narrative is also has a bigger focus on 
Lebanese history.  
Ch. (continued) p. 
12. Al-ʿarab w-ad-dawla al-ʿuṯmānīya (The Arabs and the Ottoman State) 60 
13. Raddat al-fiʿl alʿarabīya ʿalā siyāsat al-ittiḥādīyīn (The Arabic reaction to the Unionist policy) 64 
14. Aṯ-ṯawra al-ʿarabīya al-kubrā (The Great Arab Revolt) 68 
15. Inhiyār al-imbirāṭūrīya al-ʿuṯmānīya w-qiyām al-jumhūrīya at-turkīya  
(The decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish Republic) 
73 
16. Al-mamlaka al-ʿarabīya as-Sūrīya (The Syrian Arab Kingdom) 78 
17. Sūriyā  fī ẓill al-intidāb al-faransī (Syria under the French Mandate) 83 
18. Qiyām al-mamlaka al-ʿirāqīya (The rise of the Kingdom of Iraq) 88 
19. Qiyām al-mamlaka al-ʿarabīya as-suʿūdīya (The rise of the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia) 93 
20. Fataḥ qanāt as-Suwēs (The opening of the Suez-Canal) 97 
21. At-tadaḵḵul al-inklīzī w-farḍ al-ḥimāya ʿalā Miṣr  
(The English invasion and the imposing of the protectorate of Egypt) 
102 
22. Istiqlāl buldān šimālī Ifrīqiya (1) (The independence of Northern African countries 1  106 
23. Istiqlāl buldān šimālī Ifrīqiya (2) (The independence of Northern African countries 1)  112 
24. Aṯ-ṯawra al-jazāʾirīya al-kubrā (The great Algerian revolution) 117 
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III.1.3 The Shiʿi Textbook 
The textbook Naḥnu w-at-tārīḵ (Us and History) is published by the aš-Šarika al-ʿālamīya li-„l-
kitāb in Beirut. The author(s) of this textbook is (are) unknown. According to Abou-Moussa, 
this organisation is a Ḥizbullāh-affiliate and its textbooks are the preferred manuals in 
Ḥizbullāh-run Mahdi schools as well as in other private religious institutions based in Beirut‟s 
southern suburbs, the Jabal ʿĀmil, and the Biqāʿ regions. This information has been confirmed 
in a private correspondence with Professor Jonathan Kriener, a Bochum University lecturer 
whose his research focuses on Lebanese history textbooks. Moreover, my inquiries in situ (in 
Burj al-Barājnah/Borj el Brajné and Ḥārat Ḥurayk/Haret Hreik schools and bookshops) also 
verified these statements.   
Similarly to the other examined manuals, there are no sources or bibliographies provided in the 
textbook except for cited historical documents.  
Structure  
Unlike the other manuals, this textbook is not covering general Arab history, but focuses on 
Lebanese events from 1840 up until the country‟s independence. Consequently, this brief 
overview of the textbook structure will not reflect the chapters covering pre-WWI events that 
are not relevant for this paper and the later analysis.  
Similarly to its Christian counterpart, this textbook also offers various additional information at 
the end of each chapter, labelled as ṯaqāfa tārīḵīya, or „historical culture‟ (i.e. cultural history). 
These boxes – that are never longer than one page –  provide original documents, relating 
additional information on culture, minorities, or economy. It is worth mentioning that many of 
these topics  deal with specifically Shiʿite or regional (Jabal ʿĀmil) history. 
 
Ch. Mawḍūʿ ad-dars (Topic of the chapter) p. 
4. Lubnān w-al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā, Lebanon and the First World War  5 
5. Aṯ-ṯawrā al-ʿarabīya al-kubrā, The great Arab revolt  11 
6.  Ḵaṭwāt tamhīdīya li-„l-intidāb, Preliminary steps towards the mandate  18 
7. Al-intidāb al-fransī (1), The French mandate (1) 23 
8. Al-intidāb al-faransī (2) – al-ḥukm al-ʿaskarī al-mubāšir  
The French mandate (2) – the direct military governance   
28 
9.  
 
Al-jumhūrīya „l-lubnānīya fī ẓill al-intidāb al-faransī 
The Lebanese Republic in the shadow of the French mandate 
33 
10. Aḥdāṯ Lubnān fī ẓill al-jumhūrīya min 1926 ilā 1939 
Lebanon‟s events in the shadow of the republic from 1926 to 1939 
38 
11. Lubnān ʿalā abwāb al-istiqlāl, Lebanon at the gates of independence 41 
12. Lubnān w-„l-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya, Lebanon and the Second World War 45 
13. Maʿrakat istiqlāl Lubnān, The battle Lebanon‟s independence 50 
14. Lubnān wa maʿrakat al-jilāʾ,  Lebanon and the battle for withdrawal 57 
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III.2 Geographic scope  
As we saw in earlier chapters, Lebanon‟s historio-geographic structure largely corresponds 
the geographic distribution of the country‟s sectarian communities, i.e. numerous regions, or 
subregions are often still dominated by a certain sect, or a sect‟s geographic distribution is 
largely delimited to a certain area. Consequently, occurrences of territories as well as their 
frequency in the narratives are useful indicators for the manuals‟ sectarian allegiance and 
ideological orientation. Thus, an analysis of the manuals‟ geographic scope can reveal further 
important details on the different notions of the country‟s geographic extent, regional shifting, 
international outlook, and position within its regional setting. By the latter two aspects, it is 
worth keeping in mind that the historical periods analysed above are often not restricted to  
exclusively Lebanese relevance, thus even though this paper tends to examine Lebanese 
historical narratives concerning the history of Lebanon proper, overlaps with Middle Eastern 
(par excellence Syrian and Ottoman) but in a lesser extent also with French historical events – 
and hence, geographic references – are inevitable.  
First and foremost, Lebanon‟s history, as it is presented in the three narratives, is not always 
the history of Lebanon as a whole. Most importantly, the Christian and Sunni narratives tend to 
put an unchallenged focus on the coastal towns and the Mount. The Shiʿite textbook, while 
doing so as well, gives additional attention to country‟s Shiʿite dominated southern Jabal ʿĀmil 
region. As for other regions and rural areas in general, the narratives fail to reflect their history 
and even neglect to include mention of them within the history concentrated around the 
aforementioned primary regions. As a result, peripheral, out-of-focus regions including the 
North (with the exception of the coastal city of Tripoli), the Biqāʿ, the cazas of the Anti-
Lebanon (ar-Rāšayā and Ḥāṣbayā) as well as the South (except for the Shiʿite textbook) are 
widely excluded from any level of national memory and are not given a role in the country‟s 
historical identity. Surprisingly, this case also applies to the subregions of the indeed prominent 
areas; e.g. smaller areas of significant historical importance such as the Šūf, al-Kūra, Kasrawān, 
or al-Matn (all of them part of Christian-dominated – and in the narratives well represented – 
Jabal Lubnān) are rarely mentioned in parts of the textbooks other than maps or statistical 
tables.      
In order to display these discrepancies, the following three maps indicate the frequency of 
the cities‟, regions‟ and some subregions‟321 occurence in the narratives. Concerning the 
                                                          
321 Lebanon‟s division into historio-geographic regions and subregions applied on the maps follow that of to be found in 
Pipes (1990) 35., and as such, does not necessarily correspond with the country‟s current or former administrative 
divisions. 
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regional division of the map, they indicate the regions Jabal Lubnān (with the subregions al-
Kūra, Kasrawān, al-Matn, and aš-Šūf), the North, the Biqāʿ (subregions include al-Hirmil and 
the caza of ar-Rāšayā), and the South (divided into the Jabal ʿĀmil and Ḥāṣbayā subregions) as 
well as the major cities and towns occurring in the narratives.  
The Christian scope  
As shown in the map, the Christian 
narrative‟s scope is undoubtedly 
centred on the Mount Lebanon region 
and the coastal towns, especially Beirut, 
while concerning Lebanon‟s Ottoman-
era division, it is the Mutaṣarrifīya that 
dominates. The country‟s Christian core 
region, represented by the Mount 
Lebanon (47 mentions) and the old 
Mutaṣarrifīya (32 mentions) –
overlapping approximately the same 
territory – accounts   for a total number of 79 occurrences and thus for an unchallenged 
dominance among Lebanese regions. This feature is not surprising and is well reflected the 
narrative‟s sectarian allegiance. Even though not being predominantly Christian, the coast‟s 
urban centres such as Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre show the highest frequency, followed by 
Baʿlbak (Shiʿi dominance) and Zaḥla (Greek Catholic dominance) in the Biqāʿ. Mount Lebanon‟s 
towns – being predominantly Christian Maronite – such as the Mutaṣarrifīya capital Baʿbdā, the 
administrative centre of ʿĀlayh and Bkerké (Bkirkī), the Maronite Patriarch‟s summer residence 
are also mentioned occasionally.    
The Sunni scope 
Parallel to the Christian narrative‟s 
scope, the Sunni scope is also largely 
centred on the coastal towns and the 
country‟s core Mount Lebanon region. 
Moreover, there is no change in 
Beirut‟s leading prevalence as well as 
in that of the Mutaṣarrifīya concerning 
Lebanon‟s Ottoman-era division. This 
preponderance and similarity is little 
surprising in the mirror of the Sunni 
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community‟s geographical distribution, as it has been mentioned in this paper, Sunnis occupy 
literally no rural areas and are only concentrated in the Mediterranean coast‟s larger urban 
centres.   
The Shiʿi scope 
Contrary to the similar scopes of the 
Christian and Sunni narratives, the 
Shiʿi scope offers a fundamentally 
different perspective of the country and 
its regional history. Although Beirut 
and the coastal towns still enjoy much 
attention, there is also emphasis on a 
region otherwise marginalised by the 
other two narratives, namely the Jabal 
ʿĀmil region, a predominantly Shiʿi 
area having a pivotal role in the 
community‟s identity. Moreover, another Shiʿi dominated region, the Biqāʿ  also occurs more 
frequently in this narrative than in its counterparts. Moreover, because of this focus on 
otherwise non-prominent and peripheral regions, the Mount Lebanon region has a smaller 
preponderance. It is also worth mentioning that the term „mutaṣarrifīya‟ is often omitted from 
this narrative to be notoriously replaced by „Jabal Lubnān‟, even in historical context.  
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III.3 The Analyzed Historical Periods 
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III.3.1 The First World War and the transitional period (1914-1920)  
 
The beginning of the twentieth century found Lebanon, or more accurately, the territories later 
forming the state of Lebanon, under Ottoman Turkish rule going back to 1516. Within this 
larger framework, the Christian-populated areas of the Jabal-Lubnān as well as the Druze-
dominated Šūf mountains enjoyed a certain degree of inner autonomy, the result of bloody 
Christian-Druze clashes ended by intervening French troops in 1861, and guaranteed by an 
international agreement between the Sublime Port, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and 
Italy. The Règlement Organique (referred to as al-Brūtūkūl, or the Protocol in Arabic) created the 
legal framework for the establishment of an autonomous mutaṣarrifīya administrated by a non-
Lebanese Christian governor appointed by Constantinople. Even though the province included 
neither Beirut, nor Tripoli, nor Sidon, nor the fertile Biqāʿ, it was gradually developing in 
economic and human terms, in fact more rapidly than the rest of the empire. This 
inexperienced growth was not only the result of the region‟s traditional exposure and strong 
ties to Europe, particularly France, but also of its continuous links to Beirut that served as its 
major port and intellectual hub, even though it was administrated directly as the centre of the 
homonymous Ottoman wilayet. By the end of the nineteenth century, Mount Lebanon and 
Beirut were the centres of heavy foreign investment including construction (e.g. Beirut-
Damascus railway, extension of the Beirut port), finance (opening of French banks), trade, and 
education. Furthermore, Ottoman authorities designated the Mount as the empire‟s primary 
silk-producing region encouraging the planting of mulberry trees on the fertile slopes322. 
However, the emergence of successful Far Eastern concurrence in the sector beginning from the 
end of the century put serious social pressure on the Mount‟s overpopulated society resulting in 
successive waves of mass emigration towards the Americas. As a result of foreign educational 
influences, Beirut became one of the cradles of the nahḍa, the Arab literary renaissance leading 
to the crystallisation of Arab national consciousness on the one hand, but also of the concept of 
„Lebanonism‟, especially among the Maronites. Thus, the outbreak of WWI and the Ottoman 
Empire‟s participation in it on the side of the Axis Powers put an abrupt end of the region‟s 
material and intellectual prosperity. Due to the Mount‟s strong ties to the – now hostile – West 
on the one side, and the British support of the Ottoman Empire‟s Arab provinces on the other, 
the Ottoman army, led by one of the empire‟s most prominent generals, Jamāl pasha, had soon 
occupied the Mutaṣarrifīya, abolishing both foreign and local privileges, forcing its Christian 
governor to abdicate, and ceding its territory to the Ottoman-controlled Damascus wilayet in 
1915. From that point, Lebanon is seriously hit by war consequences and shortages further 
aggravated by the Allied naval blockade of the entire Syrian coast, the decline of crucial trade 
and overseas revenues, the 1915 locust invasion, and the ensuing famine and spread of 
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epidemics. Meanwhile, the Ottoman army defeated, Lebanon‟s fate is largely influenced by 
series of international events and agreements as well as by three Lebanese delegations, 
including one led by Maronite patriarch Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik, attending the Paris Peace 
Conference to claim the maintenance and even the expansion of the Mutaṣarrifīya‟s territories 
as “Christian homeland”, resulting in subsequent British, Faisalian, and French military 
occupations between 1918 and 1920. Ultimately, the San Remo conference placed the whole of 
Syria, including Lebanon, under a League of Nations mandate entrusted to France. The decision 
was immediately implemented through French military intervention against King Fayṣal‟s 
Damascus-based Arab Kingdom forcing him into Iraqi exile and permitting the detachment of 
an enlarged version of Lebanon, the État du Grand Liban, from the rest of Syria.323   
 
III.3.1.1 Formal aspects 
Christian Textbook 
In the Christian textbook, there are two whole chapters devoted to the events of the First World 
War and the following transitional period throughout the total of 16 pages. The 9-page 1st 
chapter, with the title Lubnān fī „l-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā, Lebanon in the First World War 
analyses Lebanese history in the years between 1914 and 1916 and is divided into three 
sections; while the 2nd chapter, Lubnān min al-ḥarb ilā „l-intidāb, Lebanon from the war to the 
mandate, consisting of 6 pages is divided into 7 sections: 
  
I. Lubnān fī-l-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā, Lebanon in the First World War 
1) Duḵūl as-salṭana al-ʿuṯmānīya al-ḥarb, The Ottoman Empire‟s enter into the war  
2) Al-waḍʿ as-siyāsī fī Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā, The political situation in Lebanon during 
World War I.  
3) Al-waḍʿ al-iqtiṣādī fī Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā, The economical situation in Lebanon during 
World War I.  
  
II. Lubnān min al-ḥarb ilā-l-intidāb, Lebanon from the war until the mandate 
Muqaddama: Insiḥāb al-ʿUṯmānīyīn Introduction: The Ottoman withdrawal 
1) Al-ḥukūmāt al-maḥallīya fī Lubnān w-fī Dimašq The local governments in Lebanon and in Damascus 
2) Al-ḥulafāʾ fī bilādnā w-an-niẓām al-idārī al-muʾaqqit The Allies in our country and the provisional 
administrative system 
3) Mawāqif al-lubnānīyīn min mustaqbal bilādihim The attitudes of the Lebanese towards the future of their 
country   
4) Al-wufūd al-lubnānīya ilā muʾtamar al-ṣulḥ fī Bārīs The Lebanese delegations at the Paris peace 
conference  
5) At-tafāhum al-inklīzī – al-faransī w-ittifāq Fayṣal- Clemenceau The Anglo-French accord and the Faisal-
Clemenceau agreement 
6) Lajnat King-Crane The King-Crane Commission 
 
                                                          
323 Cf. Lubnān EI² 
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Sunni Textbook 
In the Sunni textbook, there are also two chapters dealing with the events between 1914 
and1920 in the total of 12 pages. The 6 page long first chapter displays events of Lebanese 
history of the years 1914-1918 and is divided into 6 sections; while the 7 pages of the second 
chapter accounts the events of the years immediately following World War I, and is divided 
into 7 sections.    
  
I. Al-waḍʿ as-siyāsī w-iqtiṣādī w-ijtimāʿī fī Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā  
Politics, economy and society in Lebanon during the First World War 
1) Waḍʿ Lubnān as-siyāsī qubayl al-ḥarb, Lebanon‟s political situation shortly before the war  
2) Waḍʿ Lubnān as-siyāsī ḵilāl al-ḥarb, Lebanon‟s political situation during the war  
3) Raddat al-fiʿl al-lubnānīya (mawqif al-lubnānīyīn min siyāsat Jamāl pāšā), The Lebanese reaction 
(attitude of the Lebanese towards Jamāl pasha‟s policy) 
4) Al-waḍʿ al-iqtiṣādī fī Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb, Lebanon‟s economical situation during the war 
5) Natāʾij al-azma al-iqtiṣādīya w-aṯarha ʿalā „l-lubnānīyīn, The results of the economic crisis and its effects 
on the Lebanese 
6) Waḍʿ Lubnān al-ijtimāʿī ḵilāl al-ḥarb, Lebanon‟s social situation during the war 
 
II. Lubnān fī fitrat al-intiqāl min al-iḥtilāl ilā-l-intidāb 1918-1920,  
Lebanon in the transitional period from the occupation to the mandate 1918-1920 
1) Lubnān bayn insiḥāb al-ʿuṯmānīyīn w-majīʾ al-ḥulafāʾ, Lebanon between the Ottoman withdrawal and the 
arrival of the Allies   
2) Ḵawf al-lubnānīyīn w-tawḍīḥ al-ḥulafāʾ Lebanese fears and the Allied explication  
3) Mawāqif al-lubnānīyīn min mustaqbal bilādihim The attitudes of the Lebanese towards the future of their 
country      
4) Taškīl lajnat King-Crane, The formation of the King-Crane Commission 
5) Ittifāq Lloyd George w-Clemenceau, The Lloyd George-Clemenceau agreement 
6) Ittifāq Fayṣal Clemenceau, The Faisal-Clemenceau agreement 
7) Muʾtamar Sān Rīmū, The San Remo conference 
 
Shiʿi Textbook 
In the Shiʿi textbook, the events there are also two chapters dealing with the events between 
1914 and1920 in the total of 12 pages. The 6 page long first chapter displays events of 
Lebanese history of the years 1914-1918 and is divided into 6 sections; while the 7 pages of the 
second chapter accounts the events of the years immediately following World War I, and is 
divided into 7 sections.    
  
IV. Lubnān w-al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʾūlā, Lebanon and the First World War 
1) Al-waḍʿ as-siyāsī, political situation   
2) Al-waḍʿ al-iqtiṣādī Economical situation 
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3) Al-waḍʿ al-ijtimāʿī Social situation 
 
VI. Ḵaṭwāt tamhīdīya li-„l-intidāb Preliminary steps towards the mandate  
1) Al-ḥulafāʾ yattaṣilūn b-š-Šarīf Ḥusayn , The Allies contact Šarīf Ḥusayn  
2)  Šarīf Ḥusayn  yuʿlin al-ḥarb, Šarīf Ḥusayn  declares the war 
3) Ittifāqīyat Sykes-Picot The Sykes-Picot Agreement 
4) Iḥtijāj al-ʿArab Protest of the Arabs 
5) Waʿd Balfour Balfour promise  
 
VII. Al-intidāb al-fransī (1) The Frnch mandate (1)  
1) Al-ḥulafāʾ w-al-ʿarab fī Lubnān, The Allies and the Arabs in Lebanon 
2) Lubnān w-muʾattamarāt aṣ-ṣulḥ, Lebanon and the peace confernecres 
3) Marāḥil al-intidāb, The stages of the mandate 
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III.3.1.2 Ottoman Lebanon 
For different territorial conceptions of Lebanon cf. pp.X of this paper.  
 
In the textbooks 
All of the three books start with the description of the country‟s territorial division into the 
Christian-governed Mutaṣarrifīya with inner autonomy (istiqlāl dāḵilī) and the Ottoman-
governed arḍ al-wilāya under the direct rule of the Sublime Porte, the later peripheral 
territories of the Lebanese state located in the Beirut and Damascus wilayets324 prior the World 
War I.  
Concerning the two territorial denominations, while the term arḍ al-wilāya is used unanimously 
in the three textbooks, the Mutaṣarrifīya appears as „al-mutaṣarrifīya aw dawlat Lubnān aṣ-ṣaġīr‟ 
in the Christian textbook, as „mutaṣarrifīyat Jabal Lubnān‟ in the Sunni textbook, while the 
Shiʿite textbook simply mentions „Jabal Lubnān‟. Since the word dawla (or daula) designates a 
“state; country; [or] empire”325, the term dawlat Lubnān aṣ-ṣaġīr, or State of Smaller Lebanon 
used in the Christian textbook evokes a stately entity bearing independence and international 
sovereignty.  
Although Lebanon never existed before as a polity, the textbooks treat its later territory as a 
consistent entity  prior to its formal establishment. Moreover, none of the textbooks describes 
the other territories belonging to the related wilayets in today‟s Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the 
Palestinian Territories. As we know, the Beirut wilayet consisted of further territories located in 
modern Syria, Israel and the West Bank, while the historic Damascus stretched on a territory 
including Southern Israel, the Gaza Strip, much of modern Jordan, and Southern Syria, but 
excluded modern Syria‟s northern and eastern parts. Hence it seems that none of the three 
narratives distinguishes between the historical and current territories and denominations of the 
Middle East‟s modern states.  
Furthermore, while the Christian and the Shiʿite textbooks make a clear distinction between 
Lebanese and Syrian, the Sunni textbook occasionally uses the term Arab as a synonym for 
Lebanese, and defines Lebanon as an Arab nation326, an addition not occurring in the two other 
textbooks.   
Beside its administrative divisions, the Christian textbook also gives a detailed account of 
Beirut‟s and the Mutaṣarrifīya‟s economic, social, political and cultural development in the late 
                                                          
324 Lit. ‟the land of the wilayet‟, i.e. the Biqāʿ, forming the part of the Ottoman Damascus wilayet, as well as the city of 
Beirut, Sidon and Tyre, and the ʿAkkār and Jabal ʿAmīl regions that were belonging to the Beirut wilayet.  
325 Wehr: s.r. d-w-l  
326 Sunni 5. 
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19th century describing Lebanon as the most advanced territory of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Arab lands.  
All in all, it appears that all of the three textbooks treat Lebanon in its modern form as a 
distinct entity within the Ottoman Empire, regardless of its contemporary subdivisions.  
III.3.1.3 Emigration  
Among the Arabic countries, it is probably Lebanon that has been the most significantly 
characterised by ongoing emigration for at least for the last 140 years of its history. With an 
estimated total of 14 million327, the Lebanese diaspora of the Americas, Europe, West Africa, 
Australia, and the Gulf region, highly outnumbers the country‟s current internal population and 
has a pivotal impact on Lebanon‟s economic, political, and cultural life. Furthermore, due to 
the customary contact with the homeland, remittances sent to charitable, religious, or 
educational organisations, as well as to relatives and family members contribute largely to 
Lebanon‟s economic growth. As Hitti remarks: “Its [Lebanon‟s] people talk of two Lebanons: 
Lebanon the resident (Lubnān al-muqīm) and Lebanon of the emigrant (Lubnān al-muġtarib).”328  
According to Hitti, emigration from Syria, particularly from Mount Lebanon, began as early 
as in the 1860s; the migrants being predominantly Christians. The first wave of emigration was 
a result of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the following modernisation in Egypt by 
Ismāʿīl Pasha who called for a high number of educated Lebanese, such as physicians, clerks, 
and officials of for the newly established civil administration. By 1907, Egypt‟s Lebanese 
community made up around 30,000 residents, largely constituting the upper educated class of 
the society, and playing an important economic and cultural role both in their new country of 
residence, as well as in their native Lebanon. Beginning from the 1880‟s, overwhelmingly 
lower-class Christians of the Mount began to emigrate in relatively large numbers to North and 
South America establishing massive (Syro-)Lebanese communities in the United States, Canada, 
Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. The high rate of this mass exodus encouraged the Sublime Porte 
to introduce travel regulations, and eventually to prohibit emigration from its Syrian lands in 
1889. 329  The number of emigrants, however, continued to increase resulting in the 
establishment of a wide Lebanese emigrant infrastructure with hubs in Marseille, New York, 
Boston, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, as well as in the closing of US immigration gates for 
Syro-Lebanese from 1924.330 During the mandate period, a third great wave of emigration took 
place, this time increasingly towards the French and British colonies of western Africa such as 
                                                          
327 Cf. Lebanon‟s country profile provided by the UK‟s Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/middle-east-north-
africa/lebanon) 
328 Hitti (1957) 476. 
329 Cf. ibid. 473-475. 
330 Kaufmann (2004) 70.  
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Senegal, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The majority of the estimated 10,000 plus migrants were 
Muslims. However, mass Christian exodus (of around 70,000) to the Americas, Australia, and 
Europe prevailed.  
The causes of these early emigration waves, however, are less of political or religious than 
economic nature. Beginning from the 1860s, Mount Lebanon was developed into the Ottoman 
Empire‟s primary region for sericulture transforming the majority of the Mount‟s arable land 
into orchards for mulberry trees. Consequently, an estimated 70% of the peasant population‟s 
income was derived directly or indirectly from silk, resulting in a significant economic but also 
demographic growth. However, with the entry of other silk producing regions, most notably 
that of Japan and China into the global silk market put an end to Lebanon‟s prosperity. The 
process was further accelerated by the better quality and lower price of Far-Eastern silk, as well 
as by the opening of the Suez Canal enabling its cheap and rapid transport to Europe.  As a 
result, Lebanon‟s impoverised rural population had no other way to deduct its demographic 
surplus than emigration.331  
Further migratory waves in the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by increasing share of 
Muslim, and non-montagnard emigrants, predominantly from the underprivileged strata of 
Lebanese society. With the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, an estimated 300,000 
plus332 of Lebanese – regardless of social or sectarian background – fled the country and was 
granted consideration as refugee in numerous European, American, and African nations.333  
Due to Lebanese citizenship laws, a large number of Lebanese or people of paternal 
Lebanese descent maintain their citizenship rights raising tricky questions of political nature 
about Lebanon‟s relation with its diaspora, which remains more than 50% - i.e. over-
proportionally in comparison with the Lebanese resident population‟s sectarian repartition – 
Christian. Ipso facto Maronite leaders oppose any alternation of diaspora citizenship rights, 
while Shiʿi and Sunni leaders frown upon potential political participation or even permanent 
return of people more than a generation removed from Lebanon.334 Thus, emigration, despite of 
its long history, is still of considerable socio-political importance raising controversial questions 
not to be answered from a non-sectarian perspective.    
In the textbooks 
As for the textbooks, emigration and its impact are mentioned in all of the three narratives, 
mostly in the form of a section within a subchapter. The Christian textbook consecrates two 
passages to Lebanese emigration movements, depicting it positively. Firstly, a passage in a zid 
maʿlūmātak box makes a short mention of it, as one of the Mutaṣarrifīya‟s distinctive 
                                                          
331 Benke: (1987) 65. 
332 Harris (1997) 86 
333 Humphrey (2000) 25. 
334 Harris (1997) 86 
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characteristic describing it as: “The Mutaṣarrifīya was known for its political stability and scientific 
activity as well as for its wide emigration movement. The economic situation improved, political 
awareness increased, and many wished full independence. Thanks to the cultural renaissance [the 
nahḍa], the perspective of the Lebanese widened. Due to this openness to the world, the way of 
emigration and studying lead the Lebanese into Europe‟s schools and universities.”335 The second text 
passage explains the importance of financial and humanitarian aid sent by the American and 
European diasporas during the sufferings of the WWI. Furthermore, the passage puts emphasis 
on the internal migration of the region‟s Christian minorities such as the Assyrians, Armenians, 
and the Chaldeans seeking refuge in the Mount, as well as that of the ʿAkkar‟s, the Biqāʿ‟s, and 
the Ḥawrān‟s rural population fleeing Ottoman oppression, famine, and poverty336. Thus, the 
Christian narrative does not fail to draw attention to the role Mount Lebanon played as 
Christian refuge for persecuted and justifies emigration only with educational motives.     
In the Sunni textbook, emigration is only brought up in the context of the World War by, 
giving the topic a much shorter account than its Christian counterpart. It mentions political and 
economic difficulties - including military recruitment, forced labour, or political persecution of 
nationalists - as its reason and names the émigré‟s desire for work, security, and stability as 
primary motives. Furthermore, the Sunni narrative points out wartime internal migration from 
agriculturally underdeveloped areas into fertile regions and urban centres.337  
On the first page of the chapter, Shiʿite textbook starts with a memoire of a Jabal ʿĀmil 
emigrant titled “The yearning of emigrants”338 gives an account of the hardships leaving the 
beloved homeland. In the further parts of the chapter, however, emigration is not mentioned 
anymore; apart from the humanitarian and financial aid sent by oversee expatriates during the 
wartime famine339.   
III.3.1.4 Ottoman measures during the war  
The outbreak of the WWI and the Ottoman Empire‟s participation in it on the side of the 
Axis Powers had direct and fundamental impacts on Lebanon. Fearing anti-Ottoman, pro-Arab, 
and pro-French sentiments, the Sublime Porte installed its Fourth Army in the Levant headed 
by the commander-in-chief Jamāl Pasha who declared his initial willingness to cooperate with 
the Arab lands in general and respect Mount Lebanon‟s inner autonomy in particular340. After 
the discovery of documents in the French Consulate in Beirut in 1915 incriminating a number 
                                                          
335 Christian textbook: p.11.  
336 Christian textbook: p.16.  
337 Sunni textbook: p.9. 
338 Shiʿite textbook: p.44.  
339 Shiʿite textbook: p.41.  
340 Hitti (1957) 483. 
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of prominent Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals in subversive activities aiming at the 
establishment of an independent Arab state, Jamāl pasha adopted a series of 
countermeasures.341 Firstly, the intellectuals involved in the Beirut document had been publicly 
hanged (14 of them in Beirut, 7 other in Damascus). The „martyrs of 1915‟, as they are referred 
to unanimously in the narratives, included i.a. the brothers Philippe and Farīd al-Ḵāzin, editors 
of the Maronite-patriotic journal „al-Arz‟342; the journalist Aḥmad Ṭabbāra, and the politicians 
ʿAbd al-Ġannī al-ʿArīsī, and Maḥmūd al-Maḥmaṣānī.343 Moreover, the Ottoman army entered 
the Mutaṣarrifīya, abolished its autonomy; transformed strategically crucial monasteries344, 
schools, and administrative edifices into military barracks and fortresses; and forced the 
Christian governor, Awhānis Pasha, to abdicate, replacing him with Istanbul-appointed Turkish 
Muslim officials. By sending Beirut‟s Maronite bishop into exile to Anatolia and threatening the 
patriarch with the same fate, Jamāl Pasha put an enormous pressure on the Maronite clergy 
and curtailed it of their former privileges. Additionally, a much feared military tribunal 
installed in ʿĀlayh/Aley took the place of the abolished Mutaṣarrifīya‟s executive functions; the 
authorities took control of trade and commerce, expropriated wheat and livestock for the army, 
and introduced the depreciated Turkish paper currency.345 These measures led to exceptionally 
high inflation rates and the spread of speculation by usurers and government officials. This 
severe situation was further worsened by tight Allied blockade of the whole Ottoman coast 
from 1915. Despite these serious deficiencies, the Ottoman authorities made no efforts to 
introduce food, medical supplies or clothing from other parts of the Empire or abroad. Being 
hermetically isolated from the rest of the world, the Mount‟s population had difficulties to 
receive remittances from their emigrated donors in abroad that they until that point heavily 
relied on. In addition to the spread of epidemics, the remnants of the region‟s crop had been 
destroyed by an invasion of locusts in 1915.  Consequently, Lebanon‟s population experienced 
the worst famine of their country‟s history in 1916, wiping out large segments of the 
economically underprivileged classes, and forcing entire Druze communities to flee their 
ancestral territories in the Šūf for the Ḥawrān. All in all, the war and its direct and indirect 
consequences, such as compulsory military service, diseases, epidemics, malnutrition, famine, 
persecution or emigration resulted in a population loss of around 100,000 people alone in 
Mount Lebanon, nearly a quarter of its pre-war residents of 450,000.346 Moreover, as Traboulsi 
argues, “the war revealed the economic insufficiency of Mount Lebanon, which depended on overseas 
                                                          
341 Hourani (1954) 49. 
342 Havemann (2002) 94.  
343 The others being: ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Ḵalīl, Muḥammad al-Maḥmaṣṣānī, Ṣāliḥ Ḥaydar, ʿAbd al-Qādir Ḵarsā, ʿAlī al-
Amanāzī, Nūr ad-Dīn al-Qāḍī, Muḥammad Musallim ʿĀbidīn, Salīm ʿAbd al-Hādī, Maḥmūd al-ʿAjamī, and  
344 Including two of the Maronites„ most prominent monasteries of Mār Yūḥanna and Mār Isḥāʿyāʾ. Hitti (1957) 483.  
345 Ibid. 484. 
346 Ibid.484-485. 
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trade for over half of its revenues and most fulfilled its needs in cereals and livestock with imports 
from the Biqāʿ and the Syrian interior.”347      
In the textbooks 
By the construal of these events, the three textbooks show an unexpected unanimity. In all 
of the narratives, Lebanon‟s political, social, and economic development is carefully examined 
highlighting cause and effect and giving detailed account on the population‟s suffering. As a 
further common feature, Ottoman Turkish authorities are made responsible for the war‟s 
disastrous impact on Lebanon designating Jamāl Pasha as “slaughterer”348, “tyrant”349 or 
“corrupt”350. There are, however, differences in the emphasis put on events and their causes. 
For instance, the suffering of the Maronites, the brave resistance of their patriarch as well the 
humanitarian aid the Maronite clergy offered during the famine are very much called in 
attention in the Christian narrative. Moreover, it accentuates exhaustively the importance of 
financial and military aid sent by overseas Lebanese migrants and underlines their role in the 
Allied and Faisalian forces351 seeking to liberate Lebanon. Moreover, the abolition of Mount 
Lebanon‟s autonomy, of foreign commercial privileges, and the elimination of the foreign 
school system are also deplored.  
In a more solid form, the Sunni narrative also gives account of numerous elements of the 
Maronite perspective acknowledging the Patriarchate‟s efforts and role during wartime 
hardships, but at the same time it also underlines the persecution of Arab nationalists and the 
“despotic oppression of the Lebanese”352 by the occupying Ottoman army.  
In comparison to its Christian and Sunni counterparts, the Shiʿite narrative omits the 
Maronite perspective as a whole mentioning neither the patriarch‟s deeds, nor any of the 
Christians‟ grievances listed in the other two narratives. Instead, it gives an account of the 
events and their socio-economic consequences.        
  
III.3.1.5 The King-Crane Commission 
In order to decide the fate of the populations of the Ottoman Empire and ascertain the 
wishes of its inhabitants in accordance with the principle of self-determination, President 
Wilson called for the appointment of an „International Commission for Inquiry‟ in 1919.353 
Boycotted by the French and the British, only the commission‟s American members – Chicago 
                                                          
347 Traboulsi (2007) 72.  
348 Christian textbook: p.13. 
349 Sunni textbook: p.6. 
350 Shiʿite textbook: p.36. 
351 As both the Christian and the Sunni narratives commemorate, many Syro-Lebanese volunteers joined the rows of 
either the Allied or Fayṣal‟s Arab forces (cf. Christian textbook. P.15.; Sunni textbook: p.7.) 
352 Sunni textbook: p.7. 
353 Hourani: 52. 
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businessman Charles Crane and Henry King, President of the Oberlin College – arrived in the 
region in June 1919. The King-Crane Commission, as it became known, toured what are today 
Lebanon, parts of Syria, of Jordan, of Israel-Palestine, and of Turkey (Cilicia) and met 
delegations from 36 cities and 1,520 villages receiving no fewer than 1,863 petitions. 
According to Traboulsi, 80 per cent of the respondents voted for a united Syria, 74 per cent 
supported independence and 60 per cent chose a „democratic and decentralised constitutional 
monarchy‟. In the event of the imposition of a foreign mandate on Syria, 60 per cent opted for 
an American mandate, much smaller number for a British mandate and only 14 per cent, 
mainly Lebanese Maronites, requested the French as mandatory power. A total of 72 per cent 
of the respondents were opposed to Zionist ambitions and to the separation of Palestine from 
the rest of the Arab East.354  
Within the later Lebanon355, however, many Christians from the mountain and the coast 
were opposing the establishment of a Syrian federation and rather reverted to a Greater 
Lebanon option. As an example, a petition from a Beirut Christian delegation stated that 
Lebanon‟s separation from Syria was supported by history, mores, racial affinities, geographical 
considerations, language, legislation, and common intellectual thinking; stating that Syria and 
Lebanon were just simply two different civilisations, as “the coast, which has turned towards the 
Occident since the days of the Phoenicians, cannot consciously consent to let itself drawn in an 
intrusive and planned Pan-Arabism.”356 As Kaufman remarks, this and similar petitions indicate, 
that the vision of Lebanon as a future Western-oriented state, buoyed up by a historical 
narrative reaching back to the Phoenicians, was widespread among Beirut‟s Christian 
bourgeoisie and was not confined to the Maronites.357  
In its report to the peace conference in Paris in 1919, the commission recommended a 
united state for the whole of natural Syria governed by Prince Fayṣal under American 
mandatory power (in addition to a separate Iraq under British mandate). It also emphasised 
that the Zionist project of unlimited emigration of Jews into Palestine and its final goal, the 
creation of a Jewish state,  required „serious modifications‟ and concluded: „anything else 
would be tantamount of treason of the Syrian people‟. The Commission‟s endorsement for 
„Syria within its natural borders‟ had a rather negligible impact on the Allies‟ peace policy and 
could little to avoid the partition of the Levant;358 while the report itself was only published 
                                                          
354 Traboulsi (2007) 78. 
355 Within today‟s Lebanon, the commission toured the cities of ʿAynāb, al-Batrūn, Baʿbdā, Baʿlbakk, Beirut, Bkarkī, 
Sidon, Tripoli, Tyre, and Zaḥla (cf. New York Times) 
356 MAE, Paris, Syrie-Liban, Vol. 43, p. 113, Le Comité Permanent Exécutif du Groupement Chrétien de Beyrouth, July 7, 
1919, quoted in Kaufmann (2004) 84.  
357 Kaufmann (2004) 84.  
358 Pipes (1990) 26. 
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three years later359. According to Pipes, the divisions aggravated traditional sectarian 
differences and introduced new tensions. Reflecting this sentiment, the Commission report 
argued that “the separation off of the Greater Lebanon … would intensify the religious 
differences in Syria.”360  
 
In the textbooks 
All of the three textbooks give a short report on the King-Crane Commission‟s activities and 
its results. While the Christian and the Sunni textbooks roughly agree on the commission‟s 
goals, route, methods, and importance explaining the rejection of the experts‟ results with the 
previous secret Anglo-French agreements to divide the region in accordance with their own 
interests, the Shiʿite narrative has the following conviction: “
”,
361 i.e. it accuses „the intervention of Zionist leaders‟ for 
the report‟s negligence. In addition, the Shiʿite version reveals no details about the local 
population‟s desires concerning the political appartenance of the region, unlike the other two 
narratives, where some possible options are listed. Accordingly, the Christian textbook states, 
that the majority of the „Lebanese‟ opted for a France-backed independent Lebanon with 
extended borders, some would have preferred American or British mandate over the country, 
while only a minority would have supported Mount Lebanon‟s autonomy within a Syrian union 
or the full independence of the mutaṣarrifīya without any affiliation to an Arab polity, nor a 
Western power.362 The Sunni textbook lists up the options of a French mandated, an 
autonomous but Syrian, and a fully independent Lebanon without mentioning their grade of 
preference among the population.363  
Thus, it seems that both the Christian and the Shiʿite narrative have their very own 
conceptions concerning the importance of the King-Crane Commission: while the former one 
seeks to use it as a pretext to legitimate the later establishment of Greater Lebanon as a French-
mandated independent state detached from the Syrian interior, its Shiʿite counterpart accuses 
Zionism for persuading the marginalisation of the report‟s recommendations resulting in the 
arbitrary division of the region in accordance with foreign Zionist interest.  
 
                                                          
359 Hourani (1954) 52. 
360 J.N. Camp report, Foreign Office 371/4153/41476, February 2, 1919. Quoted in: Pipes (1990) 33.  
361 Shiʿite textbook: p.65.  
362 Christian textbook: p. 26. Furthermore, a previous subchapter (pp.22-23.) relates Lebanese attitude towards the 
future political form of the region in a regional perspective, stating that “the people of Mount Lebanon (most of them 
Christians) demanded the reunification of the territories that had been detached from the Mutaṣarrifīya-system of the Mount, 
and the independence of the whole [country]”, while “the people of the wilayet (most of them Muslims) called for inner 
autonomy with ties to Fayṣalian rule, and participation on the Syrian Conference in Damascus, and assigned Prince Fayṣal to 
represent their view in Paris.” 
363 Sunni textbook: p.15.  
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III.3.1.6 International accords shaping Lebanon 
Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916): In order to delimitate the spheres of influence in the 
Arab territories at that time under Ottoman control claimed by their respective governments, a 
secret agreement had been signed by the diplomats François George Picot and Sir Mark Sykes 
representing France and the United Kingdom, respectively. The accord, concluded and 
embodied in a number of notes exchanged between the French, British, and Russian 
governments, provided for the division of the Fertile Crescent into zones of direct and indirect 
rule as follows: France gained direct control over the Levantine coast north from the Raʾs an-
Naqūra, including Mount Lebanon and the Anatolian region of Cilicia, as well as indirect 
control over the Syrian interior including the former Damascus, Aleppo, and Mosul wilayets to 
be administrated by an Arab State or Confederation. Similarly, Britain was to be at liberty to 
establish a form of direct administration in the wilayets of Basra and Baghdad, and impose its 
indirect control over a future Arab State stretching through the rest of Iraq and Syrian Desert to 
the port of ʿAqaba. In what is now Israel and the Palestinian Territories an international 
administration was to be established, with Great Britain retaining direct control over the cities 
of Haifa and Acre.364 Prior the signing of the agreement, France funded an expedition to 
ascertain whether the imposition of her control over the Syrian region was serving her colonial 
interests resulting in a report reaching positive conclusions. Similarly, Britain‟s strong claim 
over Palestine as a buffer zone between the Sinai and the Levant to secure the Suez Canal and 
the road to India was also serving the colonial enterprise, while securing of the Basra and 
Baghdad regions was mainly due to its oil fields and its strategic location at the Persian Gulf, 
which had also become a zone of British interest. These colonial aims were, however, justified 
by the necessary protection of the region‟s Christian, but also Druze, ʿAlawī, and even Shiʿite 
minorities rooting in, for instance, age-old French self-perception as Protector of the Levant‟s 
Christian communities.365  
Lloyd George-Clemenceau Agreement (September 1919): After having occupied Lebanon 
and overthrown its Baʿbdā-based Arab government, France‟s endeavour was to insure total 
control and to obtain mandate over the whole of Syria, while Prince Fayṣal, whose revolt was 
inspired, armed, advised, and financed by Britain, ruled Damascus, in the belief that Great 
Britain would use her influence to fulfil her promises made in the 1915-16 Anglo-Arab 
McMahon-Ḥusayn  Correspondence.366 In order to avoid an Anglo-French clash concerning the 
future of a British-promised independent Arab state, the Prime Ministers of France and Great 
Britain reached an agreement in September 1919 modifying the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
                                                          
364 Hourani (1954) 46-47.  
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according to recent developments. First and foremost, British troops had been withdrawn from 
Syria (excluding Palestine) and Cilicia to be replaced by the French army on the coast and 
Cilicia, as well by Arab troops in the interior. Moreover, France received a share in the Anglo-
Persian Petroleum Company that had recently been discovered oil in Iraq. In return, France 
dropped any claim of Palestine, and also ceded the Mosul region – originally considered part of 
the French sphere of influence – to Britain.  As a result, her new position enabled France to 
extend her direct control over the whole of Syria, and also gained legitimisation from her most 
prominent ally. Consequently, Fayṣal‟s Arab government could do nothing else than to express 
its protest against the new regional framework and to try to settle its differences with France. 
With British encouragement Fayṣal travelled to Europe to find a solution with Clemenceau‟s 
France.367   
Fayṣal-Clemenceau Agreement (January 1920): Following the transfer of military control 
over the Syrian coast from Great Britain to France, Fayṣal had to recognise that Britain had left 
him to his fate. Lacking military strength to resist French forces, Fayṣal accepted Lloyd 
George‟s suggestion to negotiate with Clemenceau in Europe in order to try to reach 
understanding with France. At the outset, Clemenceau refused to receive the Prince, but when 
they finally met, the two statesmen came to a provisional agreement, by which the right of the 
Syrian Arabs to an independent state centred in Damascus and led by Fayṣal was 
acknowledged,368 with the condition that a French high commissioner would be posted in 
Aleppo, French civil and military advisors as well as French economic, military, and cultural 
aid would be resorted exclusively. Moreover, Fayṣal had to recognise Lebanon‟s independence 
and territorial integrity under French mandate without Lebanon‟s borders having been defined 
previously.369  
San Remo Conference (April 1920): To decide the fate of the occupied territories of the 
former Ottoman Empire, the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan met in the 
city of Sanremo, Northern Italy, to determine the allocations of type „A‟ League of Nations 
mandates. The representatives of these governments allotted the northern part of geographical 
Syria to France, and the southern half, known as Palestine, to Great Britain, with the obligation 
of carrying out the policy of the Balfour Declaration370. As a result, historic Syria has been split 
                                                          
367 Hourani (1954) 52. 
368 Hourani (1954) 53. 
369 Traboulsi (2007) 77. 
370 Article C of the San Remo Convention: “Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should 
be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His 
Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and 
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up – among arbitrary borders corresponding neither to Ottoman provincial subdivisions, nor to 
ethno-religious lines – into mandates ruled by European powers which the local population 
“found hard to distinguish from colonial rule”371.  Fayṣal in turn, heavily rejected the 
convention, however, without much avail. Shortly after the convention‟s announcement, the 
French army entered Damascus in July 1920 putting an end to Fayṣal‟s short-lived Syrian 
Kingdom and forcing him into Iraqi exile where he had been proclaimed king of the country.372 
In the textbooks 
Although all of the three accords had crucial direct impacts on the territories of the later 
Lebanese state, most of the narratives do not treat them as a compact series of events, but 
rather refer them as highly individual conformities not influencing the other. For instance, 
while making references to the Sykes-Picot Agreement in chapters on Lebanese history at the 
very beginning of the textbooks, the agreement itself is not given detailed attention earlier than 
in chapters on general Arab history, neither in the Sunni, nor in the Christian narratives.373 
Consequently, the Sykes-Picot agreement does not seem to be considered as integral part of 
Lebanese history or to have a pivotal effect on the creation of the country by the 
aforementioned narratives. The Shiʿite textbook, on the other hand, gives a chronologically 
correct account on the current of consecutive international accords beginning with the Sykes-
Picot Agreement up until the San Remo Conference, but at the same time fails to cover the 
1920 Fayṣal-Clemenceau Agreement.374   
Parallel to the differing illustrations of these accords of historical significance, the three 
narratives offer dissimilar interpretations and views of them, both in particular and in context. 
For example, while giving a throughout well-founded account on the events both in detail and 
in context, the Christian textbook retains a somewhat aloof and neutral style by discussing 
their significance, seeking to avoid siding with neither a biased Arab,  nor a “European” point 
of view. On the other hand, however, the narrative allows literally no critique on French 
                                                                                                                                                                          
whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds 
for reconstituting their national home in that country” (Laqueur: p.34.)   
371 Hourani (1954) 57. 
372 Pipes (1990) 28. 
373 The agreement is discussed in Chapter 14 – Aṯ-ṯawra al-ʿarabīya al-kubrā, or The Great Arab Revolt in the Sunni 
(pp.70-72) as well as in Chapter 2 of the section of Arabic history – Tafakkuk as-Sulṭana al-ʿUṯmānīya w-qiyām al-
Jumhūrīya at-Turkīya, or „The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Turkish Republic (pp.114-
116) in the Christian textbook.  
374 Additionally to the agreements, the Christian textbook provides a detailed insight into the personal correspondence 
between the Maronite patriarch Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik and French Prime Minister Clemenceau concerning Maronite 
demands to establish an extended, independent Lebanon with French help. An excerpt from the patriarch‟s memoires 
(provided in a „zadd maʿlūmātak‟ box on pp.25) summarises the Maronite clergy‟s arguments for Lebanon‟s 
independence and extended territory, while Clemenceau‟s answer promises French support to 
“conserve[Lebanese]traditions and expand its administrative and political system and [to] invest in the country” (pp.25-
26.). These details are not given any reference in the two other textbooks.  
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policies and interest shaping these agreements, and does not condemn or even put negative 
light on them375. At the same time, Arab resentments and political disappointment, i.e. an 
expected narrative or comment depicting an “Arab” angle is also absent. The same attitude is 
true to the agreements discussed in the first section of the textbook consecrated exclusively to 
Lebanese history.  
The Sunni narrative, similarly to its Christian counterpart, seeks to adopt an unbiased 
narrative tone and thus, tries to emphasise economic circumstances as motives for the 
extension of Franco-British expansion in the region. By doing so, the narrative is not entirely 
free from information contradicting itself; for instance, concerning the Fayṣal-Clemenceau 
Agreement, the Sunni textbook states: “Summarizing this agreement, France recognised Syria‟s 
independence, and in return, Syria recognised Lebanon‟s independence under French mandate, made 
the Biqāʿ region to a demilitarised zone between the Arab and French administrations, and let France 
to represent Syrian interests in abroad.”376     
Unlike its Christian and Sunni counterparts, the Shiʿi narrative provides a different tune, 
lacking balanced rhetoric or neutrality. For instance, the Sykes-Picot Agreement is referred to 
as “secret conspiracy to get the resources and wealth of the Arabs”377; the Balfour Declaration 
(which is discussed extensively as part of Lebanese history) is displayed to have been seeking 
to establish “a Jewish state in the middle of the Arab lands to serve Britain‟s colonial interests”378, 
while the San Remo Conference was nothing more than “the achievement of Anglo-French 
colonial aspirations through the legalisation of the League of Nations.”379 With such rhetoric, the 
Shiʿite narrative avoids the Sunni-Christian attempt to give a balanced view, and thus, seems to 
prefer to put light on the events from a “local” or “Arab” perspective, and to allow an 
occasionally anti-European point of view.   
 
 
   
                                                          
375 As an example, while a subchapter concerning the agreement is consecrated to the post-war modifications of the 
accord, the French mandate‟s extension to the whole of Syria and Lebanon is commented with one single sentence: 
“waḍaʿ Lubnān w-Sūriyā taḥta al-intidāb al-faransī.” (Christian textbook: p.116)  
376 Sunni textbook: p.16. 
377 Shiʿi textbook: p.58. 
378 Shiʿi textbook: p.60. 
379 Shiʿi textbook: p.67. 
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 III.3.2 The French Mandate and the State of Greater Lebanon (1920-1926) 
Throughout the First World War the Lebanese Christians remained convinced that under 
French occupation their national aspirations would soon be realised; but even when the War 
was over, it was to take another two years of political upheaval in the Levant before they 
finally achieved their centuries-old dream of a state of their own. As it had been examined 
earlier, in the interim period, the quéstion libanaise became entangled in a larger context of 
international and regional issues including Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East, the secret 
War agreements, Prince Fayṣal‟s Arab national movement in Syria, and the relationship of that 
movement with France and Britain. The establishment of a desired Lebanese state, envisioned 
as a foyer chrértien by its par excellence Maronite partisans, was only possible after the solution 
of these problems and controversies. True, in the end the French government and its 
representatives in the Levant did fulfil Lebanese Christian aspirations in creating them a 
country and giving it generous borders. But this was not merely the automatic outcome of 
French pledges and traditional ties to Lebanon‟s Christians, especially the Maronites; it also 
reflected France‟s current interest in the area as a whole, including its developing relationship 
with Fayṣal‟s Arab government in Damascus and her British ally‟s presence in the south and 
east of the region. Moreover, the new country‟s generous borders soon proved themselves to be 
way too generous as the mainly Muslim population of the newly annexed territories were 
neither helping to legitimise the Lebanon‟s raison d‟être, nor showed much sympathy and 
cooperation towards the country‟s artificially imposed Christian hegemony or French – i.e. 
foreign Western Christian – overlords.   
Hence, the display of this period in the historical narratives allows a great deal of free space 
to reflect ideological and sectarian affiliated aspects of common history. The reception of a 
foreign power, forced detachment from a greater historic region, the establishment of a country 
never existing before lacking general consensus in and outside, etc. offers a wide range of 
possible interpretations.  As we will see, the presentation of certain sub-topics is anything but 
free from biases, stereotypes, or judgements leaving only a handful of issues that are 
reasonably agreed on in all the three narratives.  
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III.3.2.1 Formal aspects 
Christian Textbook 
 
III. Al-intidāb, The Mandate 
1) Mabdaʾ al-intidāb w-al-ittifāq ʿalayhi, The begin of the mandate and the agreement on it  
2) Muʾattamar Sān Rīmū w-farḍ al-intidāb, The San Remo conference and the implementation of the mandate  
3) Ṣakk al-intidāb, The Mandate document  
4) Raddat fiʿl majlis idārat mutaṣarrifīyat Jabal Lubnān, The reaction from Mount Lebanon‟s Administrative Council  
5) Taṭbīq al-intidāb, The application of the mandate  
 
IV. Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr 1920-1926, The State of Greater Lebanon 1920-1926 
1) Ẓurūf inšāʾhā The circumstances of its creation 
2) Qarrārat inšāʾhā The decisions of its creation 
3) Iʿlānhā Its proclamation   
4) Al-mutaġayyarāt allatī ʿarafhā Lubnān Lebanon‟s The alternations experienced by Lebanon 
5) Niẓām al-ḥukm fī Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr Greater Lebanon‟s governmental system 
6) Lajnat King-Crane The King-Crane Commission 
 
Sunni Textbook 
III. Mabdaʾ al-intidāb w-qiyām Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr 1920-1926  
The beginning of the mandate and the emergence of the State of Greater Lebanon   
1) Taʿrīf niẓām al-intidāb, Definition of the mandate system   
2) Kayf tamm al-ittifāq ʿalā mabdaʾ al-intidāb, How the mandate contract concluded the beginning of the mandate  
3) Anwāʿ al-intidāb, Mandate types 
4) Ṣakk al-intidāb, The mandate document  
5) Marāḥil ʿahd al-intidāb, Stages of the mandate period 
6) Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr 1920-1926, The State of Greater Lebanon 1920-1926 
  
IV. Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr 1920-1926 (niẓām al-ḥukm w-tanẓīm ad-dawla)  
The State of Greater Lebanon 1920-1926 (governmental system and the reorganisation of the state) 
1) Niẓām al-ḥukm fī Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr, The governmental system in the State of Greater Lebanon   
2) Tanẓīm ad-dawla (abraz munjazāt fī ʿahd Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr), The reorganisation of the state (the most important 
achievements in the era of the State of Greater Lebanon)  
3) Al-mufawwaḍīya al-ʿaliyā al-faransīya, The French High Commissariat      
4) Madan taṭbīq ṣakk al-intidāb fī Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr, Duration of the Mandate contract‟s application in the State of 
Greater Lebanon 
 
Shiʿi Textbook 
VII. Al-intidāb al-faransī (1), The French mandate (1)   
1) Al-ḥulafāʾ w-al-ʿarab fī Lubnān, The Allied and the Arabs in Lebanon   
2) Lubnān w-muʾattamar aṣ-ṣulḥ, Lebanon and the peace conference  
3) Marāḥilʿ al-intidāb, Stages of the Mandate   
4) Takrīs al-intidāb, Inauguration of the Mandate  
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VIII. Al-intidāb al-faransī (2) – al-ḥukm al-ʿaskarī al-mubāšir  
The French mandate (2) – the direct military governance   
1) Dawlat Lubnān al-kabīr, The State of Greater Lebanon  
2) Ṣakk al-intidāb, The mandate document 
3)  Al-ḥukm al-ʿaskarī al-mubāšir, The direct military governance  
 4) Idāra fī ʿahd al-intidāb, Administration in the Mandate era 
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III.3.2.2 The mandate system and its implication 
The granting of the mandate over Syria to France in the San Remo Conference in April 1920 
was an official recognition of France‟s long-standing ties with the Levant. Apart from the deep-
rooting educational influence (that have already been examined in this paper) represented by 
the presence of French religious orders and a network of educational establishments financed 
by the French state, France‟s mission civilisatrice had the clear political goal of strengthening her 
position in the region in which she had for centuries had an interest. In the Levant, as in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, missionaries had been the first to lay the fundaments of 
French colonial ambitions, despite the Third Republic‟s pivotal principle concerning the 
separation of State and Church. Outside la France métropolitaine, however, this principle did not 
seriously hamper religious activities and intensive clerical involvement; the French empire had 
indeed been benefiting from the results of their involvement on the colonies d‟outre-mer. 
Moreover, due to French banks and businesses that had been heavily investing in the Ottoman 
Empire long before its collapse and partition, France also had extensive economic interests in 
the Levant. Before the War, 63% of the Ottoman public dept was in French hands, while French 
companies held an almost complete monopoly of the railway system of what had been created 
Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, and had also significant shares in ports, gas and electricity 
companies, chemical plans, silk cultivation as well as various other sectors.380 Thus, France‟s 
concerns about protecting these investments had been a major factor in her efforts to secure 
the region and put it under any form of control. By achieving these goals, France could have 
hardly found a more reliable natural ally in the region than the Maronites. Ruled by a 
Francophile and Francophone elite, exposed to Western, and particularly French, influence for 
centuries, this self-conscious uniate Christian community had been seeking the Third Republic‟s 
direct protection since the beginning of the War sending a number of delegations to Paris 
demanding an own “Christian homeland” mandated to the troisième république and detached 
from its Arab-Muslim environment. On the other hand, however, Fayṣal‟s Arab national 
movement that had emerged after the War as a powerful regional force among the Muslim 
population of bilād aš-Šām adopted an exceedingly abhorring attitude both towards French 
efforts to extend the country‟s influence to Syria, and the Maronite claim for an independent 
state under French protection. Hence, the Fayṣalian regime regarded Maronite demands not as 
a legitimate national desire, but rather as a French political tool exploited to prevent the Arab 
majority from realising its aspirations for an independent, united Syria within its natural 
borders.381 As a desperate attempt to prevent France (and Britain) from implementing their 
secret War agreements and the resolution of the 1920 San Remo Conference partitioning the 
Middle East, an elected Syrian congress proclaimed the independence of the Syrian Arab 
Kingdom within its „natural borders‟ (i.e. including the whole of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine), 
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and with Fayṣal as its king. Following this move, talks had been engaged between Fayṣal and 
Mount Lebanon‟s Administrative Council382 the latter one expressing its strong opposition to 
Arab Syria‟s self-declared independence. But as the Arab government recognised Lebanon‟s 
right to territorial expansion and independence, the majority of the AC members accepted, 
concluding an agreement despite the objection of Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik, who was already won 
over the idea of the French mandate. Nonetheless, on July 10, 1920, eight AC members set off 
to Damascus in order to sign a joint declaration denouncing the French mandate in return for 
Fayṣal‟s recognition of Lebanese independence. En route to the capital, the delegation had been 
intercepted and arrested by French troops, accusing them of planning to accompany Fayṣal to 
Europe in order to represent Lebanon and claim its inclusion into the Arab Kingdom and finally 
exiling all of them to Corsica.383 Three months later, the French Army of the Orient (however, 
mainly composing of the units of the Senegalese Colonial Army), under the command of 
General Henri Gouraud, started to take possession384 of its freshly mandated Syrian territories. 
After crossing the Biqāʿ, they defeated the Arab army at Maysalūn385, marched into Damascus 
and expelled Fayṣal and his government from Syria. Thus, for the next quarter century, France 
would control the whole of the country under the terms of the mandate laid down by the 
League of Nations. As the principle of the mandate system, Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations stated that:  
“To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be 
under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples 
not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should 
be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. 
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples 
should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their 
geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that 
this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. […] 
                                                          
382 Being in charge since the Ottoman army‟s withdrawal from region, Mount Lebanon‟s Administrative Council (al-
majlis al-idārī) – representing the cazas of the former Mutaṣarrifīya – was practically carrying out the policy of the 
charismatic Maronite Patriarch, Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik.  
383
 Traboulsi (2007) 78-79. 
384 Henri Joseph Eugène Gouraud, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner for Syria, 
Lebanon and Cilicia as early as in September 1919, sent an King Fayṣal an ultimatum ordering him the unconditional 
recognition of the French mandate over the whole of Syria, the reduction of the Syrian army, the abolition of 
conscription, the adoption of a new Franco-Syrian currency, French occupation of the Riyāq-Aleppo railway, and the 
installment of a French high representative in Aleppo. Despite heavy protest of his supporters, Fayṣal accepted the 
terms of the ultimatum. However, claiming that the answer came too late, General Gouraud launched an offensive 
across the Biqāʿ against the Syrian capital on 21 July. Cf. Hourani (1954) 54 et Traboulsi (2007) 79.  
385 Taking place on July 24, 1920 12 km west of Damascus, the battle of Maysalūn witnessed the pitting of Arab 
cavalry against French war tanks as well as the killing of commander of the Fayṣalian army and Minister of Defence, 
Yūsuf al-ʿAẓma, giving way to the French occupation of the capital and the rest of the country. Traboulsi (2007) 79. 
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Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of 
development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to 
the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able 
to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of 
the Mandatory. […] 
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in 
reference to the territory committed to its charge. 
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not 
previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the 
Council. 
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of 
the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the 
mandates.”386 
 
In accordance with the previsions of this article, special Mandate contracts had been designed 
for the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. The respective document for Syria, officially 
the Mandate contract for Syria and Lebanon, amended on July 24, 1922, recorded the decision of 
the Principal Allied Powers to entrust Syria and Lebanon to the French Republic charged with 
the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population387. Among other 
regulations, the contract ordered the Mandatory power to  
(Art.1.) implement a constitution within three years with the participation of local authorities 
and encourage autonomy; 
(Art.2.) maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence, to organise local militias 
(recruited from local inhabitants) as may be necessary for the defence of the territory and to 
employ this militias for defence;  
(Art.3.) seize exclusive control the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon;  
(Art. 4.) be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded 
or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power; 
(Art.5.) abobolish former foreign privileges but allowing foreign consulates to continue their 
work; 
(Art.6.) establish a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a 
complete guarantee of their rights; 
(Art.8.) ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of 
worship which are consonant with public order and morality and encourage public instruction 
by securing the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and 
education of its own members in its own language; 
(Art.9.) refrain from all interference in the administration of religious communities and sacred 
shrines belonging to the various religions; 
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 Hourani (1953) 164. 
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(Art. 11.) impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and customs 
duties as it may consider necessary; 
(Art.12.) adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreements 
already existing; 
(Art.14.) encourage the protection of antiquities; 
(Art.15) adopt French and Arabic as the two official languages of Syria and Lebanon.388 
 
In the textbooks 
Concerning the mandate system and its particular application in Lebanon, the Christian and 
Sunni textbooks provide comprehensive explications of the international circumstances and 
contemporary legal manoeuvres leading to the framework of League of Nations mandates. Both 
of the two textbooks summarise the most important of the League of Nation Charta‟s article 22 
on mandates and of the special Mandate Contract for Syria and Lebanon, and describe the 
mandate system as “compromise between colonialism and the Wilsonian concept of right for 
self-determination”.  
More than its Sunni counterpart, the Christian narrative seeks to present a balanced 
account. First, it emphasises the negative aspects of the mandate system such as the 
unenthusiastic reaction of Mount Lebanon‟s Administrative Council that had been calling for 
total and immediate independence and was opposing the mandate; the arrestment and 
detention of AC members on their way to Damascus by General Gouraud, as well as the French 
taking hold of the Lebanese economy and building up their monopolies, adding that the 
exploitation of Lebanon‟s sectarian structure made the majority of the population opposing the 
mandate rule. On the other hand, however, the same narrative praise the French and the 
mandate period for laying the fundaments of the modern state, its institutions, administrative 
and monetary systems, constitutional basis, as well as for developing the country‟s 
infrastructure (road network, electricity, port facilities, and irrigation), educational system, and 
for propagating French language and culture in Lebanon and Syria.389 Further details of the 
period, such as the battle of Maysalūn and Syria‟s French partition into separate states are 
mentioned but not commented.  
In contrary to this display, the Sunni narrative is rather taciturn on evaluating the mandate 
period and restricts itself to an uncommented listing of the events leading to the mandate 
documents and names some of their most important articles. As the narrative lacks the 
interpretation of events and offers no comment on initial French policies or local reactions, it is 
hard to detect whether this ineloquence is the result of disinterest or is rather a tool to avoid 
potentially negative comments. As an interesting detail, the Sunni textbook remarks that the 
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mandate concept was designed for the tutelage of the former German and Turkish colonies. 
Hence, it refers to the Ottoman Empire as a colonial power and to Lebanon as its colony. 
As for the Shiʿi narrative, it offers a fundamentally different perspective. First, it gives an 
extremely short summary on the most important articles of the mandate documents describing 
them as “League of Nations sanctions” and the French mandate as “direct military governance” 
(al-ḥukm al-ʿaskarī al-mubāšir) that “curtailed freedoms and persecuted nationalists”. As it adds, 
French agents also provoked clashes between Muslims and Christians in the Jabal ʿĀmil region 
leading to the (Muslim) attack of Christian villages that served “as justification for the French 
army to enter Islamic villages and burn them down”. Consequently, the Shiʿi narrative seems to be 
anything but neutral in the evaluation of the French rule (at least of its early years) and, just 
like the Christian textbook, accuses the mandatory power for exploiting the country‟s sectarian 
structures. These examples show that the Shiʿi narrative, unlike its Christian counterpart, fails 
to present the period, the mandate as institution and especially the beginnings of the French 
mandatory rule over Lebanon in a balanced way, but put them in a negative light and 
underlines their arbitrary characters. 
 
III.3.2.3 The State of Greater Lebanon 
Creation and territory:  Famine, isolation, and economic inviability during the years of World 
War I motivated Maronite leaders, especially in the entourage of Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik, to 
seek the establishment of an agriculturally secure state for their community by the attachment 
of fertile regions such as the Biqāʿ, ʿAkkār, and the south as well as the key ports of Tripoli and 
Sidon. By adopting economic viability as a primary argument Maronites faced a serious 
dilemma: “they could either claim territory which would bring with it a high number of non-
Maronites, or they could keep Christians predominant and Lebanon small. Achieving ideal 
boundaries meant losing the overwhelming Christian majority, while keeping the Christian 
dominance meant remaining geographically tiny.”390 The weight of these concerns is well 
indicated by the controversies even within the Maronite community. For instance, the idea of 
an extended Lebanon stretching its territory literally in every direction had been rejected not 
just by the Administrative Council391 but even by Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik‟s brother, Saʿd-Allāh, 
the vice-president of the council.392 But this partial Maronite rejection was just the tip of the 
iceberg: for the Muslim population of the desired additional territories a detachment from their 
“Syrian Mother” meant an almost “unimaginable inversion of the natural order of their 
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universe”393 as well as a trauma of losing socio-political supremacy to a Christian political 
dominance never before experienced.   
After all, in line with her politique minoritaire, France subdivided the territory of her Syrian 
mandate into six separate units carrying clear religious connotations394, or états serving the 
traditional French colonial divide et impera principle. On 1st September 1920, General Gouraud, 
French High Commissioner of Syria, the Lebanon and Cilicia gave a speech in the presence of 
local notables in Beirut announcing the creation of the État du Grand Liban, or dawlat Lubnān al-
kabīr as one of the six new separate entities carved out of Syria. By implementing al-
Ḥuwayyek‟s model, the event put an end to debates concerning the shape of the nascent 
country and converted the “Little Lebanon” of the former Mutaṣarrifīya into the State of 
Greater Lebanon. This new entity – roughly twice the size of the Mutaṣarrifīya – included 
virtually all the Maronites nationalists had ever sought: Tripoli and the ʿAkkār region in the 
north, the Biqāʿ Valley and the cazas Ḥāṣbayā and Rāšayā to the east, Jabal ʿĀmil and the ports 
of Sidon and Tyre to the south, and Beirut, the new capital, to the west. Demographically, these 
attachments changed the country‟s denominational structure replacing the relative harmony of 
the Mutaṣarrifīya with the more complicated sectarian mosaic of Greater Lebanon.395 The 
Christians, initially foreseeing the new Lebanon as a foyer chrétien, now only counted for a 
slight majority within the new borders. Consequently, from the very beginning of its creation, 
Grand Liban became the subject of further concerns, opposed by many Christians who called for 
the reduction of its territory, while others emphasising it not only as “a home for the Christian 
dwelling therein, but also as a refuge for the Christians of neighbouring Muslim countries in 
case if they should be compelled to flee from the persecution of their neighbours”396. Besides 
the maintenance of the centuries-old Christian refuge-theory, parallels with the Zionist project 
of a “national home” for the Jews in Palestine cannot be overlooked and were, as Wild argues, 
intentional.397 As for the Muslim population of the new territories, an overwhelming majority 
of them rejected the new borders as well as the very existence of Lebanon as a separate state 
under the tutelage of a European Christian Power and called annexation to Syria. After initial 
attacks on Christian villages, the Muslim opposition formed a block of the Coast and the Four 
Cazas encouraging the population of the new territories to recoil from participation in 
Lebanese political life, such as elections, or to refuse the obtaining of the Lebanese nationality 
and passport. As Traboulsi summarises, “the population of the annexed territories mainly 
expressed their opposition to economic, administrative, and fiscal injustices. In fact, these had 
a larger population than that of the former Mutaṣarrifīya (380,000 as opposed to 330,000), 
                                                          
393 Harris (1997) 41. 
394 For a detailed description of these units cf. the section on „Notes on terminology‟ of this paper.   
395 Harris (1997) 41. 
396 Wild (2004) 156. 
397 Wild (2004) 157. 
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their financial resources were richer (83 per cent of the fiscal revenues of the new state came 
from the annexed territories; while 83 per cent of these were spent in Mount Lebanon). 
Regarding administrative posts, the majority of the functionaries of the administration of 
Greater Lebanon came from the ancient Mutaṣarrifīya and replaced the functionaries of the 
wilaya of Beirut. Last but not least, the coastal cities (Tripoli, Sidon, Beirut, and Tyre) incurred 
heavy economic losses because their ports had been severed from the Syrian hinterland.”398  
In the textbooks  
Needless to say, that the creation of the country as a separate political entity occupies a 
prominent position in all of the three narratives. As it has been the case so far, it is still the 
Christian narrative that covers the topic the most accurately and the most detailed. From here 
on, Greater Lebanon is often referred to as the waṭan, or the nation, an ambiguous term also 
designating the whole Arab nation, regardless of its current political borders. The Christian 
narrative, however, strictly restricts the use of this term to the designation of the Lebanese 
nation, while in the Sunni and Shiʿi narratives waṭan often occurs in both senses. Apart from 
this terminological difference, the Christian textbook continues to deliver balanced information 
on the era by underlining both the French role in the country‟s creation through, for instance, 
citing General Gouraud‟s touching proclamation speech, in a positive way, but at the same time 
it does not forget to mention the annexed territories‟ Muslim opposition to the country‟s 
arbitrary borders and their detachment from Syria: “Most of the Christians welcomed the mandate 
and considered it as a provisional stage that helps to build up the country and establish its 
independence, while most of the people of the wilayet (especially Muslims) were opposing it and 
considered it as a forced solution. This opposition decreased but the Muslims participated cautiously 
in Lebanese politics until the ratification of the National Pact in 1943”399 
In the case of discussing the establishment of Grand Liban, the Sunni manual continues to 
use its reserved narrative restricted to mentioning only what is really necessary. Thereby it 
desiginates the French mandatory rule and the country‟s new borders as a “forced imposition”, 
but argues that the attachment of the „coast and the four cazas‟ only served economic reasons 
to make the future state economically viable and independent and summarises the solution as: 
“Lebanon profited from its new situation as a state with human and economic resources. It is also 
worth mentioning that the mandate and the proclamation of Greater Lebanon were absolutely 
welcomed by the inhabitants of the Mutaṣarrifīya, especially the Christians, while it was opposed by 
the inhabitants of the wilayet, especially the Muslims.”400 
                                                          
398 Traboulsi (2007) 81. 
399 Christian 34. 
400 Sunni 21. 
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However, the most confusing account on this period is undoubtedly presented in the Shiʿi 
narrative: While stating that “the Lebanese were happy to get a viable state composed of the 
restored Mount Lebanon and the cazas, now including crucial agricultural, industrial and touristic 
regions as well as the ports of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon”, the narrative seems to declare its full 
support to the Lebanese state. Further remarks such as: In addition of the population‟s increase the 
majority of Mount Lebanon was Druze and Christian while the other religions (Sunni and Shiʿi) 
returned to play their natural role in the building of Lebanon on the basic principles of truth, justice, 
and equality”401 suggesting that the annexed territories had „eternal ties‟ to Jabal Lubnān that 
had been cut off in the Ottoman times.  
Concerning Lebanon‟s new borders and territory, there are significant terminological 
differences between the three narratives. By referring to Greater Lebanon‟s territorial 
extensions that, as already mentioned, never formed a polity before the country‟s 1920 
declaration, the Christian textbook consequently denotes them as Lebanon‟s “historical territory” 
that had been “restored”. According to Wild, this wider interpretation of Jabal Lubnān and 
therefore the claim for a significantly enlarged territory was nevertheless presented as 
“historical” and was typically coined by Maronites beginning in the 19th century.402 In contrast, 
the appellation “the coast and the four cazas” – also used by the numerous congresses calling for 
the reattachment of the annexed territories to Syria – has deep historical links to the Sunni 
community‟s past. As for the Shiʿi textbook, it avoids using any collective denominations for 
the attached territories and simply refers to them by their geographic name.   
  
                                                          
401 Shiʿi 72. 
402 Wild (2004) 151. 
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III.3.3 The Constitution of 1926  
As was mentioned before in this paper, the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 – the first Lebanese 
document of its kind – is of essential importance for the country‟s legal, constitutional, and 
political system and still influences a number of aspects in contemporary Lebanon and has a 
pivotal impact on both local and international politics. Through this document – prescribed by 
the Mandate Contract - France had given the peoples of her Middle Eastern mandate some 
Western-style rights and institutions; but on the other hand she failed to grant the country real 
independence. As Winslow remarks: „One might say that the Constitution of 1926 provided the 
political machinery for the Lebanese to govern themselves according to French preferences. It 
would not have worked except that, for many Lebanese, the alternatives were far more 
dangerous-a smaller Lebanon difficult to defend or a Lebanon dominated by Syrian Arabs.”403 
Even though having experienced a number of modifications since its promulgation in 1926, 
many of the document‟s original articles are still in force today. Together with the 1943 
unwritten National Pact and the 1990 Ṭāʾif Accord, it forms Lebanon‟s government fundament 
and regulates the country‟s inter-communitarian relations. Due to this pivotal importance and 
strong impact, the Constitution bears a prominent place within the different historical 
narratives and offers numerous possible interpretations.  
  
III.3.3.1 Formal aspects 
Christian Textbook 
V. Ad-dustūr al-lubnānī w-našʾat al-Jumhūrīya „l-Lubnānīya,  
The Lebanese Constitution and the naissance of the Lebanese Republic 
1) Ẓurūf waḍʿ ad-dustūr, Circumstances of the constitution-making the Constitution  
2) Niẓām al-ḥukm fī Lubnān fī ḍawʾ dustūr sanat 1926, Lebanon‟s governmental system in the light of the 1926 constitution  
3) Ḥayāt ad-dustūr ḥattā al-istiqlāl fī 1943, The life of the constitution until independence in 1943  
 
Sunni Textbook 
V. Našaʾat ad-dustūr al-lubnānī 1926 aw qiyām al-Jumhūrīya „l-lubnānīya  
The birth of the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 or the emergence of the Lebanese Republic 
1) Aẓ-ẓurūf allatī addat ilā waḍʿihi (limāḏā wuḍiʿa?), The circumstances that led to its promulgation (why was it amended?)   
2) Kayf tamm waḍʿhu?, How its promulgation happened?  
3) Ḥayāt ad-dustūr bayn at-taṭbīq w-at-taʿlīq, The life of the Constitution between application and suspension  
4) Ahamm bunūd ad-dustūr (dustūr 1926), The most important articles of the constitution (the 1926 Constitution) 
5) Niẓām al-ḥukm bi-mūjib ad-dustūr 1926, The governmental system on the basis of the 1926 Constitution 
6) At-taʿdīlāt ad-dustūrīya, Constitutional amendments 
7) Dustūr Lubnān al-jadīd:), Lebanon‟s new Constitution: (The Document of National Accord)404  
                                                          
403 Winslow (1996) 61. 
404 As an interesting addition, the last subchapter of this section makes mention of the 1990 Ṭāʾif Agreement (known 
officially as the Document of National Accord, or waṯīqat al-wifāq al-waṭanī, and referred to as the New Constitution, or 
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Shiʿi Textbook 
IX. Al-jumhūrīya „l-lubnānīya fī ẓill al-intidāb al-faransī* 
The Lebanese Republic in the shadow of the French mandate  
1) Waḍʿ ad-dustūr, The making of the Constitution   
2) Min bunūd ad-dustūr, From the Constitution‟s articles  
3) Taʿdīl ad-dustūr, Modifications of the Constitution  
*Further subchapters of this section will be discussed when relevant.  
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
ad-dustūr al-jadīd in the narrative). Generally, modern – i.e. post 1943 – national history is just simply not part of the 
Lebanese curriculum, regardless of school type or sectarian affiliation.404 Thus, by bearing reference to the recent – and 
highly controversial – event, the Sunni textbook is a rare exception among the available narratives. As for the coverage 
on the Agreement, it will be discussed later in this section.   
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III.3.3.2 Promulgation and content 
The bloody events of the Syrian revolt erupted in 1925405 and the imminence of the League 
of Nations Mandate Commission drove the French mandatory to grant Lebanon and Syria a 
constitution, as it was laid down in Article 1 of the Mandate Contract for Syria and Lebanon in 
1922.  In December 1925, the first civilian High Commissioner, Henri de Jouvenel (1926-29) 
appointed a parliamentary drafting commission, including Petro Ṭrād406, ʿUmar Dāʿūq407, Šibl 
Dammūs408 and Michel Šīḥā409, which was immediately boycotted by majority of Sunni and 
Shiʿi leaders. Nevertheless, the final version of the constitutional text, adopted on 23 May 
1926, renamed Greater Lebanon the Lebanese Republic, defined its flag as the tricolour French 
flag with the Lebanese cedar in the white strip and adopted French as official language 
alongside Arabic. Significantly, the Constitution neglected to define Lebanon‟s borders, as if to 
emphasise that they were open to alterations. As for the country‟s governmental system, the 
Representative Council (majlis at-tamṯīlīya, Conseil représentatif) – renamed Chamber of Deputies 
(majlis an-nawāb, Chambre des députés) – was to represent the communities roughly in 
proportion to their numerical strength; every district elected a number of deputies belonging to 
the different communities living in it, but every deputy was elected not only by his co-
religionists but by the whole electorate of the district.410 This elective majlis was complemented 
by a separate and nominated Senate (majlis aš-šuyūḵ, Sénate) representing the 17 official 
recognised sects and the country‟s administrative regions. However, the two chambers were 
soon merged into a semi-chamber parliament with two-thirds of its members elected, one-third 
nominated411. The Constitution, inspired by the 1875 French and the 1831 Belgian 
constitutions412 was a hybrid one: “on a republican body [with strong, French-style presidency], 
emphasising individual rights and liberties and political and judicial equality were grafted 
articles concerning communal rights and representation most probably at the initiative of 
Michel Chiha. Article 95 provided for the (temporary) fair distribution of government and 
                                                          
405 Broken out in 1925 and raging for over two years, insurgencies throughout Syria (mainly in Jabal ad-Durūz, 
Damascus, Ḥomṣ, and the south-east of Lebanon) opposing French mandatory presence and the partition of the country 
was only bloodily put down by the French and resulted the Quai d‟Orsay‟s more liberal attitude towards the Syrian 
mandate.    
406 Greek Orthodox lawyer, MP, and briefly President of the Republic, Pedro (or Petro) Ṭrād was one of the most 
prominent pro-French Christian Lebanese politicians of the interbellum era. Cf. Kaufmann (2004) 84. 
407 Beirut Sunni notable, president of the Chamber of Commerce, later Beirut mayor. Zamir (1988) 51; 130; 167. 
408 Greek Orthodox representative of the Biqāʿ, head of the drafting committee. Zamir (1988) 205. 
409 Offspring of a prominent Greek Catholic Beiruti banker dynasty, Michel Chiha was one of Lebanon‟s most influential 
interbellum figures. Beirut‟s deputy in the Representative Council and later in the parliament, journalist (owner of the 
French-language Beirut daily Le Jour and founder of the English-language daily The Eastern Times), philosopher and 
prominent writer, Chiha is considered to be the main architect of the Constitution. Cf. Zamir (1988) 125; 192; 205, and 
Kaufmann (2004) 159-60.  
410 Hourani (1954) 189. 
411 Hourani (1954) 188. 
412 Corm (2005) 87. 
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administrative posts (but not of parliamentary seats) among the various sects.”413 Implemented 
into the political sphere, this meant that the relations between the sectarian communities were 
defined as two constitutionally fixed principles. First, all Lebanese citizens were equal before 
the law, possessed the same rights and duties, and were equally admissible to all public offices 
without any restriction or distinction414. Secondly, the communities should be equitably 
represented in public offices and in ministries, in so far as this did not detract from the welfare 
of the state415. The whole political organisation of the state was permeated by these principles, 
but by the second more than the first. On the other hand, the state relinquished to the religious 
communities its legislative rights and rulings on personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, 
adoption, inheritance, etc.) in the name of religious freedom.416 But most importantly, the 
Constitution legalised the Mandate, with French control over the country‟s foreign and military 
affairs and public security. The president of the republic was given extensive executive powers, 
helped by the cabinet whose ministers he had the right to dismiss; yet he was responsible to no 
one and no institution except the French High Commissioner.417 Indeed, the High 
Commissioner, incorporating the mandatory power in person, retained ultimate executive and 
veto authority in the meantime.  
All in all, the Constitution, created as a result of local pressure demanding more 
independence and rights in the country‟s internal affairs, also proved beneficial for the 
mandatory power, reserving it extensive right, as derived from Article 22 of the Mandate 
Covenant. Moreover, with its clear provisions of sectarian representation, the document not 
just legalised political communitarianism, but fixed it as the fundament of the Lebanese State‟s 
architecture. As Hourani remarks, “The maintenance of the balance between the communities 
was an important and often the most important consideration in the making of appointments in 
central and local administration alike.”418   
  
                                                          
413 Traboulsi (2007) 90.  
414 Article 7: “All the Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal civil and political rights and are equally subjected to 
public charges and duties, without any distinction whatever” and article 12: “All Lebanese citizens are equally admitted to all 
public functions without any other cause for preference except their merit and competence and according to the conditions set 
by law. A special statute shall govern Civil Servants according to the administrations to which they belong” (cf. Lebanese 
Constitution) 
415 “As a transitory measure and for the sake of even justice and concord, the communities shall be equally represented in 
public posts and in ministerial composition, without damage to State interest resulting therefrom.” cf. Lebanese 
Constitution(1926) article 95. 
416 “Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the Almighty, the State respects all creeds and guarantees and 
protects their free exercise, on condition that they do not interfere with public order. It also guarantees to individuals, whatever 
their religious allegiance, the respect of their personal status and their religious interests.” Lebanese Constitution (1926) 
article 9.  
417 Traboulsi (2007) 90.   
418 Hourani (1954) 180. 
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In the textbooks 
Unlike in the case of the previous topics, the three narratives show a surprising accordance 
in the discussion of the 1926 dustūr, its promulgation, significance, and later modifications. As 
all of the textbooks agree, the Constitution‟s promulgation happened in the spirit of Article 20 
of the League of Nations Covenant that obliged the mandatory to grant its mandated territories 
an „organic law‟, or constitution within three years after the specific mandate contracts came 
into force. Furthermore, the narratives‟ depiction of the country‟s new governmental system 
(dividing the stately apparatus among its legislative, executive, and judiciary functions) 
inaugurated by the Constitution as well as other details concerning the definition of the 
nation‟s capital, flag, official languages, or the accurate lists of the document‟s future 
suspensions and amendments show little divergence. As a further common feature, the 
narratives agree that the Constitution, while being a “democratic phenomenon” that created “a 
republican parliamentary democracy” and as such the “first republic among Arab countries”419, was 
spoiled by the powers left in the hands of the mandatory420.  
However, a considerable number of dissimilarities occur in the narratives, some of which 
definitely serve as valuable indicators of ideological stance. For instance, while the Christian 
narrative celebrates the transformation of the former Greater Lebanese State‟s “direct mandatory 
rule” into “national governance”421, the Shiʿi textbook prefers to regard the transition as a missed 
opportunity to achieve “full independence as aspired by the Lebanese”422. A further detail that is 
not agreed upon is the impulse that finally made France grant Lebanon a constitution. While 
according to the Christian narrative, the French authorities‟ decision served to calm “forces 
opposing French policies instigated by the Syrian revolt”, the Sunni narrative describes it as a 
“reward for their [of the Lebanese] peaceful attitude towards the French during the 1925 Syrian 
revolt”, and the Shiʿite textbook speaks of a “French imposition to maintain France‟s power in the 
country”. 
Overall, it occurs that although the constitution is a topic that allows the hitherto most 
unanimous description, but at the same time it is still not free from subtle signs of the 
narratives‟ general ideological orientations and biases.  
As mentioned before, by discussing later constitutional developments, the Sunni textbook 
contains a unique addition as at the end of the chapter it consecrates a separate subchapter423 
to the Ṭāʾif Agreement that it calls “ad-dustūr al-jadīd”, or the „new constitution‟ seeking to put 
an end to political sectarianism by measures such as the abolition of sectarian quotas in the 
distribution of parliament seats. By linking the country‟s first constitutional document with the 
most recent, the Sunni narrative legitimises the Agreement and also allows a basic document of 
contemporary importance to occur in the textbook.  
                                                          
419 Cf. Christian 41; Sunni 30.; Shiʿi 80. 
420 It is worth mentioning that both the Christian and the Sunni narratives prefer referring to the France as “the 
mandatory (power)” in all of the cases when it comes to a remark putting negative light on French mandatory policy 
and powers. However, it remains hard to determine whether such a nuanced distinction is intentional or not.  
421 Christian 40. 
422 Shiʿi 80. 
423 Sunni 31-32.  
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III.3.4 The Lebanese Republic 1926-1939 
III.3.4.1 Formal aspects 
Christian Textbook 
VI. Al-Jumhūrīya „l-Lubnānīya (1926-1939) al-aḥdāṯ as-siyāsīya ḥattā bidāyat al-ḥarb al-ʿalamīya 
aṯ-ṯānīa  
The Lebanese Republic (1926-1939) – political events until the beginning of - World War 2 
1) Riʾāsat Charles Dabbās, Charles Dabbās‟ presidency   
2) Riʾāsat Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd, Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd‟s presidency  
3) Riʾāsat Imīl Iddih424, Émile Eddé‟s presidency 
3) Muʿāhadat sana 1936 bayn Lubnān w-Faransā, 1936 treaty between Lebanon and France 
 
Sunni Textbook 
VI. Aḥdāṯ Lubnān fī ẓill al-jumhūrīya min 1926 ilā 1939  
Lebanon’s events in the shadow of the republic from 1926 to 1939 
1) Riʾāsat Charles Dabbās, Charles Dabbās‟ presidency   
2) Riʾāsat Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd, Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd‟s presidency  
3) Riʾāsat Imīl Iddih, Émile Eddé‟s presidency 
3) Muʿāhadat 1936 bayn Lubnān w-Faransā, 1936 treaty between Lebanon and France 
 
Shiʿi Textbook 
IX. Al-jumhūrīya „l-lubnānīya fī ẓill al-intidāb al-faransī [continued]  
The Lebanese Republic in the shadow of the French mandate  
4) Al-ḥukm al-waṭanī baʿd iʿlān ad-dustūr, National governance after the promulgation of the Constitution 
4.a) Charles Dabbās (1926-1933) 
4.b) Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd  
4.c) Amīl Idda, Émile Eddé 
 
X. Lubnān ʿalā abwāb al-istiqlāl  
Lebanon at the gates of independence 
1) Muʿāhadat 1936, The 1936 treaty 
2) Al-ḥayāt as-siyāsīya fī Lubnān, Political life in Lebanon 
3) Al-ḥayāt al-ijtimāʿīya fī Lubnān, Social life in Lebanon 
4) Al-ḥayāt al-iqtiṣādīya fī Lubnān, Economic life in Lebanon 
5) Tawqīm ʿahd al-intidāb, The calendar of the mandate era 
 
  
                                                          
424 Note difference between the spellings of President Émile Eddé‟s name in the Christian and Sunni (  Imīl Iddih) 
and the Shiʿi textbooks (  Amīl Idda). Hence, to avoid controversies, the commonly used French transcription of 
the president‟s name is used throughout this paper, as an exception to the transcription guidelines stated to be followed 
at the beginning of this work.  
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III.3.4.2 Charles Dabbās’ presidency (September 1926-January 1934) 
On May 24, 1926, Lebanon was proclaimed a constitutional republic, however, its first political 
manoeuvres as such only barely worked; the election of a President at the first joint session of 
the two freshly created legislative houses proved cumbersome. Finally, Charles Dabbās, a Greek 
Orthodox, had been elected as a new President, while Auguste Adīb Pasha, himself a 
Maronite425, was appointed the country‟s first Prime Minister.426  
As one of his first actions as president, Dabbās amended some of the Constitution‟s articles. 
In 1927, he abolished the appointed Senate, merging it into the Chamber of Deputies (majlis 
an-nawāb, Chambre des députés) and renaming it the Representative Assembly (majlis niyābī, 
Assemblée representative); a second amendment, in 1929, extended the President's term from 
three years to six years but made it non-renewable. President Dabbās, however, whose first 
term came by appointment, was elected to a second term. From that time, the majlis niyābī was 
elected on sectarian basis.427  
Shortly after 1926, a myriad of political parties of various types began to appear on the 
Lebanese political landscape. Some of these parties, such as Bišāra al-Khūrī‟s Constitutional 
Bloc (al-kutla ad-dustūrīya) and Émile Eddé‟s National Bloc (al-kutla al-waṭanīya al-lubnānīya) 
were political organisations centred on a dominant political figure and committed to 
supporting the perennial candidates who founded them.  Others parties, however, were formed 
as reactions on purely national issues or followers of existing ideologies. For instance, in order 
to discipline and rejuvenate Christian youth and develop a sense of solidarity among the 
Lebanese, Pierre Gemayel (Jumayyil), a Maronite from Bikfayyā, founded the Katā‛ib 
(Phalangist) Party. With the aim of „rebuilding the national character after a millennium of 
dormancy”, the Katā'ib let itself be inspired by fascist ideologies which were fashionable at the 
time. As a reaction to the efforts to enforce Christian solidarity, the Sunni Najjāda (Arabic for 
„rescuers‟) organization appeared, headed by ʿAdnān al-Ḥakīm.428 On the other side of the coin, 
the Lebanese Communist Party (al-ḥizb aš-šuyūʿī al-lubnānī) emerged during this period as did 
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-ḥizb as-sūrī al-qawmī al-ijtimāʿī) of Anṭūn Saʿda (Antoun 
Saadé), with its Pan-Syrian doctrines; while Kamāl Junblāṭ, the French-educated chief of the 
country‟s Druze community, organised his Progressive Socialist Party (al-ḥizb at-taqaddumī al-
ištirāqī), a party based on ideological, personal and sectarian allegiances. In addition, many 
Lebanese, both Muslim and Christian, were supporters of one of the Pan-Arab or Greater-Syrian 
                                                          
425 Although Lebanon‟s first President was Greek Orthodox, and its first few Prime Ministers were Maronites, in later 
years when these offices wer reserved to the Maronite and the Sunnis, respectively. 
426 Winslow (1996) 62. 
427 Traboulsi (2007) 90.  
428 Traboulsi (2007) 102.  
140 
 
nationalist or unionist groups that were struggling both for independence and the retention of 
Lebanon as part of Greater Syria.429  
The presidency of Dabbās, however, was mostly marked by two crises: the repercussions of 
the Great Depression of 1929 caused economic and social difficulties and resulted in a number 
of workers‟ strikes due to unemployment and the rise of the cost of living in the ensuing 
years.430 The other crisis was of a political nature: In 1932, Muslims called for an official census 
of Lebanon, thinking that it would lend substance to Šayḵ Muḥammad al-Jisr's431 candidacy for 
President. It was al-Jisr's view, based on extrapolations of the last Ottoman census that a new 
count would reveal a Muslim majority in the larger Lebanon that the French had created. 
Because the Ottomans had significantly undercounted the non-Muslims in 1914, the Šeyḵ's 
hopes proved to be mistaken. On the other hand, the size of the Muslim community, which the 
1932 census revealed, frightened many Christian separatists and also worried the French.432 
Additionally, to make the point that a Muslim has the right to the post of the head of state, in 
1932 al-Jisr submitted his candidature(candidacy for presidency. Émile Eddé, fearing that he 
might lose ground to his eternal rival Bišāra al-Ḵūrī, withdrew in favour of Jisr, upon which 
High Commissioner Auguste-Henri Ponsot (1929-1932), in order to avoid creating such a 
precedent, suspended the constitution and disbanded the Representative Assembly.433  
 
III.3.4.3 Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd’s presidency (January 1934-January 1936) 
„During the following years, as Winslow remarks, the French were the Constitution of Lebanon, 
and they were not unhappy to play divide-and-rule while the Lebanese played musical chairs”.  To fill 
the void of the vacant presidency, the High Commission upgraded the office of Secretary of 
State, making it the key conduit through which they temporarily administered Lebanon. Under 
the close auspices of the Mandatory, this office was held by members of several sects, both 
Christian and Muslim.434 
Dissatisfied with High Commissioner Henri Ponsot‟s demeanour, the Quai d‟Orsay replaced 
him with count Damien de Martel in 1933 authorising him the partial restoration of 
constitutional life in Lebanon. On January 2, 1934, de Martel published two decrees 
announcing to accept Dabbās‟ resignation from the post of the raʾīs al-jumhūrīya, replacing him 
with Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd for a one-year term.435 By nominating him, de Martel had sought to 
                                                          
429 Winslow (1996) 72-73. 
430 Traboulsi (2007) 96. 
431 Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Tripoli‟s Sunni leader. Traboulsi (2007) 91.  
432
 Winslow (1996) 64. 
433
 Traboulsi (2007) 91.  
434
 Winslow (1996) 65; 67. 
435
 Winslow (1996) 66.  
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defuse the political tension fuelled by the rivalry between Eddé‟s National and al-Ḵūrī‟s 
Constitutional Blocs by using the 75-year old president –an old functionary from the former 
Mutaṣarrifīya – as a tool to control the administration. In fact, Saʿd‟s appointment added to the 
political instability, as literally every factions of the political palette campaigned to discredit 
him and his supporters, portraying him as an old, corrupt politician whose views and methods 
were shaped by Ottoman-era political practice, therefore unable to address the issues of the 
modern western-style state, and were thus harmful to both Maronite and Lebanese national 
interests. Indeed, both the country‟s politicians and public opinion regarded as-Saʿd as a French 
puppet to carry out the High Commissioner‟s orders that seemed to prefer the convenience of 
direct administration.436 For instance, without consulting the Assembly, de Martel offered the 
Lebanese a new republican civil code, replacing that of the Ottomans still in force at the time, 
and ordered parliamentary elections based on a revised electoral law (defining the number of 
deputies in the majlis niyābī as twenty-five, including seven directly appointed by the High 
Commissioner). However, the French High Commission attempted steps to gradually move the 
country back to constitutionalism. The office of President, which at times during this period 
had been left vacant, was put up for election by the recently reconstituted Chamber. This 
attempt, by de Martel, led to the election of Emile Eddé by one vote; his rival, Bishāra al-Khūrī, 
went into opposition.437 
 
 
III.3.4.4 Émile Eddé’s presidency (January 1936-April 1941) and the Franco-Lebanese 
Treaty of 1936 
During the period of the non-constitutional government between 1932 and 1937, the French 
allowed the Lebanese to return to normal public life in stages, restoring some legislative 
powers to politicians in 1935.  However, although he had been elected President on January 
1936, Émile Eddé was unable to form a strong government, so the French continued to rule 
while making plans for a new stage in Lebanon‟s constitutional development.438  
 As a reaction to the region‟s turbulent events439, seven deputies from al-Ḵūrī‟s oppositional 
Constitutional Bloc addressed a memorandum to High Commissioner de Martel demanding 
                                                          
436 Zamir (2000) 147-148 
437 Winslow (1996) 67. 
438 Zamir (2000) 179. 
439 In line with the insurgencies of the late 1920s, anti-mandate demonstrations in Syria led the French authorities to 
take steps towards the country‟s promised independence. On 24 February 1936 a Franco-Syrian treaty re-established 
parliamentary life, recognised Syria‟s formal independence (but left the Mandatory‟s rights to the country‟s foreign 
representation and to the control of its security affairs intact) and backed its admission to the League of Nations. 
Similarly, the Egyptian nationalist movement reached a treaty with Britain, signed in August of the same year, 
declaring Egypt‟s independence (with restrictions similar to Syria‟s conditions), while Palestine was the scene of a 
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Lebanon‟s equal treatment with Syria by the application of the constitution and backing 
Lebanese ambitions of  membership in the League of Nations. As a response, the Quai d'Orsay 
made plans to conclude a draft treaty with Lebanon, involving new constitutional documents, a 
full return to parliamentary government, and special rights and privileges for France, similarly 
to the case with her Syrian mandate in the same year. The concept, modelled on the Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty of 1930 through which (in 1932) Iraq became independent and gained 
membership in the League of Nations, encountered heavy opposition in France, although it was 
ever finally ratified by the Mandatory. Nevertheless, the Treaty, signed by de Martel and Eddé 
on 13 November 1936, had been ratified in Lebanon440 itself and provided it with the essential 
constitutional structure that governed the independent Republic after 1943. As its text 
concludes, France recognises Lebanon as an independent state within its 1920 boundaries and 
undertakes steps to help its admission to the League of Nations. In return, Lebanon guarantees 
French interests, the continuation of the monetary parity between the two countries, remains 
France‟s ally in the event of war. Ipso facto France is allowed to maintain her military presence 
(air force and navy) and continues to have her right to use Lebanon‟s infrastructure and 
communication facilities.441 As Winslow summarises: “According to the Franco-Lebanese 
Treaty, Lebanon was to be sovereign, separate, and closely tied to the French. Though not formally in 
control of the country, France would have a special status in the “Alliance” and would reserve for 
itself all the usual privileges - supervision of the armed forces, the currency, and litigation 
involving foreigners. The French Ambassador was to take precedence over all other diplomats, 
and the two countries pledged close cooperation in foreign affairs. Pending final ratification by 
France (which never happened) the French High Commissioner would have remained at his 
post with his powers unchanged.442 
As for Lebanon‟s opposition, for them the Treaty, promising a mere „alliance of friendship‟ 
and the de facto only formal independence, was a bitter setback with regard to the country‟s 
comparatively good relations with France and created two kinds of interpretations: Christian 
„protectionists‟ feared that Lebanon, formally independent from France, would soon be annexed 
by the also independent, but in every regard more powerful, Syria, while Muslim „unionists‟ 
feared that the country‟s independence would lead to the legitimisation of the 1920 borders 
making chances of annexation much slighter.443 As a result, Lebanon‟s Muslim-populated 
peripheral regions were hit by massive waves of demonstrations and strikes which paralysed 
the country for months in 1936., In March 1936, the Congress of the Coast and the Four Cazas, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
large-scale popular uprising, against the British mandate and Jewish immigration, that paralysed the country and led to 
ongoing clashes between the British Army and local insurgents. Cf. Traboulsi (2007) 97-98. 
440 Traboulsi (2007) 100.  
441 Traboulsi (2007) 101.  
442 Winslow (1996) 69. 
443 Winslow (1996) 70. 
143 
 
a gathering held by Muslim opponents of Lebanon‟s territorial enlargement had called for the 
re-annexation of these territories to Syria. As a new approach, however, moderate currents, 
represented by Riyāḍ aṣ-Ṣulḥ444 (Riad as-Solh), was accusing the congressmen of ignoring the 
new realities of the country. As he argued, at the beginning of the mandate, the term 
Lebanonism was synonymous with Christianity, while „unionism‟ was inseparable from 
Islamism. However, after the imposition of the mandate, Christians became increasingly 
disappointed by France “becoming aware that the great number of economic factors renders their 
daily life as well as their destinies intimately linked to those of the destinies of the Sons of Syria.”445 
For aṣ-Ṣulḥ the question of detachment became secondary, rather supporting the emergence of 
a new Lebanese patriotism that would surpass the detachment/attachment dilemma in favour 
of a wider vision of Lebanon‟s Arab root, but without a merger with Syria.  
In September 1937, Emile Eddé – named president for a second term earlier that year – 
asked a Sunni Muslim, Ḵayr ad-Din al-Aḥdab446 to form a cabinet. This Sunni Prime Minister set 
a precedent that was to become an unwritten rule for the future. However, despite Eddé‟s 
changed orientation, the provisions of the 1936 Franco-Lebanese Treaty and rapprochement 
attempts from Muslim side led by aṣ-Ṣulḥ - regarded to opportunist - convinced many Muslims 
of a supposed complot between France and Lebanon‟s Christians to codify a separate Christian 
state in the Middle East and left them hostile to the Lebanese State. As Winslow puts it: “By 
formalising a separate client state, the French had made sure they could always keep one foot in the 
door; their Christian clients would still need them. Independence might come, but the French would 
not have to leave.”447  
In the textbooks 
As could have been expected in the case of such a politically interwoven period, the three 
narratives are especially sensitive indicators to detect sectarian perceptions at this crucial stage 
of political development and the formation of state structures. To begin with, the presidency 
and personality of Charles Dabbās is the first controversy that shows no sign of accord. For 
instance, the Sunni textbook praises him as “famous for integrity and good governance; [and to 
be] politically moderate and acceptable to all parties and to the French”.448 Moreover, his 
significance as Lebanon‟s first „constitutional president‟ as well as his policies are 
                                                          
444 Coming from a prominent Beiruti Sunni family, Riyāḍ aṣ-Ṣulḥ opened up Sunni dialogue with Christians and 
advocated for inter-sectarian alliance against the mandate. With his two cousins, Kāẓim and Taqī ad-Dīn, he founded 
the Republican Party for Independence (ḥizb al-istiqlāl al-jumhūrī), representing a section of the professional middle 
classes and agitating for the political independence of Syria and Lebanon and their economic unity. Traboulsi (2007) 
99. 
445 aṣ-Ṣulḥ, Kāẓim: Muškilāt al-ittiṣāl w-al-infiṣāl fī Lubnān. Beirut: March 1936, cited in Traboulsi (2007) 99. 
446 Sunni notable from Tripoli, one of the first Muslims to collaborate with the mandate. Traboulsi (2007) 100 
447 Winslow (1996) 72. 
448 Sunni 33. 
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acknowledged. Parallel to this tone, the Christian narrative describes him as “educator of the 
Lebanese” who “defended Lebanese interests and […] not provoked the French”449. Moreover, both 
narratives admire him for commissioning the national anthem, establishing the Beirut National 
Museum, the elaboration of the Lebanese school system according to the French model, and 
also positively evaluate the subsequent constitutional amendments that “made stately structures 
more viable”450. In the Shiʿite narrative, Dabbās and his presidency has a completely different 
image. First of all it is not mentioned at all that he has been appointed for a second term, and 
his provisions that are attributed so much importance by the other two textbooks are also left 
out, but adds that “the Lebanese felt betrayed in their aspirations by the French mandate and 
regarded the president of the state to be a puppet in the hands of the High Commissioner that carries 
out his policy”.451 However, the suspension of the constitution is condemned in all narratives, 
while High Commissioner de Martel is either portrayed as a “moderate, flexible politician”452, or 
as the “actual, authoritarian ruler of Lebanon”453. Moreover, the Shiʿi narrative also accuses the 
French mandate and monetary system for the country‟s economic difficulties following the 
1929 Great Depression.    
Concerning Lebanon‟s second raʾīs al-jumhūrīya, Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd, the narratives have a 
surprisingly unanimous verdict, describing him as an honest old bureaucrat serving his waṭan 
loyally since the time of the Mutaṣarrifīya and balancing well between “French claims and 
Lebanese rights”454. However, the French-style civil code granted to Lebanon in place of the old 
Ottoman legislation is only welcomed positively by the Sunni and Christian narratives; the 
Shiʿite one regards it to be “violation of the country‟s traditions and customs”455.   
Another major point of confusion is al-Jisr‟s presidential candidacy. While the Sunni 
textbook argues that al-Jisr enjoyed the support of the majority of the Majlis‟ members, the 
Christian version states that although he was a moderate and respected politician who had 
been supported and “financed by some of the Majlis members”, the Maronites “rightful demand for 
a Maronite president of the republic”456 had to have priority. As for the Shiʿite textbook, this 
“constitutional crisis” is displayed as a Sunni-Maronite power struggle not having much 
relevance and only resulting in anther unjust French step that put an end to Lebanon‟s 
                                                          
449 Christian 45.  
450 Sunni 35.  
451 Shiʿi 84.  
452 Christian 47. 
453 Shiʿi 86. 
454 Shiʿi 85.  
455 Shiʿi 88.  
456 Christian 48.  
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“imaginary independence” and once again highlighted the French mandate‟s “colonial nature”457, 
namely the suspension of the constitution. 
Concerning Émile Eddé‟s presidency, the textbooks? provide nothing but a few details on it 
with certain common points that agreed upon. For instance, although he was a prominent 
Maronite politician, even the Christian textbook acknowledges that Eddé, as a reliable ally of 
the French since his Egyptian exile during the World War I, was serving mandatory interests 
rather than those of the Lebanese. Moreover, the most important event of his presidency, the 
signing of the 1936 Franco-Lebanese treaty is also welcomed with much skepticism from all 
sides. For instance, while the Shiʿite narrative evaluates the accord as an “imperialist diktat” in 
order to “prolong French colonial rule” with a “lie of independence”458. Even though the other two 
narratives are not attacking the accord with such hard words, both criticize its provisions to 
keep up French military bases, a French high representative and other political and military 
privileges in Lebanon.      
Hence, as we see, this period of Lebanese history is very prone to inspire different 
approaches of crucial historical issues affecting the country‟s independence, relation to France, 
identity and inter-sectarian struggle. Consequently, the provided narratives are full of 
differences, contradictions, and altering focal points that make free way to dissimilar historical 
perceptions and concepts of the country and its alienated communities.   
 
 
  
  
                                                          
457 Shiʿi 89.  
458 Shiʿi 91.  
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III.3.5 Achieving independence (1939-1943)  
Lebanon‟s formal independence from France came over a period of time and through a series of 
cumbersome events. From the Allied proclamation of June 1941, the arrest and release of the 
government in November 1943, and the protracted diplomacy that rid the country of French 
forces in 1946, the Lebanese demonstrated surprising talents in pressing their case before the 
world. They demonstrated both a degree of tenacity and an ability to finesse their way through 
one of the most difficult periods of international politics as well as the inferno of World War II 
that affected the country directly not just through the turbulence of France‟s metropolitan 
politics, but also through the raging of direct military operations. This period also witnessed a 
before and later inexperienced cooperation between the leading elite of the country‟s at the 
time two major sects, the Maronites and the Sunnis, and made the birth of a second 
fundamental document, the National Pact, possible. Finally, Lebanon‟s independence could 
only be reached with British assistance and with the opposition of the French, regardless of the 
actual régime (Vichy or Free French) in France. Yet achieving independence – through strikes 
and protests, inter-communal solidarity, and the Christian opposition of the French – is an ideal 
framework for forging a myth of the country‟s genesis. As later event proofed, it was easier to 
oppose the French than to establish Lebanon. Thus, with British assistance, the Lebanese had 
removed the French, inherited the façade of a democratic republic with elected parliament, and 
averted the faith to be integrated into metropolitan France like, for instance, Algeria.  
  
NB: As it will be clear from the tables of contest, all three narratives put considerable emphasis 
on the display of this period. In comparison with the rest of the contents, the World War II and 
its direct impacts on Lebanon as well as the country‟s struggle for independence is the best-
covered era in the textbooks, both in terms of proportional quantity and detailed display of 
events. Moreover, the three narratives provide extensive information not just on political and 
military events but also on the country‟s socio-economical state and (d)evolution during the 
war years. Surprisingly, these accounts are roughly corresponding with each other, 
consequently, they does not require a detailed and in-depth analysis. Instead, this final part 
concentrates on some crucial details having an inevitable role on the perception of the 
complete historic period in particular and in that of Lebanon in general, viz., the last years of 
the French rule, the country‟s independence, and the National Pact. Hence, this section, after 
giving a general outline of the period as usual, will only examine these factors in order to 
provide a more general overview and to avoid a rather unnecessary study of detailed events.  
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III.3.5.1 Formal aspects 
 
Christian Textbook 
VII. Lubnān fī „l-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya,  
Lebanon in the Second World War 
1) al-awḍāʿ fī Lubnān qabla suqūṭ Faransā, Circumstances in Lebanon before France‟s fall   
2) Lubnān fī ʿahd ḥukūmat Vichy, Lebanon in the Vichy-era  
 
VIII. Al-ḥulafāʾ fī Lubnān w-Sūriyā (tammūz 1941),  
The Allies in Lebanon and Syria (July 1941) 
1) ẓurūf w-asbāb iḥtilāl al-ḥulafāʾ Lubnān w-Sūriyā ʿām 1941, Circumstances and reasons for Lebanon‟s and 
Syria‟s Allied occupation in 1941l   
2) Sayr al-ḥarb: maḥāwir al-hujūm, The course of the war: the pivot of attacks  
3) Mawqif al-lubnānīyīn wa dawr raʾīs Naqqāš, The position of the Lebanese and the role of President Naqqāš 
(Naccache) 
4) Nihāyat al-ḥarb w-ittifāqīyat ʿAkkā, The end of the War and the Acre Agreement  
5) Mawqif kull min al-inklīz w-al-faransīyīn al-aḥrār baʿd ittifāqīyat ʿAkkā, British and Free French positions 
after the Acre Agreement  
6) Al-waḍʿ al-iqtiṣādī baʿd ad-dūḵūl al-ḥulafāʾ Lubnān ṣayf 1941, Economic situation after the Allied invasion 
of Lebanon in the summer of 1941. 
 
IX. Al-istiqlāl al-lubnānī (1941-1943),  
The Lebanese independence (1941-1943) 
1) Catroux yaʿlun istiqlāl Lubnān fī 26 tišrīn aṯ-ṯānī 1941, Catroux proclaims Lebanon‟s independence on 26 
September, 1941   
2) Mawqif al-lubnānīyīn w-al-muṭālaba bi-ʿawda al-ḥayāt ad-dustūrīya, The position of the Lebanese and the 
claim for the return of the constitutional life.   
3) ʿAwdat al-ḥayāt ad-dustūrīya w-intiḵābāt an-niyābīya w-ar-riʾāsīya, The return of the constitutional life 
and the parliamentary and presidential elections. 
4) Al-mīṯāq al-waṭanī w-siyāsat al-ḥukūma al-istiqlālīya, The National Pact and the policy of the 
Independence Government  
5) Taʿdīl ad-dustūr fī 8 tišrīn aṯ-ṯānī 1943 w-mawqif al-faransīyīn, Amendment of the constitution on 8 
September, 1943, and the position of the French 
6) Raddat faʿl al-lubnānīyīn aš-šaʿbīya w-ar-rasmīya w-mawāqif ad-duwal, The popular and official reaction 
of the Lebanese and the states‟ positions.  
7) Ḥall al-azma w-ʿawdat al-muʿtaqalīn, The solution of the crisis and the return of the detainees.  
 
X. Istilām al-maṣāliḥ w-taḥqīq al-jilāʾ al-ʿaskarī,  
The takeover of the administration and achieving the withdrawal of military forces  
1) Qaḍīyat al-maṣāliḥ, The case of the administration   
2) Al-faransīyūn yuḥāwilūn al-ḥuṣūl ʿalā markaz mumtāz, The French try the obtainment of privileged 
postions 
3) ʿLubnān yatasallam al-jayš, Lebanon gets the army. 
4) Al-jilāʾ al-ʿaskarī ʿan Lubnān, The military withdrawal from Lebanon.   
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Sunni Textbook 
VII. Lubnān fī „l-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya,  
Lebanon in the Second World War 
1) al-waḍʿ as-siyāsī fī Lubnān ʿand bidāyat al-ḥarb alʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya (min aylūl 1939 ḥattā ḥazīrān 
1940), Political situation in Lebanon at the beginning of the World War II (September 1939-June 1940)   
2) al-waḍʿ al-iqtiṣādī fī maṭlaʿ al-ḥarb, The economic situation at the outbreak of the War.  
3) waḍʿ Lubnān as-siyāsī baʿd suqūṭ Faransā bi-yad al-almān (fī ʿahd ḥukūmat Vichy min ḥazīrān 1940 ilā 
ḥazīrān 1941), Lebanon‟s political situation after France‟s fall in the hands of the Germans (in the era of the 
Vichy-government from June 1940 until June 1941) 
4)   al-waḍʿ al-iqtiṣādī fī Lubnān fī ʿahd al-Fīšīyīn, The economic situation in Lebanon in the era of the 
Vichyists 
 
 VIII. Duḵūl al-ḥulafāʾ ilā Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya   
 Allied invasion of Lebanon during the World War II 
1) Fī 8 ḥazīrān 1941 wajjah al-ḥulafāʾ (al-inklīz w-al-faransīyūn al-aḥrār) ḥamla ʿaskarīya li-„l-iḥtilāl 
Lubnān w-Sūriyā, On July 8, 1941 the Allied (the English and the Free French) head a military operation to 
occupy Lebanon and Syria 
2)   Sayr al-ḥarb, The course of the war 
3) Mawqif al-lubnānīyīn min al-maʿārik, The share of the Lebanese from the battles 
4) Nihāyat al-ḥarb w-ittifāqīyat ʿAkkā, The end of the war and the Acre Agreement 
5) aṣ-ṣirāʿ bayn al-faransīyīn w-al-inklīz, The conflict between the French and the English 
 
IX. Duḵūl al-ḥulafāʾ ilā Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya    
 Allied invasion of Lebanon during the World War II  
1) Awḍāʿ fī Lubnān as-siyāsīya fī ẓill al-ḥulafāʾ min ṣayf 1941 ḥattā ḵarīf 1943, Political circumstances in 
Lebanon in the shadow of the Allies from the summer of 1941 until the autumn of 1943 
2) Intiqāl sulṭat al-intidāb fī Lubnān ilā „l-faransīyīn al-aḥrār, The transfer of the mandate power in Lebanon 
to the Free French 
3) Istiqlāl Catroux fī 26 tišrīn aṯ.ṯānī 1941, Cartoux‟s independence on 26 October 1941 
4) Makāsib Lubnān min istiqlāl Catroux, Lebanon‟s profits from Cartoux‟s independence 
5) Al-azma bayn Naqqāš wa Catroux w ʿawdat al-ḥayāt ad-dustūrīya, The crisis between Naqqāš and 
Catroux and the return of the constitutional life 
 
X. Taḥqīq al-istiqlāl   
 The fulfilment of the independence  
1) Taʾlīf ḥukūmat al-istiqlāl, The composition of the independence-government  
2) Taṭbīq as-siyāsa al-istiqlālīya, The implementation of the independence-policy 
3) Raddat al-faʿl al-faransīya, The French reaction 
4) Raddat al-faʿl al-lubnānīya ʿalā taṣarraf al-faransīyīn, The Lebanese reaction to the behaviour of the French 
 
XI. Maʿrakat al-jilāʾ al-iqtiṣādī w-al-ʿaskarī    
 The battle for economic and military withdrawal  
1) Al-jilāʾ ʿan al-maṣāliḥ al-iqtiṣādīya, The evacuation of economic interests 
2) Tasallam al-jayš al-lubnānī, The set up of the Lebanese Army 
3) Taḥqīq al-jilāʾ al-ʿaskarī, The fulfllment of the military withdrawal 
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Shiʿi Textbook 
   
XI. Lubnān w-„l-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya,  
Lebanon and the Second World War 
1) Masīrat al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya aṯ-ṯāniya, The course of the World War II 
2) Lubnān fī iṭār ḥukūmat Vichy, Lebanon in the cadre of the Vichy government 
3) An-nufūḏ al-almānī fī „š-šarq, German influence in the East 
4) Al-ḥulafāʾ fi Sūrīya wa Lubnān, The Allied in Syria and Lebanon 
5) Marāḥil al-istiqlāl, The stages of independence  
   
XII. Maʿrakat istiqlāl Lubnān    
 The battle Lebanon’s independence  
1) Ḥukūmat al-istiqlāl al-awwal, The first government of independence  
2) Al-azma maʿ al-intidāb, The crisis with the independence 
3) Taʿdīl ad-dustūr, The amendment of the constitution  
4) Al-mawqif al-faransī, The French position  
5) al-mawāqif aš-šaʿbīya w-ar-rasmīya, The popular and the official positions 
6) At-tarājuʿ al-faransī w-al-istiqlāl, The French withdrawal and the independence 
 
XIII. Lubnān wa maʿrakat al-jilāʾ    
 Lebanon and the battle for withdrawal  
1) Al-muṭālaba yatasallam al-maṣāliḥ al-ḥaywīya, The claim recognises the vital interests 
2) Al-muṭālaba bi-„l-jilāʾ al-ajnabī ʿan Lubnān, The claim for foreign withdrawal from Lebanon 
3) Taškīl nawāt al-jayš al-lubnānī, The formation of the core of the Lebanese army 
4) Šakwā Lubnān ilā hayʾa al-umam, Lebanon‟s protest at the League of Nations 
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III.3.5.2 World War II and its impacts on Lebanon 
During the last few years of renewed constitutional life, protest died down as war loomed 
again in Europe. The eruption of World War II created and matured the conditions for Lebanon 
to obtain its full independence from France. In 1940, France collapsed under German 
occupation leaving the pro-Nazi Vichy-regime in charge in what was left of France and her 
oversee territories, thus also in Lebanon. In 1939, High Commissioner Gabriel Puaux declared 
the state of emergency and suspended the Lebanese Constitution. However, he was soon forced 
to leave for France, and eventually the office was placed in the hands of General Henri 
Dentz459. In 1941 Free French and British troops attacked from three directions and overthrew 
the pro-Vichy mandatory administration in Syria and Lebanon.460 General de Gaulle was 
increasingly apprehensive that Britain‟s intentions were motivated by the “preconceived idea of 
evicting” 461 France from the entire region. He nominated Georges Catroux462 as delegate of Free 
France in Syria and Lebanon, who declared the independence of these countries and invited 
their respective governments to sign a new treaty with France to terminate the mandate. This 
initiative found, however, little sympathy within Lebanon: Constitutionalists, independentists, 
and even the Maronite Church stood up against “that illusory and incomplete independence”463, 
calling for new elections and the complete transfer of power to the Lebanese, including the 
election of a new president. Thus, the French authorities‟ refusal was little surprising, and 
although Catroux confirmed Alfred Naqqāš (Alfred Naccache) as new president, he continued to 
rule the country as an “all-powerful high commissioner”464 declaring that war conditions made 
impossible to exercise full independence.  
III.3.5.3 The way to independence 
Gradually, the Middle East became more and more involved in military operations making 
its countries directly affected by the World War and its consequences. To begin with, Lebanon‟s 
financial elite accumulated huge profits through these war conditions establishing strong links 
with Anglo-Saxon and Arab Gulf-state markets. As a result, the desire grew to seize control 
over the French Intérêts communs and to liberate the country from the constraints and 
restrictions of the weak and closed French monetary zone, which Lebanon had been tied to 
                                                          
459 Previously an intelligence officer under General Serail, Henri Dentz was described as an “uninspired but respected 
Alsatian, a loyal Vichy follower and conscientious defeatist. His tenure of office was destined to be uniformly 
unfortunate.” After the fall of the Vichy-regime he had been imprisoned in France where he died in 1945. Cf. Browne, 
Walter L., Lebanon's Struggle, part II, “Dispatch by Clayton Lane, December 17, 1955”, pp. 38-46., cited in Winslow 
(1996) 78. 
460 The success of the joint British-Free French campaign forced General Dentz to ask fo terms resulting in an Armistice 
Convention initialed in the Palestinian city of Acre (ʿAkkā, Saint Jean d‟Acre). According to the contract that had been 
signed on 14 July 1941, the Allied forces were to occupy Syria and Lebanon, the French forces were accorded the full 
honours of war, while prisoners of war were to be released, allowing free choice between rallying to the Allied cause or 
being repatriated to France. Cf. Hourani (1954) 240.  
461 Traboulsi (2007) 104. 
462 formerly a governor in Indochina and a more senior officer, had left Pétain and gone over to de Gaulle. Winslow 
(1996) 79. 
463 Traboulsi (2007) 105. 
464 Traboulsi (2007) 104. 
151 
 
since the beginning of the mandate465. On the other hand, with a regional military HQ in Cairo 
controlling the regions transport, economy, agriculture, and finally, politics, Great Britain 
became indisputably the Middle East‟s first and almost sole power. Thus, in the meanwhile it 
was Cairo where, and the British by whom Lebanon‟s independence was negotiated. In June 
1942, General Edward Spears, commander of the British army in the Orient, organised a 
meeting between Bišāra al-Ḵūrī and the Syrian nationalist leader Jamīl Mardam who agreed on 
the return to constitutional life and integral independence of their countries, and refused to 
grant any privileges for France after independence. As Traboulsi remarks, “Ḵūrī was thereby 
recognised by the Syrian nationalists as the representative of the majority of the Lebanese Christians 
and Muslims”.466 Obviously, this British-brokered deal found little sympathy among the French, 
who had no other choice then to give their grudging agreement to this policy. However, 
Lebanon‟s return to constitutional life was not implemented until late 1942. Instead, after the 
resignation of President Naqqāš, the French appointed Ayyub Ṯābit, a Protestant politician 
from Eddé‟s National Bloc, to form an interim government strictly supervised by French 
‟advisors‟. In order to reform the electoral law, Ṯābit decreed a ratio of 32 Christian to 22 
Muslim seats in the parliament and granted emigrants still holding Lebanese nationality 
(mostly Christians) the right to vote. The provisions were – to little surprise – rejected by 
Muslim politicians forcing Ṯābit to abdicate and to be replaced by the prominent Greek 
Orthodox lawyer and former member of the 1925 constitutional drafting committee, Petro Ṭrād 
who declared a more moderate version of the draft bill (modifying the parliamentary quota to 
30/25467, and dropping emigrants‟ voting right). 
Under General Spears‟ pressure, the French allowed elections to be held in 1943, resulting 
in the net victory of Bišāra al-Ḵūrī‟s Constitutional Bloc. On 21 September, al-Ḵūrī was elected 
president of the republic by the Assembly and immediately offered aṣ-Ṣulḥ to the new cabinet. 
This government presented notes to the Free French Delegate General Jean Helleu468, 
requesting changes in the constitutional amendments that would, in a word, award 
independence to the country and transform the French presence into “what would be appropriate 
for an embassy”469. The Maronite President and the Sunni Prime Minister declared themselves to 
be elected to lead an independent government and a sovereign state. Lebanon‟s and the new 
government‟s sovereignty was right away recognised by Syrian PM Jamīl Mardan. In return 
“Lebanon made the commitment that its territory would not be used as a base or passageway for any 
foreign force that endangers Syria‟s independence or security”470 and promised close economic and 
social collaboration between two the countries. Subsequently, the new government demanded 
                                                          
465 Gates, Carolyn: The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy. Oxford, New York: Centre for Lebanese 
Studies and I.B. Tauris, 1989. Cited in Traboulsi (2007) 105.  
466 Winslow (1996) 80.  
467 According to Traboulsi, this quota of 6/5 remained the ratio for Christian-Muslim power-sharing until 1990, when it 
was replaced by parity according to the Ṭāʾif Agreement. Traboulsi (2007) 106.  
468 Described as a weak career diplomat by his contemporaries, Helleu had been serving the High Commissariat under 
Poncot. Appointed to be Catroux‟s successor as the plenipotentiary of the Free France in the Levant, later he had been 
removed from this position on the request of the British War cabinet. Hourani (1954) 287-288. 
469 Winslow (1996) 83. 
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the full transfer of powers to the Lebanese authorities from the Free French. But as France 
wanted a new treaty to guarantee her privileged economical, military, and cultural position, 
Helleu refused the Lebanese demand by declaring that the mandate is only to be terminated by 
a new treaty, regardless of previous documents promising independence.  
III.3.5.4 Independence  
As a reaction, the Lebanese Assembly passed a series of constitutional amendments in 
November 1943 in order to obliterate the French mandatory as the only source of political 
power and jurisdiction, reinstate Arabic as the country‟s sole official language, and adopt a new 
design of the national flag. Subsequently, the French Delegate-General Helleu declared the 
amendments null and void, declaring them unilateral and as such illegal. On 11 November, PM 
al-Ḵūrī and some members of his cabinet had been arrested and incarcerated in the ar-Rāšayā 
fort in the Southern Biqāʿ. Émile Eddé was appointed his successor but had been boycotted by 
the entire Lebanese political class. A general strike paralyzed the country, and the organized 
resistance was nearly unanimous. The Christian Katā‛ib and the Muslim Najjāda cooperated in 
leading the opposition to the French action. Pressed by the British, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the 
event completely isolated France. After Winston Churchill‟s personal intervention at de Gaulle 
and Spears‟s ultimatum to the Free French, General Catroux was sent back to Beirut to replace 
Helleu. Once there, he immediately released President al-Khūri and his colleagues and 
proclaimed the end of the French mandate over the country on 22 November 1943. All in all, 
Lebanon‟s independence is largely the product of British intervention and opposition of 
France‟s policies seeking to preserve its unlimited power in the region that she had been 
regarding as a natural French sphere of influence.471  
 
If there is one point in Lebanese history that is more or less agreed upon, then it is the 
celebration of the country‟s independence. Even though this „joy‟ is not always shared for the 
same reason by every sect, Lebanese independence is displayed to be a common achievement of 
the Lebanese, a national success that opened the way for a sovereign republic, membership in 
international organisations such as the UN and the Arab League and without foreign tutelage or 
military occupation. More surprisingly, the stages how this success had been realised are also 
not entirely different. Needless to say  the usual rhetoric typical for each narrative is still 
prevailing, it is solely the result and its evaluation that shows an unusual harmony.  
As for the Sunni and Christian narratives, they  
III.3.5.5 Constitutional amendments  
In order to fit the needs of an independent republic, the country‟s 1926 Constitution 
experienced major amendments following the proclamation of Lebanese independence in 1943. 
These modifications, however, did little more than scratching the surface of the already 
existing system. By leaving the articles 9472, 10 and 95 – the pillars of the country‟s political 
sectarianism – virtually untouched they could only barely conceal the Maronites‟ political 
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primacy. “While it establishes the judicial, civic and political equality of all Lebanese as citizens, it 
institutionalises their judicial and political inequality as subjects belonging to hierarchised religious 
communities with unequal access to political power and public office.”473 Moreover, the French-style 
presidency – reserved as a Maronite domain – remained literally unaccountable making its 
bearer to an uncontested head of the executive. Hence, major modifications only affected 
articles concerning the former mandatory and its privileges; these had been, similarly to the 
constitutions of other former mandated countries, most notably that of Syria, abolishing every 
reference to it. “Essentially all that was done, as Winslow argues, was to remove the governmental 
mechanism France had created from French hands and place it in the hands of the Lebanese. The 
colonial apparatus was in native hands, but it was still a colonial apparatus.”474  
III.3.5.6 The National Pact 
Besides the formal written Constitution, it is an unwritten verbal agreement, the National 
Pact, which serves as Lebanon‟s other founding text. As it has been already mentioned in this 
paper, the National Pact is of pivotal importance for Lebanon‟s stately structure, sectarian 
power-sharing system, and identity. Alone its authors are symbolic figures embodying the two 
main forces of the nascent republic: Riyāḍ aṣ-Ṣulḥ, independent Lebanon‟s first Prime Minister 
representing the class of traditional Sunni notables from the coast‟s urban centres, and Bišāra 
al-Ḵūrī, the country‟s first post-independence President First, personifying a new, less 
Francophil Maronite bourgeoisie.475  
By confirming the 6/5 power-sharing formula of the Constitution‟s amended Article 95, the 
National Pact provisioned not just the distribution of administrative and political, but also 
Grade One posts according this ratio. In case of the latter, it reserves the presidency for the 
Maronites, the post of the Prime Minister to the Sunni and the post of the Speaker of the 
parliament to a Shiʿi. Second, the pact contains clear provisions of the country‟s long disputed 
identity, defined Lebanon as “country with and Arab face”, and delineated the its relations and 
obligations vis-à-vis the outside world. As for Lebanon‟s “Arab face”, this unique formulation 
was the result of a Christian-Muslim compromise replacing Muslims demands for unification 
with Syria feared by Christians on the one hand, and the country‟s Christian imposed Western 
protection and orientation criticised by Muslims on the other hand. And lastly, the agreement‟s 
power-sharing principle implied virtual partnership between the Muslim and Christian political 
elite and secured better Muslim participation in state functions and decision-making in general. 
Through the 6/5 formula, Muslims were, at least theoretically, awarded equal access of the 
state‟s apparatus, especially in regard to traditional and historically accumulated privileges. 
However, these conciliatory provisions that aimed to create a viable system without 
reconstructing the state‟s existing fundaments were not incorporated into the amended 
constitution of 1943.476  
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III.3.5.7 Aftermath 
Although formally independent, Lebanon‟s problems with France continued. After the 
country had been liberated American and British forces, France insisted to regulate her 
relations with the former mandates through new bilateral treaties and to regain some of her 
lost privileges. The Lebanese, unwilling to do so, received unexpected support from the side of 
the USA that recognised the country‟s full independence on 19 September 1945. Subsequently, 
Britain expressed its backing for the Syrian proposal to evacuate Allied troops from Syria and 
Lebanon. As an answer, France bombarded parts of Damascus in May 1945 and sent 
supplementary forces into the region. The British protested heavily and immediately ordered 
the French to evacuate their bases. On 13 December 1945, an US-brokered compromise 
declared the withdrawal of French and British troops from the two Levantine countries. On 31 
December 1946, the last foreign soldier departed from Lebanon.477  
In line with the country‟s commitment to its Arab identity proclaimed in the National Pact, 
Lebanon needed reorientation in a post-colonial and post-war era. In order to avoid submersion 
in one of the proposed Arab unity plans, Lebanon enthusiastically became one of the founding 
member of the Arab League, taking part in the drafting of the league‟s charter known as the 
Alexandria Protocol.478     
 
III.3.5.8 In the textbooks 
 
The French 
As we saw in the introductory section, the French played a very ambivalent role in this 
period of Lebanese history. Consequently, the textbooks reflect this role in different ways. As it 
has been the case so far, the Christian narrative offers the most nuanced picture of the French. 
To begin with, it provides a deep insight into historical circumstances including detailed 
information on France‟s military defeat from Nazi Germany, the occupation, the Vichy-
government, the résistance, de Gaulle‟s Free French as well the military events in the Middle 
East, the Anglo-French power-struggle, and French military and economic interests to keep her 
influence vivid in the region. However, despite the detailed display of the French policy‟s 
background that allows the expression of pro-French (but certainly not anti-French) attitude at 
a certain degree, the period‟s further, Lebanon-specific events leave no doubt about the 
narrative‟s real allegiance. In these cases, the French policy is no longer enjoying any 
privileged attention or attitude, but is severely criticised for hindering Lebanese independence 
and exploiting its mandatory power. For instance, even though Catroux‟s declaration of 
independence is neither condemned nor commented enthusiastically, it is described as the “first 
step towards real independence”, in contrary to its Shiʿite description as “political lie to maintain 
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their [the French policymakers‟] imperialist rule”. Overall, the Christian narrative seems to offer a 
balanced view of the French and their wartime policy by avoiding black-and-white comments 
and pointing out the little positive that can be attributed to it. On the other hand, the narrative 
is definitely allowing opposing comments and partially severe critique. 
As for the Sunni textbook, it shows much similarity with the Christian narrative and seeks to 
offer the same balanced view of events. However, there is a remarkable difference in the 
perception of the French: their image here is more black-and-white, the amount and dept of 
background information concerning French metropolitan politics and wartime events are 
significantly smaller, and unveiled pro-Lebanese tone makes balancing less successful than it is 
in the case of the Christian narrative. Consequently, the general French image is noticeably 
more negative and more biased. 
As expected, the Shiʿite narrative has a considerably different approach. Representing an 
opponent attitude to the French mandate, the textbook‟s relevant chapters directly speak of 
“unveiled French military occupation”, “economic exploitation”, and “illegal tyranny”. 
Consequently, a balanced French image is completely absent, just like background information 
on French military and political circumstances. French are only referred to in negative terms, 
as tyrants, occupiers, colonialists, and more or less all of their contribution to this period of 
Lebanese history are sharply condemned and severely criticised. Besides especially harsh 
attacks against French policies regarding Lebanon, the Shiʿite narrative has literally no 
additional or positive remarks on the French. 
All in all, the French do not have positive image in any of the textbooks. This rather 
negative image, however, has different forms and degrees of negativity depending on the basic 
sectarian allegiance of the narrative. Given the fact that the French, French presence and 
influence are inevitable components in the formation of historical perceptions, their image is 
also an exceptionally important one.  
 
    
The National Pact 
 Even though not being a written document, the National Pact is still of fundamental 
importance for the power structure of the Lebanese State both in historical and in 
contemporaneous terms. However, despite of this significance, it is differently reflected in the 
three narratives. To begin with, the Sunni narrative describes the National Pact as compromise 
for Christian Muslim coexistence and lists its most important provisions concerning Lebanon‟s 
identity as „part of the Arab World‟ and a country with „Arab face‟. However, it criticises the 
maintenance and corroboration of political sectarianism describing it as an obstacle for the 
country‟s political development and security479 (however, without mentioning the later Civil 
War).  
 Similarly to the Sunni narrative, the Christian version also describes the pact as a 
compromise between Christians “demanding European guaranty” and Muslims seeking the 
“attachment to the Arab World”, adding that this pact was necessary to maintain the peace and 
prosperity of the country. It also states that Lebanon is “part of the Arab World” but at the same 
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time “has strong ties to the Western culture and civilisation”, and addition not emphasised in the 
Sunni narrative.    
As for the Shiʿite textbook, surprisingly, while it mentions some elements from the Pact 
including the country‟s Arab identity, it refers to the agreement as “some of the principles of the 
ministerial statement” and omits the term National Pact. Moreover, it attributes provision to this 
„ministerial statement‟ that were never included in the original agreement, namely that “the 
government of independence agreed that the country is not willing to be a colony anymore, but a free 
and independent state”480. Hence, this narrative makes no mention on other provisions such as 
the Christian-Muslim power sharing and compromise.  
 
Independence  
Unlike in the case of the National Pact, Lebanon‟s way to independence has a surprisingly 
similar coverage in the three textbooks. As it is to be expected, the hitherto used rhetoric is still 
prevailing, for instance, the Shiʿi narrative still labels many French political and military move 
as „colonial‟ or „imperialist‟, while its Christian counterpart still seems to avoid too harsh 
comments on the mandatory power‟s policy, although it condemns it often. As for the 
„protagonists‟ of the independence movement, Riyāḍ aṣ-Ṣulḥ (Sunni Muslim) and Bišāra al-Ḵūrī 
(Maronite Christian), it is interesting to mention that while the Sunni narrative celebrates the 
former as “the father of Lebanese independence”481, the Maronite version argues that it was the 
latter one having the most crucial role in its achievement. It is also worth mentioning that with 
the exception of the Shiʿite textbook, the narratives are putting much attention not solely on 
the country‟s political, but also on its economic and military independence from France, 
emphasising, e.g. the vital role the Intérêts communs were playing Lebanon‟s de facto autonomy 
on every level. Hence, it is maybe appropriate to remark that these two textbooks. 
   All things considered, the notions of Lebanese independence in the three narratives have 
very similar narrative operatives in terms of content and coverage: at the first sight, these 
features would suggest the existence of a more or less unitary concept about this crucial event 
that is not affected by sectarian biasing. However, there are a number of factors that still 
prevent the emergence of a notion free of sectarian perceptions. For instance, the 
aforementioned prevalence of specific rhetoric allows certain events to be viewed from the 
relevant narrative‟s sectarian perspective. Moreover, linguistic tools emphasising the sectarian 
divide (e.g. Christian textbook‟s baladnā, or „our country‟ vs. Shiʿite al-balad, or „the country‟ 
for referring to Lebanon), as well as major differences between the emphasis on certain topics 
or events are all hindering the possibility of a similar or harmonious perception of the period 
and the country as a whole.      
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IV. Conclusion 
 
In April 2010, Al Jazeera‟s Documentary Channel was the first Arab-language television 
channel to air Lebanese filmmaker Hady Zaccak‟s (Hādī Zakkāk) award-winning documentary 
“Darsun fī „t-tārīkh” (A History Lesson), examining the consequences of differing historical 
perceptions, national/sectarian identities, allegiances and the way these are shaped through the 
complexity of contemporary Lebanese history education. As he revealed, deep sectarian 
divisions and continual disagreements between political factions over the tumultuous series of 
events that have characterised Lebanon‟s more recent history, are still resulting in alternating 
concepts of the country and its different sects. As the director remarks at the end: “They all [the 
interviewed students] believe in Lebanon, but the concept of Lebanon differs. It becomes more, for 
example, a Muslim or a Christian Lebanon first, and then „the Lebanon.”482  
In line with Zaccak‟s documentary, this he analysis aimed to reveal that even a crucial 
historical period that is not only the last one to be covered by the majority of currently 
available history textbooks, but also the last that is more or less agreed upon by the major 
sects, conceals various forms of obvious and hidden alienations that still make a large 
contribution to the maintenance of sectarian differentiation: 
 
Geographical alienation  
As it has been mentioned before, a country‟s territorial evolution poses a number of dilemmas 
for historical narratives. These dilemmas include the representation of annexed territories vs. 
the motherland, that of the peripheral regions vs. the country‟s core regions10, as well as 
centralised vs. decentralised narratives. In the case of the Christian and Sunni textbooks, the 
country‟s modern history is overwhelmingly coined by the Maronite community with its core 
region in the northern part of the Mount Lebanon range. These factors result in the 
overrepresentation of the coastal cities, par excellence Beirut, and the Lebanese Mount in 
general. To counter this historical focus, the „peripheral‟ Shiʿite community has produced their 
own regional narrative propagating a Shiʿite version of Lebanese history with a reduced 
reference to Mount Lebanon, but with much attention to the Shiʿite-dominated southern Jabal 
ʿĀmil region. This form of alimentation is an effective tool to undermine a unitary concept of 
the country as a whole and to strengthen regional (and thus sectarian) allegiances.  
  
Communitarian alienation  
In line with its geographical counterpart, communitarian alienation is also a major tool of 
identity making, as besides geography, religious and ethnic communities are the environments 
or backgrounds an individual the most likely to be attached to. Throughout history, religion, 
culture, and language were the most successful motors of social segregation, often resulting in 
various forms of conflicts. Consequently, communitarian alienation is often inevitably linked 
with geographical alienation. In the case of Lebanon, sectarianism – a form of 
communitarianism based on religious segregation – is not just a social dividing principle, but 
through consequent constitutional legalisation in the past, it is also a basic pillar of the current 
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political system. Accordingly, textbooks are also seldom free from communitarian 
distinguishing including the sectarian labelling of historic figures, narrative on sectarian 
history. Consequently, this form of alienation contributes to the maintenance of existing 
sectarian dividing lines and prevents the forging of a Lebanese identity loyal to the country and 
not only to a single community.  
 
National alienation 
Parallel to communitarian alienations, the narratives also tend to put a large emphasis on 
the distinction of Lebanon from its Arab environment. Historically, Lebanon‟s raison d‟être was 
its (Christian emphasised and sectarian motivated) particularity from its Muslim-majority 
environment and opposition to be the part of it. The most prominent example to illustrate such 
divergences is the term waṭan. While in traditional context (and thus used in the Muslim-
affiliated textbooks), the term refers to the Arab nation as a whole „from the Atlantic to the 
Indian Ocean‟, while (the generally Christian-preferred) waṭan can also designate a particular 
nation, in this case, the „Lebanese nation‟, particular due to its exposure to Western influences 
and role as carrefour of civilisations. Consequently, Lebanon‟s Arab identity remains a 
prominent and highly controversial issue and as such, gives much space to both „self-alienation‟ 
(„Lebanese as a distinct nationality‟483) and segregative forms („Lebanese vs. Arabs‟). The latter 
form is especially true for the narratives‟ relation with Syria, as it is constantly referred to as a 
different country with different people and different history.   
 
 
As these forms of alienation show, Lebanon‟s communities still see the country‟s history 
through different glasses. The image what they get is considered to be true, and truth is 
considered to be indisputable in a country that witnessed so much inter-sectarian tensions and 
clashes. Moreover, the emerging image is seemingly not free from intentional 
absentmindedness and marginalisation of certain crucial events. Consequently, national 
identity in Lebanon remains a litigious issue across many spheres of society with in the most 
cases still sectarian motivated competing memories of “what we were.” In such a context, 
history textbooks work to forge memories of events and perceptions of the while at the same 
time they create a new consciousness to serve as a major pillar of identity. Accordingly, 
textbooks are rather tools of identity making than sources of historical knowledge. Hence, 
narratives are not simply mirrors that reflect how a society (let it be a sectarian or a nation-
wide) keeps up the memory of a supposed collective past, they also reproduce social relations, 
which are inevitably empowered by politics, ideologies, and sectarian perceptions. Ipso facto 
the current educational system is unable to serve as the motor of the much needed 
“desectarianisation” of the country, as the prevailing narratives are doing nothing more than 
creating altering and competing perceptions of the country‟s past. Ironically, the way a nation 
remembers its historical past is shaping its future. Consequently, a unified national narrative, 
as foreseen by the Ṭāʾif Agreement, would be vital to mitigate Lebanon‟s sectarian tensions, 
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alter conflicting sectarian and national self-perceptions and the perception of the other, and 
create a coherent history for future Lebanese generations.  
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Liban. Abdication de l'émir Ḥaidar. L'émir Molḥam ; sa succession. Partis des Djonblâtyya et des 
Yazbakyya. L'émir Yoûsof. 92-102.  
 
CHAPITRE XV. L'HÉGÉMONIE D'ACRE ET LE LIBAN (1750-1804).  
1. Ḍâhir al-ʿOmar (1750-1775). Vénalité des fonctionnaires. La Porte et les rebelles. Origine de Dâhir; son 
programme ; débuts et portrait. Renaissance d'Acre. Les Russes dans la Méditerranée. Le mamloûk ʿAlî-
bey. Aboû Dhahab en Syrie. Répercussion au Liban. Succès de Ḍâhir. Les Russes bombardent Beyrouth. 
Retour et mort d'Aboû Dhahab. Siège d'Acre ; fin de Ḍâhir. 103-112.  
2. Djazzâr (1775-1804).' Son origine, ses débuts. Second bombardement de Beyrouth. Djazzâr à Saidâ et 
à Acre; Pacha de Damas et arbitre de la Syrie. Révolte militaire; démêlés avec la France. Chute de l'émir 
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Yoûsof ; Jeunesse, débuts de Bachîr II Djazzâr et Bachîr II. Portrait de Bachîr. Décadence de la Syrie. 112-
119.  
3. Bonaparte en Syrie (1799). Les préparatifs de Djazzâr. Mesures contre les chrétiens. Intervention des 
Anglais. Illusions de Bonaparte. Son départ d'Égypte. Dispositions des Syriens. Attitude de l'émir Bachîr. 
Prise des villes palestiniennes. Début du siège d'Acre. Victoire du mont Thabor.  
Levée du siège. Comment Bonaparte explique son échec. Épilogue de la campagne.  
 
CHAPITRE XVI. LA SYRIE ET LE LIBAN AU XIXE SIÈCLE.  
1. Gouvernement de Bachîr II. La vengeance de Djazzâr. Premier exil de Bachîr. Mort de Djazzâr. 
Nouvelle attitude de Bachîr. Solaimân-pacha. Les Wahhâbites ; leurs progrès. Faiblesse de la Porte. 
Yoûsof-pacha, Mesures contre les chrétiens. Les Wahhâbites en Syrie. Bachîr à Damas. Barbar-aghâ. 
Ismaʿîlis et Noṣairis. Bachîr et les Druses d'Alep. Révoltes militaires ; la situation à Damas, à Alep. Bachîr 
et Solaimân-pacha. Mort de ce dernier. ʿAbdallah-pacha d'Acre. Second exil de Bachîr. Sa position entre 
Darwîch et ʿAbdallah ; son nouvel exil. Méhémet-ʿAlî et Bachîr. Intervention de Méhémet-ʿAlî. Retour de 
Bachîr. Bachîr et Djonblâṭ ; Prestige de Bachîr. Méhémet-ʿAlî convoite la Syrie, Gouvernement intérieur de 
Bachîr ; son luxe, ses finances, relations avec Beyrouth. Cupidité, arrogance de ʿAbdallah-pacha.  
2. Les Égyptiens en Syrie (1831-1810). Politique égyptienne. Mahmoûd et Méhémet. Situation troublée 
en Syrie. Ibrahîm-pacha d'Egypte. Siège d'Acre. Occupation de la côte. Victoires de Ḥoms, de Bailân. 
Soumission de la Syrie. Arrangement de Kutahia. Organisation de la Syrie. Les villes libanaises. Tolérance, 
fiscalité. Révoltes : Naplouse, les Noṣairis. Désarmement et conscription. Résistance des Libanais. Guerre 
au Ladjâ. Échec d'Ibrahim. Intervention de Mahmoûd. Bataille de Nizib. Avènement de ʿAbdulmadjîd. La 
diplomatie anglaise. Attitude de Bachîr. La révolte au Liban. Les chefs populaires. Traité de Londres. La 
flotte alliée bombarde  
Beyrouth. Abdication de Bachîr II ; nomination de Bachîr III. Chute d'Acre. Ibrahim évacue la Syrie. 150-
169.  
3. Anarchie au Liban (1840-1860). Beyrouth, centre administratif. Surexcitation des esprits. 
L'impérialisme des Druses. Incapacité de Bachîr III. L'Angleterre, la Porte et les Druses. Guerre civile. 
Abdication de Bachîr III. Exclusion des Chihâb. ʿOmar-pacha. Double qâimaqâmat. Les événements de 
1845. « Règlement » de Châkîb-effendi. Révolte des paysans. Khourchid-pacha. Isma'îl-bey et les Noṣairis. 
Le Hattihumayoun. 169-180.  
4. L'année 1860. Le Gouvernement autonome du Liban. Préparatifs des Druses. Massacres au Liban, au 
Wâdittaim. À Damas : Aḥmad-pacha et ʿAbdalqâdir. L'intervention française, Fouad-pacha à Damas. Les 
Français au Liban. La Commission européenne. Résultats de l'expédition française. Le « Règlement 
organique ». Amputations territoriales. Réorganisation du Liban; son relèvement. 181-190.  
 
CHAPITRE XVII. LA SYRIE CONTEMPORAINE. ʿABDULʿAZIZ ET 'ABDUL-ḤAMID.  
Réorganisation administrative. Le vilayet de Beyrouth. Marasme de la Syrie. Faillite des réformes. Les 
Druses du Ḥaurân. Midḥat-pacha. Colonisation juive en Palestine et « Sionisme ». La menace du Sionisme. 
La Turquie et les travaux publics. Entreprises françaises. Le réseau ferroviaire syrien. La finance française 
en Syrie. L'instruction publique. La France et les écoles de Syrie. L'émigration.  
      
CHAPITRE XVIII. LA VEILLE DE LA GRANDE GUERRE.  
1. La période jeune-turque. La révolution jeune-turque. Division des Syriens. Le « Comité » jeune-turc. 
Désillusions des chrétiens. Manœuvres des Jeunes-Turcs. Aggravations militaires et fiscales. 205-211.  
2. Le réveil nationaliste. Les nationalistes syriens. Leur programme. Mesures contre les nationalistes. 
Avènement d'Enver. Le Congrès syrien de Paris. Dernières résistances des nationalistes. 211-215,  
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CHAPITRE XIX. LA GUERRE ET LA SYRIE.  
1. La guerre au particularisme syrien. Neutralité hypocrite. Dénonciation des Capitulations. La Turquie 
déclare la guerre. Les Syriens dans l'armée française. Fin de l'autonomie libanaise. Martyrs syriens. La 
famine. Les Syriens hors la loi. 216-221.  
2. Opérations militaires en Syrie. Chemins de fer stratégiques. Les deux attaques contre le Canal de Suez, 
Résistance et insoumission en Syrie. Druses et Noṣairis. Ḥosain et Faiṣal. Révolution et opérations 
militaires en Arabie. Au midi de la Palestine. Prise de Jérusalem. Le contingent français. La Turquie aux 
abois. Liman Von Sanders. Les Chrétiens et Faiṣal; leurs prouesses. A l'Orient du Jourdain et dans la 
Palestine cisjourdaine. La veille de la victoire. Plan des opérations. Faiṣal traite avec les Turcs, 221-237.  
 
CHAPITRE XX. LA DÉLIVRANCE.  
1. En Palestine. La victoire de Sarona, Participation du détachement français. Délivrance de la Palestine. 
La colonne mobile de Transjordanie ; son activité. Prise de Darʿa.  
Inertie des Chérifiens ; inanité de leurs prétentions. 238-244.  
2. En Syrie. La lutte pour Damas. Les fronts de « Tibériade » et de « Rayâq ». L'évacuation de Damas. Les 
Chérifiens à Beyrouth. Dans l'Est de la Syrie. Les Syriens contre les Turcs. Dernières luttes. Bataille d'Alep. 
Les Turcs évacuent la Syrie. La fin d'un mirage. 244-250.  
 
CHAPITRE XXI. LA RÉORGANISATION DE LA SYRIE ET DU LIBAN.  
1. Luttes et tâtonnements. Le ravitaillement; ses complications. Premières stipulations des Alliés relatives 
à la Syrie. Hypothèque chérifienne. Le mandat. La commission américaine. Protestations des Syriens 
contre le sionisme et l'amputation de la Palestine. 251-256.  
2. L’aventure de Faiṣal. La politique, la diplomatie du émir Faisal. Son succès à Damas. Le général 
Gouraud et Faiṣal. Faiṣal, roi de la Syrie ; ses provocations. L‟ultimatum de Gouraud. La victoire de Khân 
Maysaloûn. Chute de Faiṣal ; sa fuite. 256-262 
3. Les États syriens. L‟indépendance de la Syrie. Proclamation du Grand Liban. Les États de la Syrie 
proprement dite. La confédération syrienne et le Grand Liban. Physionomie du Statut syrien: fédéralisme 
et particularisme. 262-268.  
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VI.2 Sample I: Christian textbook  
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VI.3 Sample I: Sunni textbook  
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VI.4 Sample I: Shiʿi textbook  
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Abstract 
Zsolt Sereghy: Sectarian differences in the narrative of Lebanese history textbooks with special regard to the 
naissance and early years of the Lebanese Republic. 
Diploma thesis. Vienna, 2010 (presented at the Institute for Oriental Studies, Vienna University)    
The diploma thesis deals with the prevailing problem of the Lebanese educational system by examining the 
influence of different sectarian-affiliated historical narratives on the development of national or communitarian 
identities. The educational landscape of Lebanon, a country paralysed by inter-communitarian strives since its 
creation in 1920, is characterised by the coexistence of two concurring educational systems: a network of private 
schools of every level owned and maintained by foreign missionaries or one of the numerous local communities 
and the stately owned system of governmental schools, the former one enjoying a prestigious and influential role 
in society. However, this multifarious educational situation enables the creation of distinct interpretations of 
common history, but at the same time it hinders the development of a common national identity and expedites 
social fragmentation. 
In order to demonstrate sectarian differences in the historical narrative, three different school history manuals (a 
‘Christian’, a ‘Shiite’ and a ‘Sunni’ one) ,intended for the last class of secondary school, are analysed in this paper by 
following historical and political aspects. As the frames of this thesis do not allow a complete analysis of a four-year 
curriculum, this paper has its focusing exclusively on the first half of the 20
th
 century (from WW1 to Lebanon’s 1943 
independence). That era, thanks to its different reception by Lebanon’s various communities as well as it is the 
most appropriate period to an analysis in this vein.  
In order to highlight crucial and inevitable background information, the analytical part is preceded by an 
introductory part that provides an overview of the country’s religious and ethnic composition. The second part 
displays both the historical development of the education in Lebanon and its current state, structure and obstacles 
by highlighting the actual debates on the curricular reform as well as the role of foreign language instruction.  
           
Kurzfassung 
Zsolt Sereghy: Konfessionelle Unterschiede in der Narrative libanesischer Geschichtsschulbücher mit 
besonderer Hinsicht auf die Entstehung und frühen Jahre der Libanesischen Republik.  
Diplomarbeit. Wien, 2010 (eingereicht am Institut für Orientalistik der Universität Wien)  
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der fortdauernden Problematik des libanesischen 
Unterrichtswesens und untersucht dabei den Einfluss konfessionsgebundener Geschichtsnarrativen auf die 
Herausbildung nationaler/gemeinschaftsgebundener Identitäten. Die Bildungslandschaft des, seit seiner Gründung 
1920 von interkonfessionellen Spannungen zwischen seiner Christlichen und Muslimischen Gemeinschaften 
geprägten Zedernstaates ist von einer Konkurrenz des, von ausländischen Missionen und heimischen 
Religionsgemeinschaften getragenen privaten und des staatlichen Schulwesen charakterisiert. Diese 
Bildungssituation ermöglicht die parallele Existenz verschiedener Geschichtswahrnehmungen, die damit der 
Entstehung einer gemeinsamen libanesischen Identität hinderlich ist und die Fragmentierung der Gesellschaft 
weiter vorantreibt.  
Für die Darstellung dieser Dichotomien wurden drei Geschichtsschulbücher (ein „christliches“, ein „schiitisches“ 
und ein „sunnitisches“) aus der Sekundarstufe gewählt und aus inhaltlichen und politischen Gesichtspunkten 
analysiert. Mit der Gegenüberstellung der beschriebenen historischen Ereignisse des jeglichen 
Geschichtsschulbuchs die inhaltlich-politische Analyse untersucht die Unterschiedlichkeiten in der 
Schwerpunktsetzung und Geschichtswahrnehmung sowie die diversen Formen konfessionsgebundener 
Geschischtswahrnehmung. Da aber im Rahmen dieser Diplomarbeit eine Analyse des kompletten vierjährigen 
Unterrichtsprogramms nicht möglich ist, fokussiert diese ausschließlich auf die Geschichte des Libanons im ersten 
Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts (von dem ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Unabhängigkeit 1943), die Periode, die dank ihrer 
umstrittenen Bedeutung für die verschiedenen communautés des Landes  am besten für eine Analyse dieser Art 
geeignet ist.  
Der erste Teil der Einleitung bietet einen Überblick auf die religiöse Zusammensetzung des Landes, während der 
dem libanesischen Bildungswesen gewidmetee zweite Teil behandelt dessen historische Entwicklung bis zur 
heutigen Zeit, beschreibt dessen Struktur und wirft ein Streichlicht auf die aktuellen Debatten über das 
Curriculumreform sowie die Stellung und Rolle des Fremdsprachenunterrichts.     
